Economic Security in China by yang, D
	  Economic	  Security	  in	  China	  
 
Dongqing Yang 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
University of York 
Politics, Economics and Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2014 
 
2	  
Abstract	  
 
This research examines the form of economic insecurity generated in China in recent years, 
and how the state’s response to this can be characterised, particularly focusing on how the 
problem is addressed at the local level. 
 
The research begins with a broad discussion explaining the background and reviewing the 
existing literature on economic security in a global context. It then takes a broad look at the 
general economic security context and related literature in China. It found that China is 
shifting away from the old types of economic and social structure, which are merging into a 
new system. However, during the transition period, neoliberalism has influenced the welfare 
system in China, and welfare provision by the state has been dramatically reduced.  
 
This thesis further explores and examines the characteristics of recent social security system 
reforms in China by exploring developments in both the social and economic systems from a 
historical perspective. It argues that social security should not only aim to prevent and 
alleviate poverty, but should also take into account a wider perspective that accepts that all 
citizens, not only those who are impoverished, need a certain degree of security. 
 
A case study was undertaken based on data from interviews and a questionnaire collected in a 
local secondary city in China. The thesis makes an important contribution to the study of 
welfare policy development and implementation in China. It finds that one of the main 
reasons for economic insecurity is China’s welfare development contains a large degree of 
informality. This informality not only generates economic insecurity in the labour market, but 
also in the way government institutions provide services. Local government has failed to take 
enough responsibility for implementing social policies and guaranteeing basic income 
security.  
 
Based on the discussions of welfare state models in Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999) and 
Ringen and Ngok (2013) merged with the characteristics of social development in China, this 
study also proposes a new dimension for the classification of the welfare state in China as a 
decentralised socialist-market liberal-conservative welfare model.  
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Chapter	  1	  -­‐	  Introduction	  	  
1.0 Introduction	  	  	  
This thesis is about economic security in the People’s Republic of China and the role of the 
emergent welfare state in addressing it. China has had to work with the problem of economic 
insecurity and many impoverished people in China now live in a state of economic insecurity. 
This thesis asks how far neoliberalisation has generated economic insecurity in China in 
recent years and assesses the state’s responses with a particular focus on how the problem is 
addressed at the local level. It does not seek to determine what kind of welfare state China is, 
but it does attempt to contribute to the on-going debate around this question by researching 
income, housing and the effect on the labour market at secondary local level in China. 
Through this, it is hoped to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of contemporary 
inequality and especially how it is dynamically shaped through the evolving interaction 
between the development of labour market rule and the practices and institutions of the state.  
 
Economic insecurity is not a phenomenon peculiar to modern capitalism, but in the recent 
phase of neoliberal globalisation, insecurity has become more institutionally endemic within 
different markets ranging from labour to finance. Many people are threatened by economic 
insecurity throughout their lives. People face uncertainties including homelessness, 
unemployment, illness and lack of food, all of which are related to social and economic 
insecurity. However, we are living in a period of transition, in particular, human society has 
dramatically changed since the onset of globalisation. This research examines the problem of 
living and working conditions of insecurity in its analyses of income security and housing 
security. The thesis should be seen in the context of insecurity as a global phenomenon driven 
by the nature of globalisation, examining and analysing economic security in terms of income 
security and housing security in China. For example, if looking at income security support, 
economic and social issues also need to be considered.  
 
The International Labour Organisation ILO (2004) examines basic ideas about economic 
security. This report defines the meaning of ‘Economic Security’ and considers a broad range 
of policies and institutional changes. It is argued that basic economic security is a human right 
(ILO, 2004, pp5,15). Further the report outlines ways that globalization and liberalization are 
linked to more economic instability and insecurity. In addition, through globalization and 
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liberalization, informal economic activities, flexible labour markets and income insecurity, 
the global economy is in danger. This chapter explores the whole structure and explains 
briefly how the research examines economic security in China. The chapter has organised the 
sections as follows: Section 1.1 discusses the impact of globalisation on economic security. 
Section 1.2 discusses the importance of the welfare state to economic security. Sections 1.3 
and 1.4 introduce economic security in China. Section 1.5 presents the research questions 
examined in this thesis. Section 1.6 gives the thesis outline with a brief introduction to each 
chapter. Section 1.7 concludes this chapter. 
1.1	  Impact	  of	  globalisation	  on	  economic	  security	  	  
In the social and economic development of Western countries, the insecurities that people 
suffered in the past are different from today, because of policy changes following 
globalisation in the 1980s. Standing (2010, p.37) argues that we are in the great 
transformation of globalization, “Neo-liberal Globalization – or the ‘second great 
transformation’ – is marked by the end of state welfare capitalism.” According to Standing, 
the welfare state is based on changes in class structures, between the working class and the 
capitalist class (Standing, 2010, p.98). He asserts that more and more workers are becoming 
members of a new precarious class as their work relations became insecure, unstable and 
disappear completely after neo-liberal globalization. He maintains that “the deregulation of 
labour markets is one of the stupidest terms that was come into popularity in 1980s, this 
deregulation is productive efficiency retrogression” (Standing, 2010, p. 10). The discussion of 
the additional changes seen in China as a result of deregulatory changes, are the same as 
Standing’s ideas about the new dangerous class (the precariat) and reregulation in the labour 
market. Standing’s ideas are used in this research to examine changes in the labour market in 
China and the effects on economic security. 
 
Chang (2007, p.26) sees globalisation as having a long history. The early post-World War 2 
(WW2) period is portrayed as a period of incomplete globalization. Chang (2003, p.5) 
highlights that after the 1980s, neo-liberalism generated social and economic failure, 
especially in developing countries. Although there was a high degree of integration after the 
1980s when developing countries joined globalisation, Chang (2007, p.26-31) argues that 
neoliberal globalization has had a poor growth record since the 1980s and has not supplied 
economic growth, equality or stability. In contrast to Standing, Chang (2007, p. 28) contends 
that increased state intervention might be the most suitable path to the successful delivery of 
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social security. Given that the shift in the prevailing economic orthodoxy has had a 
considerable impact on people’s living security, recent approaches to improving social 
welfare systems have stressed the need to consider the roles that both economic and social 
development play in guaranteeing income and housing security. Standing’s analytical method 
considers regulation as important in generating the new insecurity. However, this research, in 
line with Chang, sees new reforms in the development of the welfare state and new forms of 
regulation as important in addressing insecurity. To understand the role of regulation and state 
institutions in relation to the labour market and the provision of welfare it is useful to review 
and draw on the literature on the development of different welfare states. The next section 
looks at the history of welfare states, including decommodification and stratification. 
1.2	  Welfare	  states	  (decommodification	  and	  stratification)	  and	  economic	  security	  	  
Esping-Andersen (1996) states that welfare states in European countries have changed rapidly, 
and the developing countries in places such as Asia and Latin America have also positively 
developed their welfare systems since the WW2. Due to economic development, the problems 
facing welfare states have also changed. Disruptions in the economy and economic structure 
put welfare systems at risk. Esping-Andersen also argues that due to economic changes 
Western countries are now struggling to afford contemporary welfare systems. He found that 
after the War most European countries had a heavy increase in the unskilled rural population. 
Welfare problems at that time were about how to secure the market to keep high wages and 
job growth, and “the chief task of welfare policy was to secure families during the passive 
stages of the male breadwinner’s life cycle, particularly in old age” (Esping-Andersen, 1996, 
p.75). Esping-Andersen asserts that following the appearance of neo-liberalism after the 
1980s, welfare state decay was accompanied by market decay and private coverage in health 
and pensions declined steadily, particularly among young and low-wage workers (Esping-
Andersen, 1996, p.16). The changing structure of the economy has generated new security 
problems today, such as rising unemployment, growing income inequality and increasing 
poverty.  
 
Esping-Andersen discusses social security in relation to two key issues, de-commodification 
and stratification. The first concerns the de-commodification of labour. Labour 
commodification is harmful to workers’ income security because “as commodities, workers 
are replaceable, easily redundant and atomized” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.37). Esping-
Andersen proposes that discussions of de-commodification should focus on eligibility 
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conditions and the coverage rate of unemployment benefits, pensions and other social benefits. 
The second issue is stratification. Esping-Andersen (1990, pp.55-58) argues that the welfare 
state is itself an instrument of social stratification, but the essential problem of income 
distribution is hidden behind the high public support expenditures of the welfare state: 
That the welfare state is an agent of stratification is well recognized, 
but, unfortunately, usually in a narrow and often mis-specified way. It 
is an aspect that has remained severely neglected, both theoretically 
and empirically…income alone provides too narrow a basis for 
portraying the structure of opportunities and inequality.  
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) also argues that the welfare state regime has produced a raft of 
classifications. He divides regimes into three categories, liberal, conservative and social 
democratic, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. However, the Chinese regime and the way 
that social welfare is distributed in China do not fit easily into any of these categories.  
1.3	  Historical	  economic	  security	  in	  China	  	  	  
Welfare state development in Europe and OECD countries has had a different pattern from 
China. The European welfare states developed after the WW2, but the current Chinese welfare 
system only changed after the economic reform in 1978. This change was impacted on by neo-
liberalisation. The previous section looks at Esping-Andersen’s discussion of European 
welfare states developing after the war; however, the Chinese welfare system developed in a 
different way, merging ideas of neo-liberalism with changing socialist forms of welfare.  
 
In order to understand the current reforms, it is necessary to understand the history of China’s 
economic and social development after WW2. China had similar social and economic 
insecurity patterns to Western countries during the period from 1949 to 1978. Chan et al (2008, 
pp.28,29,62) discuss the large amount of unskilled and poor population flow in China after 
WW2, when the state was trying to get people back to work and providing income and 
housing security, just as Europe was doing with their labour population. However, the 
methods used in achieving this were very different.  
 
After the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949, China had a welfare system which 
could be called state socialism (Chan et al, 2008, pp.28; Finer, 2003, pp.28-32). During the 
period from the 1950s to the late 1970s, the state was responsible for the development of the 
economic and social sectors. Both sectors were organised by the government rather than by 
private institutions. Economic activities were promoted entirely by the organized efforts of 
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government institutions. Those activities were directed by state planning, based on the model 
of the Soviet Union (Chan et al, 2008, p.28). The state did not allow a capitalist market system 
to exist in China. All privately owned and most free market activity were eliminated (Riskin et 
al, 2000, p.20). The state played the role of business manager and allocated resources. All 
economic and social activity was under the direct supervision of state and local government. 
The socialist welfare system was also based on the same high degree of government 
intervention. Under the socialist welfare system, people’s income, housing and the labour 
market were highly secured by the state. For example, jobs were guaranteed by state owned 
enterprises. For urban workers (including civil servants), social benefits were at a very high 
level, with guaranteed income, housing, pension and child benefits (Gang et al, 1998, p.31). In 
rural areas during the state socialist period, rural collectives were responsible for social 
welfare provisions for the rural population and provided guaranteed living necessities such as 
food, clothes, medical care and education. Chan et al (2008, p.62) assert that those guarantees 
provided a safety net for poor people.  
 
Before the economic reforms of 1978, China tried to build a more equal society and had a 
full-employment policy in urban areas to protect social security. The state had the main role in 
the social and economic system in China. However, since the economic reform, the state is 
better disposed to the capitalist free market system and the economic and social system has 
changed. This change was heavily influenced by neo-liberalization. This includes the impact 
on the welfare system, as it is closely related to the economic system. State guaranteed 
provisions were gradually replaced by a market-based system, such as workers having to go 
and find jobs instead of having them allocated by the government. Housing provision also 
changed and workers needed to buy houses in the market. Chan et al (2008, p.31) argue that 
after the 1978 economic reform, China like other countries was affected by neo-liberal 
policies. New employment problems emerged as a result of the introduction of the private 
sector and changes to the operation of state-owned enterprises. Midgley and Tang (2010, 
pp.48,49) argue that in the three decades after the economic reform, new social risks have 
been created by the new economic and social structures, such as widening income and 
regional inequalities, rising unemployment and the emergence of urban poverty.   
1.4	  Current	  economic	  security	  in	  China	  	  
Currently, China’s social security provision in terms of income and housing policy is facing 
the challenges of the country’s large population and income gap. According to the 
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International Labour Office (ILO) (2004, p.v) much economic insecurity can be avoided and 
protected against. During the last two decades in China, a series of income and housing 
policies have been announced that are now well established, such as the Minimum Standard 
of Living Scheme (MSLS) and the Low Rent Housing (LRH) payment. However, there are 
still considerable barriers to the successful implementation of these schemes.  
 
In recent research, Ringen and Ngok (2013, p.6) suggest a new dimension in welfare state 
classification, ‘order versus fragmentation’. They argue that there are degrees of order or 
fragmentation within any policy design. They describe fragmentation as part of the process 
that explains why and how this pattern of development occurs in the specific context of 
economic liberalization. In turn, this impacts on social policy formation and effectiveness. 
China can be seen as a “fragmented, liberal-conservative hybrid model” (Ringen and Ngok, 
2013, pp.14-16) which is limited and defensive in both ambition and practice. They assert that 
co-ordination between central and local authorities is poor and often conflicted and that 
welfare services are providing minimal and inequitable support to citizens. This research 
looks at this idea in more depth, examining social policy structure and design in China. 
 
Ringen and Ngok (2013, pp.14-16) also argue that the emerging welfare state in China is 
developing in response to economic necessity. The welfare system is not traditional, not 
socialist, and not developmental. Although China aims to provide social security, the 
implementation services are of poor quality, only providing minimal support. In addition 
migrant and irregular workers do not have many rights in the social system. This thesis will 
extend their discussion to a more specific case by investigating the local government level and 
the benefit recipient level in China. It also examines the degree of informality in policy 
implementation and the labour market, which can influence economic security in China.  
1.5	  Research	  Question	  	  	  
In Western countries, social security has been widely introduced and analysed. Social security 
systems and theories have therefore become more and more improved making them more 
suitable to deal with contemporary problems. China has specific problems because it is a very 
big country; it has a huge population and also has complex economic and social systems. 
China has experienced a lot of new challenges in its provision of economic security in recent 
decades. This raises many questions: 
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1. How far do neo-liberalist ideas influence Chinese policy on economic security? 
2. What are the new problems of economic security in China?  
3. How is China’s social security system developing? Why is China developing in this 
way?  
4. How is China implementing social security policies? What kind of welfare state is 
China producing? Is that more liberal or more conservative? 
5. Is there stratification within China? If so, what kind of stratification is it?  
6. How does the degree of informality (an aspect of fragmentation) influence economic 
security in China? 
The main research question therefore follows from the above questions and links the issues as 
a whole:  
 
What is the form of economic insecurity generated in China in recent years, and how can we 
characterise the state’s response, particularly focusing on how the problem is addressed at the 
local level?  
 
The above questions are very important in examining the new challenges of economic 
security for China. This thesis will analyse, examine those questions and consider how to help 
China improve social and economic security. It will look at the related sectors of income and 
housing and make a comparison to the experiences of social security in other countries.  
 
In order to conduct an in depth investigation, it is necessary to carry out research at the local 
level in China and find out how policies and implementation affect local people. Therefore, 
this research does not attempt to look at the big developed areas in China. Rather it 
concentrates on a small secondary city where people’s experiences are more typical of life in 
China, as there are not many big first level cities such as Beijing or Shanghai, most cities are 
secondary level.  
1.6	  	  Thesis	  outline	  	  
The thesis structure will focus in from a broad view to specific issues. The thesis begins with 
a broad international economic security discussion. It then takes a broad look at economic 
security issues in China. Following the methodology, an in-depth discussion of the findings 
on income and housing security in China is given, also presenting a case study that supports 
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the analysis. Each chapter is organised in the same way, starting with a brief introduction with 
the chapter’s claim and contents, the main discussions follows, and there is a conclusion at the 
end. A brief summary of the contents in each chapter is given below.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out basic and general theories about economic security and discusses how the 
structure of economic insecurity has evolved under globalisation and liberalisation, with a 
focus on income security. Global integration and liberalisation have proceeded at an 
accelerated pace in the last 30 years (Chang, 2007, pp.4-10). Although market economies and 
global integration have been around since the colonial period of the late 19th and early 20th 
century, neoliberalism can be seen as a distinct phase of globalisation, happening in the last 
30-40 years. It is particularly characterised by greater financial opening, and also deregulatory 
reforms in developing (deregulation, privatisation) countries and greater ties in terms of 
investment and trade. Through the influence of the ideology of neoliberalisation and the fast 
growth of techniques of communication, the world has become more and more flat. However, 
in terms of concentration of income and wealth it has become more hierarchical, especially 
within countries. In only a few seconds you can communicate between China and America, 
goods prices in Asia can influence the market in Europe and market failure may lead to a 
financial crisis like the one in 2008. However, the transformations happening under 
globalisation are not finished, and we are still in the process of global transformation. This 
chapter discusses globalisation as one of the most important structural transformation in 
human history and through it most of the old types of economic systems and regulations have 
been challenged. It also examines the nature of neo-liberalism within globalisation and its 
effects on reforming institutions, organisation of work and welfare states.  
 
The forces of liberalization and technological change have the potential to increase the 
standard of living. But they have also made societies and economies unstable and insecure. 
For example, the financial crisis which occurred in 2008 was a painful lesson for many people. 
Financial bubbles that burst quickly cause great problems for the global economy and this 
crisis heavily reduced international economic growth and increased the unemployment rate 
significantly. The impact that followed for economic security was huge. This has caused a 
backlash of criticism in the literature against the reforms of neo-liberalization.  
 
This chapter looks at how for economic security, it is not only the problem of the welfare 
system being liberalised, but also the problem of the labour market becoming liberalized and 
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changing towards greater flexibility. In the foundation of the market economy, there is only a 
weak response from the state to this new challenge. Flexibility translates into greater 
insecurity in housing and income for workers. People who lose their jobs or face a lack of 
income security can become a serious problem for social stability. Thus, the background to 
and types of income security are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 3 considers economic security issues in China. It provides a historical background of 
welfare system development in China and discusses how globalization and liberalization have 
evolved in China. China was partially liberalizing after the late 1970s, when economic reform 
began to drive the ‘ship of China’ into the international sea. This was at the same time as the 
free market ideology appeared and China, like most other countries, was affected by it. The 
old types of economic structure merged into the new system. The state owned enterprises 
experienced substantial restructuring during the decade of 1990s prior to and immediately 
after China’s entry to the WTO. The state owned enterprises sector has emerged as 
thoroughly restructured but still the pillar of China’s national industry. The absolute state 
controlled economy was destroyed and state owned enterprises began to exit the market. The 
public and private sectors were merging quickly and small private firms and self-employed 
workers started to play a part in the market. 
 
The old systems of regulation and old types of distribution and social protection were slowly 
dismantled. A competitive market system began to be set up. China was set to move toward a 
new system. After 30 years, China has achieved phenomenal economic growth, but the new 
system is not completed. The policies that led to China’s economic revolution are a success 
for the market economy system and have changed China, giving it a new modern face, but the 
impact on the welfare system has not been very significant. Inequality levels in China in the 
past were not very great. The Gini coefficient was around 0.30 in 1960s and 1970s (Adelmen 
and Sunding, 1987, p.454). However, in 2005, the Gini coefficient reached 0.415 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011b). China’s sustained growth rate for the past 2 decades at 
least above 8% per year on average, and China’s total GDP reaches the 2nd place in the world 
exceeding Japan in 2010 to just below the USA. However, in terms of per capita GDP, China 
is still lower-middle income country. Thus this claim that China is ‘rich’ is inaccurate and the 
whole statement substantially simplifies a very complex picture of China’s growth. This 
chapter compares these measures between other countries (e.g. Japan and South Korea) that 
have caught up with China through fast growth.  China’s record “in reducing extreme poverty 
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has been remarkable, between 1981 and 2004 the fraction of the population consuming less 
than a dollar-a-day fell from 65% to 10%, and more than half a billion people were lifted out 
of poverty” (World Bank, 2009, p. iii). However, there are still a considerable number of 
poverty-stricken areas and the number of poor people remains high with insecurity due to 
poverty widespread in China. This chapter looks at income security policies such as 
unemployment insurance and the minimum income policy.  
 
The fast growth of income inequality problems was a result of the process of global 
transformation. The global timing of China’s high growth period paralleled the second 
(neoliberal) globalisation, whereas Japan’s and Korean’s later periods of catch-up occurred 
during more state interventionist phases of capitalist development. In China, income 
inequality affected income security, with wider wage differentials, most of the capital moving 
only around the highest class of people and lower income people losing. Income inequality 
has risen significantly due to the developing gap between urban and rural areas and also 
within both urban and rural areas as well. Because income is more related to the cost of health, 
housing and education than before, the pressure of access to health, housing and education for 
the poor has particularly increased. Privatization and liberalization have broken the welfare 
protection system. The new system of social protection still has many challenges, and China’s 
ability to develop a new type of social security system has become more and more important.  
 
Housing security is another very important economic security issue in China. This chapter 
provides more details about the change in housing welfare policies during the period of 
transition. According to the Chinese State Council (2007a,p1), the government has enacted 
some housing provision policies to help poor people to find accommodations such as a 
housing provident fund system, affordable housing and low rent housing policies. However, 
those policies do not go far enough to solve the new housing insecurity today in China.  
 
Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter. It covers data gathering and data analysis design. This 
chapter covers data gathering at three different levels, the national level, the local government 
level and the recipient level.  
 
At the national level, the investigation is divided into three parts, using triangulation to give a 
more complete view of the issues by examining the viewpoints of central government 
officials, academics and the ILO. Interviews were conducted with a number of participants to 
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gather data on issues of social security policies. Participants at this level were recruited from 
various state level government departments, such as the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, academic staff from Renmin University and officials representing the ILO. 
 
At the local government level, the research focuses on Tangshan city in China. Tangshan is a 
big, industrial coastal city close to Beijing. It mixes a large middle-income class, a lower 
income class and rural migrants. As most places in China are not that developed, being still 
under development, Tangshan, as a secondary city is closest to the actual situation in many 
parts of China. The researcher is familiar with this city, and this was helpful in recruiting 
participants for the interview study. Participants were recruited from relevant government 
departments in Tangshan, including the Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security, the 
Bureau of Civil Affairs and Housing and Urban-Rural Development, and the Bureau 
Development and Reform Commission in Tangshan. The interview participants also included 
a local District Judge to represent official opinions.  
 
The third stage involves participants from the recipients level in Tangshan city. This level is 
divided into three different groups, the lower-middle income class, low income class and 
migrant workers. It examines how current policies affect the different levels. Over 150 people 
responded to a questionnaire (50 in each group) and some also gave short informal interviews. 
The recipients’ answers are the most convincing statement about the social security situation 
in China. The questionnaire questions are located in Appendix C.  
 
Chapter 5 contains the analysis of the national level data. This section analyses the key 
principles guiding social security policies, as well as examining the international and 
literature views that underpin them. The aim here is not just to provide a view of the situation 
and examine the details of policy development, but also to provide a view of how the state 
can design policies so the new form of social security system can be clearly defined. By 
considering social policy implementation, this chapter also focuses on whether central 
government takes a centralised or decentralised function in the social system. In the economic 
and political system, central government is definitely the main commander. However, in the 
current social system, local government has the ability to modify state policies and even set 
up its own payment standard. This decentralization in the social welfare system has given 
more powers to local government. In practice, the social payment standard has been set at a 
minimum level which is not sufficient to cover people’s living expenditure.  
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This chapter also considers where the current social security system in China came from. The 
current system has learned from other countries’ experiences, combined with its own political 
and economic development characteristics. This chapter also considers possible ways to help 
China improve the system and lead it in a more efficient direction.  
 
Chapter 6 analyses the data from the local government level, and Tangshan City is given as a 
case study in this chapter. This chapter first introduces the government system in China, 
showing how local government in China is responsible for implementation. It deals directly 
with citizens, so efficiently implementing social policies is very important. However, as 
decentralization has become important in China, local government does not just implement 
policy, but it also has certain rights to modify policy and set up its own local social payment 
standard. Many critics have questioned whether having decentralised authorities will generate 
social security provision problems, as local governments might set a low standard and not 
give quality support. Decentralised systems may give a lower level of welfare provision than 
centralised ones (Castles, 1999, Swank, 2002 and Cameron, 1978). Also, this decentralization 
makes local government less responsive to local people. In recent decades, China’s main 
target has been economic growth, with the GDP figure being very important. Local 
government has to pay a large amount towards social support, but the payment to social 
support does not help GDP figures, which are judged by central government. Therefore, local 
government is more focused on GDP growth and less on social payments, causing local 
government to reduce the support rate.  
 
In addition, insecurity problems do not only come from the low payment level, but other 
factors are also involved, such as satisfaction with services and facilities. An example can be 
seen in the recent siting of social houses, which have been located in isolated areas on the 
edge of cities, far from jobs and amenities, which people find unhelpful. This was done in 
order to reduce budget costs. Local government built social houses in places that were less 
expensive. Thus, local government considers costs and how many social houses it has built, 
but nothing else. The argument is that a lot of social housing only focuses on the quantity, but 
not the quality. Many people in China complain that social houses have been built in an out-
of-the-way area without enough services and public facilities. Because of this, some people 
might even choose not to take up housing in this area. Peppercorn and Taffin (2013, p.79) 
also state that low-rent housing is almost always built in isolated city boundary areas. In 
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addition, social isolation is a problem, caused by social houses being in “special” areas that 
put poor homeless people together and away from the rest of the population. This might cause 
more insecurity issues.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the recipient level. The data was collected from the case study 
questionnaires and some informal interviews. There were 150 participants at this level (50 in 
each group). The groups are low-income, lower-middle income and poor migrants. This 
chapter focuses on living conditions, recipient feelings and in particular earning level and 
housing. It also examines the arguments from previous chapters, examining whether people 
are feeling the same way as argued in Chapter 5 that most of people are actually feeling bad 
about the government services and social support payment. 
 
Compared to other countries, population is a big issue in China. It is very difficult for local 
government to administrate and manage individual income status, and maintain good services 
for each recipient. Therefore, it is important to examine whether urban and rural recipients 
receive all the benefits they claim, and how much income support they obtain. The Minimum 
Standard of Living Scheme (MSLS) is the main factor that guarantees people’s basic living 
income, and it directly influences the amount of security people might feel. This chapter 
shows that the recipients see MSLS as not performing well in the social security system. 
People think that the MSLS payment is not high enough, and they are not satisfied with the 
services or the benefits they receive from the local authorities.  
 
The low rent housing (LRH) scheme is another important security policy that secures housing 
needs. Chapter 5 shows that problems with social housing mean that it does not always satisfy 
people’s needs, which generates more insecurity issues. This chapter looks at the findings on 
how recipients feel about this policy. For example, the case study in Tangshan city found that 
people felt socially isolated and that social amenities available to others in the city were not 
available to them.  
 
In addition, it examines rural migrant workers’ living security problems. As the household 
registration system in China has separated rural and urban residents, this means there are two 
ways to treat people. In general, rural residents are entitled to much lower benefits than urban 
residents. In addition, rural migrants are in an even worse situation. Because they have moved 
into an urban area, but remain rural residents, they cannot get any urban support. If they need 
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anything, they have to go back to their rural home area. However, rural benefits will not cover 
what they need to live in urban cities. The rural government could not provide unemployment 
insurance to migrants to work in urban cities, because those migrant workers’ jobs are 
registered as urban.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses in greater depth the barriers to policy improvement in the area of social 
development. It combines data from all levels of discussion in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. It looks 
specifically at the impact of informality on income and housing security policies that have 
been implemented. It also explains why China’s economic security system is developing in 
the way that it is. It will show that the barriers have also actively shaped the way in which 
social security policy has been created and implemented. This chapter also extends the 
discussion in the literature about how to situate China, looking at what can be used and 
learned from the work of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1996) and Ringen and Ngok (2013) on 
decommodification/stratification and order/fragmentation. In Esping-Andersen’s discussion 
of social security in relation to the two key issues of de-commodification and stratification, 
welfare states are classified into three categories: the liberal regime, the conservatism regime 
and the social democratic regime. This chapter sees China as unlike other countries, with new 
different kinds of stratification emerging in this developing country.  
 
In addition, it examines the structural division of China, including the rural-urban, public-
private and formal-informal divisions that are influenced by marketization. The ‘fragmented 
liberal conservative’ model put forward by Ringen and Ngok (2013) is a good way to discuss 
informality and the role this plays in policy formation within this setting. This chapter extends 
earlier work by looking at more specific details from the findings, focusing on informality and 
the labour market.  
 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions from the thesis about social policy reforms in China. It 
summarises the main arguments of the thesis concerning income security and housing 
insecurity issues in relation to neo-liberalisation. Based on the arguments made in the 
literature review (Chapters 2 and 3), this chapter highlights the arguments on the effect of 
neo-liberalism. It discusses the answers to the main research question on how neo-liberalism 
has generated a heavy impact on China’s current welfare system.  
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This chapter also defines the economic security development model in China. During the 
history of the welfare system development, China has been developing towards a near 
universal protection type, but not a fully universal one.  Policies such as the MSLS still 
benefit the extremely poor more than other citizens. Also, due to the household registration 
system the main excluded groups are rural migrants and informal workers. Regarding 
economic development, local government has focused more attention on economic growth 
than social development and this has resulted in serious insecurity problems, such as 
insufficient funds for social support and an increase in the amount of informality. During 
economic development in China, issues regarding employment informality have greatly 
increased in the labour market and even in the implementation of policies by local 
government. The high degree of informality has put people in a more insecure situation, 
which in turn has affected how the state operates. Therefore, China's social development 
model contains unique barriers such as informality and the household registration system. 
1.7	  Conclusion	  	  	  
This chapter provides a general background on what the thesis is about. It introduces the key 
literature and ideas in the research. Firstly it presents an empirical grounding discussion on 
the different regimes of welfare states: the liberal, conservative and social democratic 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996, 1999). It also introduces Esping-Andersen’s ideas about 
decommodification and stratification, followed by a brief discussion of this in relation to 
social security arrangements in China. It then presents more recent research on ‘order versus 
fragmentation’ (Ringen and Ngok, 2013) in the design of social policies. Ringen and Ngok 
(2013) define China as a fragmented liberal-conservative hybrid model, in which the state is 
mainly responding to economic necessity and the social welfare system is related to economic 
activities.  
 
This chapter also gives an outline of the thesis structure, as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 are 
literature reviews from an overview of the international economic security context to general 
views of China’s economic security. Chapter 4 defines the methodology used in the thesis. 
Chapter 5 discusses economic security in China at the national level. Chapter 6 discusses the 
local government level using a case study in Tangshan and Chapter 7 discuses economic 
security issues at the recipient level. Chapter 8 gives more details on the main economic 
security issues and combines the discussions from previous chapters. Chapter 9 summarises 
the thesis arguments. 
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In order to have a deeper understanding and discussion, the next chapter provides a general 
discussion of the phenomenon of economic security and discusses how the structure of social 
and economic security has evolved under globalization and liberalization. Then leads to a 
discussion of economic security in China.  
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Chapter	  2	  –	  Economic	  security	  in	  the	  international	  context	  	  
2.0	  Introduction	  	  
This chapter examines the literature on the international issue of economic security in the 
context of the globalisation process. It provides an overview of general ideas about economic 
security, its characteristics and the factors that influence it. It also identifies further issues of 
contemporary concern in both Western countries and developing countries in the areas of 
income security and welfare. The literature explored in this chapter contributes to the later 
analysis and discussion and indicates the theoretical underpinnings of many discussions on 
international economic insecurity issues. 
 
The consequences of economic insecurity can be serious, as they affect people’s lives, 
individual wellbeing and labour market behaviour. Economic security includes many aspects, 
such as income security, housing security, health security and so on. Income security is one of 
the most important aspects of people’s lives. Since nearly all living necessities and 
commodities in a market economic system are ascribed a monetary or price value, people’s 
perception of their own economic insecurity is heavily dependent on their purchasing power. 
Maintaining a certain level of income is a crucial security issue for an individual’s wellbeing. 
What, then, is income security? The International Labour Office (ILO) (2004, p.56) states that 
“a person’s income security depends on what income he or she retains, not what he or she 
earns; the assurance of that income lasting beyond today; the prospect of receiving adequate 
income in the future.” Although both collectives and individuals tend to regard high income 
as indicative of income security, the importance of maintaining a stable income is less 
recognised. The view in this thesis is that economic insecurity has been paid insufficient 
attention, especially in developing countries and among the working class. One problem is 
that neo-liberal globalisation economic policies have been increasing international economic 
insecurity since the 1980s.  
 
This chapter will view the changes in economic security in recent decades. Currently, 
economic insecurity haunts many working people. Every year, around one third of workers in 
OECD countries change jobs and in America about 45% of workers leave their employment 
annually (Standing, 2011a, p.36). The ILO asserts that “globalisation has been associated with 
an increase in economic instability and a greater incidence of economic crises” (ILO, 2004, p. 
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xviii). However, the factors that contribute to economic insecurity remain largely unanalysed, 
especially in developing countries. Before discussing details of economic security and how 
neoliberal ideology has influenced security in the past three decades, an understanding of the 
process of globalisation is necessary. 
 
The opening sections of this chapter, 2.1 and 2.2 give an historical review on how the 
changing nature of globalisation over time has affected social systems. Section 2.3 discusses 
how changes due to globalisation generated insecurity. Section 2.4 explains how globalisation 
affects labour markets. Section 2.5 examines the impact of the globalisation process on 
developing countries. Section 2.6 considers whether globalisation leads to income inequality. 
Section 2.7 defines at the meaning of economic security. Section 2.8 gives the background to 
income security as the main factor in economic security. Section 2.9 shows the different types 
of income insecurity. Section 2.10 discusses contemporary general income security policies 
and Section 2.11 concludes this chapter. 
2.1	  What	  effects	  has	  globalisation	  had	  on	  economics	  and	  social	  welfare?	  	  	  
The shift towards globalisation over the past thirty years has had a considerable influence on 
economic and social welfare systems worldwide. It is the subject of extensive discussion, 
especially in the field of social security, where it has caused great controversy. In order to 
understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to know where the current form of globalisation 
comes from. Although the process of globalisation can take different forms, it commonly 
includes the integration of economics, businesses, culture and other social factors. 
Globalisation is not new. It can be dated back more than a hundred years to the nineteenth-
century British Empire (Ferguson, 2003, pp.xxiv-xxv; Chang, 2007, p.21) which governed 
around 25% of the world and adopted free trade and free market policies within its territory. 
According to Chang (2007, pp.21–22), Britain’s economic success led to other countries 
opening up trade and deregulating their economies and “this liberal world order was perfected 
around 1870 under British hegemony.” The opening up of sea-lanes led to an increase in 
worldwide trade, significant migration of labour, and movement of capital. Furthermore, 
developments in communication technologies increased the rate at which information could 
be transmitted. By the early 1900s, oceanic telegraph cables connected distant countries. Prior 
to the invention of the telegraph, sending information from America to Asia, for example, 
could take months, but after the late 1800s it could be done in a day. States began to develop a 
network of relationships that could be considered global. In the past, globalisation had been 
29	  	  
founded on the international movement of labour, resources and capital. From 1500 to 1820 
the annual average rate of growth of world GDP per capita remained steady at around 0.05, 
but between 1820 and 1913, the annual average rate of growth of world GDP per capita 
increased significantly and reached 1.30 (Maddison, 2007, p.265). In this period, many 
countries started to deregulate their domestic economies and liberalise trade policies. The 
barriers to the international trade market were lowered, which allowed countries to trade more 
easily with each other. The significant growth in GDP led to a massive population shift from 
agriculture to industry, from rural to urban and from country to country. The world entered a 
stage of mass migration, with huge numbers of people emigrating to America and population 
shifts to and from the British colonies and the colonies of other European countries. Between 
1850 and 1914, five million Germans, 4 million Italians and Austro-Hungarians, 3.5 million 
British and 3.2 million Russians crossed the Atlantic to work (Khoudour-Casteras, 2008, 
p.213). This mass migration led many European countries to take a greater interest in 
providing welfare support for their population and in the building of rudimentary social 
insurance systems. For example, the country with the highest number of emigrants from 
Europe, Germany, adopted a new insurance law for its workers in 1883. Which stated that all 
industrial workers would benefit from the insurance, with two-thirds of the cost born by the 
workers and one-third by the employers. “Sick workers were covered for medical treatment 
for up to 13 weeks and received financial support equivalent to three-quarters of their average 
wage. If workers were permanently disabled, they could receive a regular pension equivalent 
to two-thirds of their annual earnings” (Khoudour-Casteras, 2008, p. 218). While welcome, 
such advances did not amount to the establishment of a fully-fledged welfare state system. 
Statistics for a group of 18 countries show that between 1870 and 1913, the average ratio of 
government spending to GDP was very low, with average public spending standing at 11%-
13% of GDP for over 43 years (Tanzi, 2002, p.116). Government expenditure on health, 
pensions and unemployment programmes at this time was insignificant. 
 
Following the First World War (WW1), Europe emerged economically and politically 
weakened. Millions had died in the trenches and the world economy suffered serious 
instability during the 1920s and 1930s. In the inter-war period, unemployment averaged 
10.5%, whereas before 1914 it had averaged about 4.5% (Matthews, 1968, p.555). Investment 
in economic and social welfare was low in the inter-war period because of the economic 
slump and war damage. Political and economic players throughout the world were desperate 
for new policies to aid recovery and development. In an effort to deal with the instability in 
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the world economy, countries again started to introduce trade barriers. Western countries such 
as Germany and the USA abandoned their liberal policies and began employing high trade 
barriers to protect their domestic economies. The free trade system effectively ended in 1932 
due to many countries re-introducing tariffs on trade (Chang, 2007, p.30), thus opening the 
way for new forms of protectionism that shielded both established and nascent industries from 
foreign competition. This new form of protectionism was especially prominent in the USA 
and Great Britain. 
 
After WW2, Western states again began to take more interest in the concept of a globalised 
economy as they had in the 19th century. In the period after WW2, the international economic 
and political environment changed and became increasingly influenced by the ideology of 
economic liberalism and globalisation. The proponents of this form of liberalism championed 
the principle of free trade and believed that the private sector should play an important role in 
the economic system. The form that globalised liberalism took in this period consisted of the 
belief that an open and liberal international economic system should be established worldwide 
and that regulations should be set to govern and manage the economic system. After the late 
1940s, this liberal globalisation model exerted a strong influence on countries with open 
economies and led to a greater integration of production, distribution and consumption of 
commodities within both developed and developing countries. The world not only globalised 
in economic areas, but also in the political arena, as evidenced by the establishment of the 
Bretton Woods system and global institutions such as the World Bank (established in 1944) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), established in 1945 to regulate the world 
economy. This period can therefore be thought of as the age of liberal globalisation. 
 
Throughout the post-war economic boom period during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s the 
effects of capitalism on the economies and social welfare systems of Western nations 
increased further. In this period, while liberalism dominated the economy and free trade, it 
had less influence in the area of social welfare, with most people relying on government 
social security protection. Many countries, especially those in Europe, developed formal, 
government-financed social protection systems that aimed to protect people against economic 
insecurity. The welfare system covered a wide range of areas that included unemployment, 
old age, illness and so on. Social protection systems also emerged in many developing 
countries, especially in the communist nations. In Eastern Europe, people received state 
support to secure their standard of living, including the provision of highly subsidised pricing 
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for housing, food and basic needs, guaranteed employment, and comprehensive health and 
education provision (Deacon, 2000, p.147). Tanzi (2002, p.117) argues that the effects of 
globalisation on social protection after WW2 worked mainly through three instruments: 
regulation, public spending and tax expenditure. In most countries, all three instruments were 
jointly used. Although liberals of this period expected less government intervention and a 
greater role for the market in global economics, this did not mean that they abandoned 
government intervention altogether. Ruggie (1982, p.381) asserts that: 
In the organization of a liberal order, pride of place is given to market 
rationality. This is not to say that authority is absent from such an 
order. It is to say that authority relations are constructed in such a 
way as to give maximum scope to market forces rather than to 
constrain them.  
 
During the 1980s, the situation worldwide began to change as Western countries started 
implementing neo-liberal programmes. Neo-liberal globalisation requires a free market, 
deregulation and privatisation. Some countries deliberately adopted deregulatory economic 
strategies and actively pursued a neo-liberal route. The world economy thus entered a new 
and heightened stage of liberal development as the neo-liberal ideology quickly influenced the 
world economic and social systems. This new globalisation process has driven the 
contemporary progress of social and economic change in most countries, and as much of the 
literature argues, the neo-liberal route is raising inequality, poverty and economic insecurity 
worldwide. The effects of neo-liberalisation on welfare systems will be explored in more 
detail in later sections. 
2.2	  How	  has	  neo-­‐liberalism	  affected	  the	  post-­‐war	  welfare	  state?	  	  
Most Western countries began to set up welfare states in the wake of WW2. In the traditional 
welfare state of this period, the state played a key role in social protection and economic 
growth, and gave “social meaning and equal worth to the formal juridical and political rights 
of all citizens” (Nash, 2000, p.238). Britain introduced a welfare state in the 1940s. The 
approach adopted by the British was characterised by three tenets: a rational basis grounded in 
empirical social science, social planning, and the active involvement of the state (Tang, 2000, 
p.119). Chang (2003, p.47) argues that the welfare economics approach of this period saw 
state intervention as necessary because of the inability of decentralised self-interested agents 
to coordinate comprehensive economic and welfare strategies. 
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The welfare state in this period typically addressed economic security problems arising from 
unemployment. It provided working class people with social support and general social 
benefits. While this maintained job growth, it also reduced the incentive to work (Esping-
Andersen, 1996, p.8). The regulated market, pricing and public production improved the 
market structure, increased the employment rate and generated economic growth in the short 
run. In the long run, however, the regulated market ultimately led to the stagnation of 
economic growth, and as Esping-Andersen (1996, p.7) argues, it was this slowdown in 
economic growth and the menace of deindustrialisation that led to increasing challenges to the 
established economic order. Chang (2003) claims that the rise of neoliberalism challenged the 
regulated system’s lack of exclusive property rights and the discrepancies that existed 
between private and social costs and benefits. 
 
The effect of deregulated globalisation on the world economic system has been profound. The 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) that resulted from the post-war drive 
towards trade liberalisation led to the eventual establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995. Following the rise of neo-liberalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
globalised world economy has come to be dominated by free trade, the free market, and the 
transfer of economic activity from the public sector to the private sector. Similarly, the new 
age of globalisation has affected welfare systems around the world, with the state’s role in 
welfare provision having reduced significantly and private or market sectors taking over large 
sections of the public welfare system in many countries. This is described by (Beck, 2000, p.1) 
as follows:  
The premises of the welfare state and pension system, of income support, local 
government and infrastructural policies, the power of organized labour, 
industry wide free collective bargaining, state expenditure, the fiscal system 
and ‘fair’ taxation – all this melts under the withering sun of globalization 
and becomes susceptible to (demands for) political moulding. 
  
Political frameworks such as the Washington Consensus came to play a significant role in 
establishing this new economic order. The Washington Consensus can be seen as setting out 
the guiding principles for the process of neo-liberal globalisation. The policy prescriptions 
contained in the Washington Consensus were designed by Washington based neo-liberal 
economists and international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. A key policy 
proposal from the Washington Consensus is: “A reduction in the size and role of the public 
sector, including privatization of publicly owned productive assets and an end to managed 
trade and industrial policies” (ILO, 2004, p.20). This is characteristic of the neo-liberal 
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approach to economic matters in its emphasis on the private sector over the public sector. The 
Washington Consensus had an enormous impact on the economic world and international 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and other associations came to play 
an increasingly powerful role in influencing national policies. In many cases, these 
institutions and associations exerted enormous pressure on individual countries to adopt 
privatisation and liberalisation policies.  
 
The results of these policies have not always been consistent with the predictions made by 
their proponents. Standing (2010), for example, notes how new kinds of inequalities and 
insecurities have emerged as a result of changes in class structure due to neo-liberal 
globalisation. Standing argues that the current form of globalisation has led to the emergence 
of a new social class, the precariat, a new class of workers “flitting between jobs, unsure of 
their occupational title, with little labour security, few enterprise benefits and tenuous access 
to state benefits” (Standing, 2010, p.109). He argues that traditional working class labour 
institutions such as industrial unions tended to stabilise workers’ incomes in the past. With the 
declining influence of such institutions in the globalised neo-liberal world, however, income 
insecurity has increasingly become a fact of life for many workers. The labour market has 
become increasingly commoditised and flexible and workers are often paid only for the exact 
hours worked, with no other work-based benefits.  
 
The argument about the commodification of labour is long established, and there is 
considerable academic discussion on the increasing commodification of labour in 21st century. 
Vosko (2000, p15) argues that: 
 
labour power is inevitably a commodity under capitalism, and the decline of 
security and freedom in the wage relation accentuates its commodity status. 
 
The argument about the commodification of labour is long established and there is 
considerable academic discussion on the increasing commodification of labour in the 21st 
century. Vosko (2000, p.15) argues that “labour power is inevitably a commodity under 
capitalism, and the decline of security and freedom in the wage relation accentuates its 
commodity status.” She contends that under the current neo-liberal consensus, the deregulated 
labour market has increased informal and temporary employment, thus increasing the 
commoditised nature of labour. Certainly, the absolute number of informal and temporary 
workers has grown quickly since the beginnings of neo-liberalisation in the 1980s (Campbell 
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and Burgess, 2001, p.172; OECD, 2002.) These informal jobs tend to offer insecure working 
hours and pay. In addition, Esping-Andersen (1990, p.37) argues that workers are 
increasingly seen as commodities: they are viewed as replaceable, are easily made redundant 
and are atomised. These factors have clear implications for the economic security of workers. 
Given this, various commentators have developed theories and proposed potential solutions to 
the issue of increasing labour insecurity.  
 
Esping-Anderson (1990) introduces the decommodification and stratification approach to 
social security. In this thesis, decommodification should be understood in terms of people’s 
degree of insulation from market dependency, and stratification should be understood as the 
way welfare states function in maintaining or breaking down social stratification. All 
countries apply these principles in different ways and to varying degrees. According to the 
ILO (2004, 2012), empirical evidence indicates that since the 1990s, people in almost all 
European welfare states have had much better economic security than people living in China. 
The Scandinavian countries in particular provide a modern, formal, targeted and efficient way 
of protecting their citizens with social security, especially in income and housing provisions. 
Given the disparity in protections afforded by different welfare systems, an exploration of the 
various welfare state models might shed light on ways to improve economic security. 
 
Since the end of WW2, the welfare state has become regarded as an integral part of the 
political, social and economic solutions to the promotion of both economic development and 
social stability (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Welfare systems play a critical role in providing a 
minimum level of social security, wellbeing and social support for citizens, and the welfare 
state provides a more efficient means of guaranteeing social security. Since different countries 
have different patterns of development, the type of welfare state differs between countries and 
there is considerable debate on which welfare state model is most suitable for a given country. 
Esping-Andersen (1990), one of the most influential theorists on the welfare state, has 
produced a three-world welfare regime typology comparing capitalist welfare states. He 
divides existing welfare states into three dominant regime types: the liberal, the conservative 
and the social democratic models. For Esping-Andersen, the liberal regime type is the 
favoured welfare model in nations such as the United States, Canada and Australia. This 
regime incorporates means-tested assistance and modest universal transfers. It mainly benefits 
those with a low-income, usually the working class. The conservative regime is an updated 
and upgraded form of the historical corporatist-statist welfare strategy and aims to cater to the 
35	  	  
new ‘post-industrial’ class structure. Examples of this welfare model are the welfare systems 
used in Austria, France, Germany and Italy. The social democratic regime draws heavily on 
the concept of social democracy as a means of bringing about social reform. It addresses both 
market and family, attempts to maximise capacities for individual independence and has a 
heavy social service burden. This model is most in evidence in the Scandinavian countries 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 26-28). In this system, social protection is provided more 
through decommodification than through stratification. By contrast, liberal welfare regime 
countries such as the US provide social protection more through stratification than through 
decommodification, and their social policy is generally less protective than that in 
Scandinavian countries. Corporatist welfare regime countries such as Germany and France 
give almost equal weight to decommodification and stratification. For example, since the 
financial crash in 2008, Germany and France have introduced a system that provides partial 
unemployment benefit coverage to workers in cases where working hours have been reduced 
due to specific economic conditions (ILO, 2011, p.107). The social security measures in 
countries operating a corporatist welfare regime are not just targeted at the poor, but provide 
protection for the individual against reliance on the market.  
 
Compared to the welfare state in Western countries, the modern East Asian welfare state 
model has been characterised as a ‘productive welfare model’ or ‘development welfare model’ 
(Goodman and White, 1998; Gough, 2001; Kwon, 2005). Holliday (2000) argues that there is 
a distinct relationship between social and economic policy in East Asia, a relationship that he 
terms ‘productivist welfare capitalism’ and which involves a high degree of state intervention 
in both the economic and social policy arenas and the subordination of social policies to 
economic or industrial objectives (Holliday, 2000, p.709). In addition, Esping-Andersen 
(1997) notes that a ‘core component’ of the welfare regime in Japan is the unique conception 
of culture and family held in the country, which has led to the development of a universalist 
welfare regime type to protect all citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1997, p.182). 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the forms that economic and welfare regimes take 
are not independent of one another: shifts in the economic sphere affect the welfare arena, and 
vice-versa. Social policy therefore responds to regime shifts in the economic realm, and the 
social security concerns that individuals have are directly related to these shifts. To what 
extent, then, does globalisation generate insecurity? The next section will explore this issue. 
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2.3	  How	  does	  globalisation	  generate	  insecurity?	  	  
Globalisation and liberalisation have been associated with an increase in economic instability 
and insecurity, although opinions differ as to where the major problems are to be found. 
Scheve and Slaughter (2004) argue that foreign direct investment and multinational 
enterprises are directly implicated in increasing labour insecurity. They contend (2004, p.3): 
 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is the key 
aspect of integration generating risk. FDI by MNEs increases firms' elasticity of 
demand for labor. More-elastic labor demands, in turn, raise the volatility of 
wages and employment, all of which tends to make workers feel less secure. 
  
Stiglitz (2002, p.56) believes that globalisation has been pursued almost as an end in itself and 
without concern for equitability and that liberalisation has been sanctioned in too many areas 
– in the financial, trade and regulatory realms – simultaneously (Stiglitz, 2002, p.56). He also 
argues that in some cases, the drive for globalisation has been based on an incorrect economic 
analysis. In terms of the financial sector, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, pp. 5–31) 
analyse the empirical relation between the banking crisis and financial liberalisation for 53 
countries from 1980 to 1995. The results reveal that countries sanctioning liberalisation in 
financial areas are more likely to have a banking crisis and that financial liberalisation exerts 
an independent negative effect on the stability of banking sectors. Radelet et al (1998, pp.1-83) 
examine the 1998 East Asian financial crisis and demonstrate that the hardest hit countries 
were the ones that had mostly closely followed the IMF’s policy prescriptions, Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand. Moreover, the IMF worsened the situation in Indonesia and Korea by 
forcing those countries to adopt its own agenda for financial reform.  
 
While supporting many of the overall aims of globalisation and liberalisation, Chang (2002) 
claims that the problem with the current globalised-neoliberal orthodoxy is not only that it has 
spread too quickly, but also that it has spread too far into too many areas and that an 
absolutely free market economy is impossible. He also argues (2002, pp. 539–559) that  
 
as far as the neoliberals acknowledge the existence of market failure, 
the only alternative they will seriously contemplate is state 
intervention, because no intermediate institutions or organisations 
have a place in their scheme.  
 
He further maintains that “neoclassical economics does, really give us a wrong perspective in 
the sense that we lose sight of a large chunk of the economic system and concentrate on one, 
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albeit important, part only” (ibid). While Chang suggests that globalisation and liberalisation 
have to continue, he believes that their excesses need to be restrained by limitations and 
institutional regulations. Some of the policies that Chang recommends include a return to 
state interventionism, adding that indirect government intervention would make both the 
market and society more secure and that the society and the market should not be fully 
liberalised. For critics of the current neoliberal orthodoxy such as Chang, greater state 
intervention is needed in order to monitor and regulate the globalised market and develop 
effective welfare systems. Expecting the market to regulate itself is unlikely to achieve 
economic optimisation and governments have an important role to play in the economic arena. 
2.4	  How	  does	  globalisation	  affect	  the	  labour	  market?	  	  	  
 
Recent developments in political economy and social welfare have been marked by debate 
concerning the degree to which neoliberal globalisation is a driving force in the creation and 
growth of labour market insecurity. Among those who argue that neoliberal globalisation has 
contributed significantly to labour market insecurity, the ILO (2004, p.135) maintains that 
labour market insecurity is a feature of the era of globalisation. Scheve and Slaughter (2004,  
p.7) argue that globalisation increases worker insecurity and Standing (2011a, p.1) claims that 
as neoliberal policies increase labour market flexibility, there has been a transfer of risks and 
insecurity onto workers. How, then, can the level of labour market security be measured? 
According to the ILO (2004, p.113) “labour market security arises from an environment in 
which there are ample opportunities for adequate income-earning activities.” Given that 
unemployment is the most well known indicator of labour market insecurity and is 
“reasonably reliable as an overall and cyclical indicator” (ILO, 2004, p.118), an examination 
of unemployment trends since the 1980s can provide evidence of the impact of neoliberal 
globalisation on economic security.  
 
Globally, unemployment has been on the rise since the 1980s. In particular, European labour 
markets have experienced consistently high unemployment rates. Table 2.1 shows the 
unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labour force in a range of European countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  	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Table 2.1 Unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labour force 
 
 
Denmark France Greece Ireland Italy 
United 
Kingdom Germany 
1986 6 10.2 7.4 18 10.6 11.2 
 1987 6.1 10.7 7.4 18.1 10.7 10.8 
 1988 6.5 10.2 7.7 17.4 11 8.8 
 1989 8.1 9.6 7.5 16.1 11 7.2 
 1990 8.3 9.4 7 14.1 9.8 6.8 
 1991 9.1 9.1 7.7 15.8 10.1 8.4 5.6 
1992 9 10.2 7.8 15 9.3 9.7 6.6 
1993 10.7 11.3 9 15.6 10.2 10.3 7.9 
1994 8 12.6 8.9 14.6 11.1 9.6 8.4 
1995 7 11.8 9.1 12 11.7 8.6 8.1 
Source: calculated from World Bank Data, 2011a. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, the unemployment rates in European countries show persistently 
high levels. Across all European countries in Table 2.1, an average of over 9.5% of the 
official workforce was unemployed in 1995. By 2003, the unemployment figure in the 
European Union as a whole stood at around 8% (ILO, 2004, p.118). 
 
In comparison, the unemployment situation in the United States appears somewhat better. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the average unemployment rate between 2001 and 2005 was around 5%. 
It should be noted that there were significant job losses between 2000 and 2003, there were 
over 9 million of worker have lost their jobs, and 4.8 million of people were working in part-
time jobs (ILO, 2004, p.118).  
 
Figure 2.1 Unemployment Rate in the United States 
 
 
                         Source: calculated from World Bank Data, 2011a. 
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However, the US average unemployment rate of 5% has been questioned. The ILO (2004,  
pp.118-119) claims that this left out many people who had stopped searching for employment 
and also part-time workers who wanted full time jobs. 
 
The unemployment rate in developing countries is also increasing. For example, the 
unemployment rates in Brazil and Argentina have increased significantly since the 1980s (see 
figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 Unemployment rate in Brazil and Argentina 
 
 
                        Source: calculated from World Bank Data, 2011a. 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Argentina fell into a deep economic recession and 
millions of people lost their jobs. The impact of globalisation on Argentina’s economy and 
unemployment rate in this period is clear: a series of adverse external shocks, including 
unusually low prices for their agricultural goods, recession in Brazil and the appreciation of 
the American dollar, has a serious impact on the health of the Argentinian economy (The 
Economist, 1999, p.1).  
 
From the evidence on unemployment rates presented above, it appears that there is a close 
link between globalisation and labour market insecurity. The next section discusses the effects 
of globalisation and liberalisation on developing countries.  
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2.5	  How	  do	  globalisation	  and	  liberalisation	  impact	  developing	  countries?	  
 
Since the 1980s, the processes of privatisation and liberalisation have been introduced to 
many low and middle-income countries, and from the 1990s in particular, these practices have 
spread all over the world. According to the ILO (2004, p. 35), in the 1990s, more than 130 
low-income and middle-income countries privatised their infrastructure and sold off state-
owned companies making more than US$600 billion. The IMF and the World Bank imposed 
globalisation policies on developing countries through their structural adjustment programme. 
These included trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and openness to foreign 
investment. Under these principles, developing low and middle-income countries were 
encouraged to move towards privatisation of their social welfare services by reducing state 
participation, even though this necessitated costs in transferring the ownership of the social 
welfare system from a public to a private system. For example, in Chile, almost all of the 
social benefits and services were taken over by the private sector. The ILO reports that “the 
switch to a private pension system has cost the Chilean government about five per cent of 
GDP during the last 20 years (much more than it would have cost to eradicate poverty 
altogether)” (ILO, 2004, p.36). Since it is necessarily true that profit is central to private 
ownership of the social welfare system, this raises further issues. Firstly, the cost of 
transferring social welfare systems from public ownership to private ownership not only falls 
on the state, but also on the individual citizen, since the individual is likely to face higher 
costs when health insurance, pensions and other welfare areas are privatised. Secondly, the 
pursuit of profit by private sector welfare providers may mean that beneficiaries are offered 
lower benefits than they would receive under a publicly owned system.  
 
Looking at the performance of neo-liberal policies in developing countries, excluding China 
and India, the average GDP per capita growth rate in developing countries using protectionist 
policies in the 1960s and 1970s was higher than after they adopted neoliberal policies. Figure 
2.3 shows that developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s experienced an average annual 
growth of about 3% in GDP per capita. However, from 1980 to 2000,  after the 
implementation of neo-liberal free market policies, the average annual GDP per capita growth 
was half that of the previous rate (ILO, 2004, p.26). Latin America had the largest decline in 
growth for these periods, from a figure of 3% to just 0.4% (ibid.).  
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Figure 2.3 Average annual GDP Growth per capital in the world (excluding China and India) 
 
 
 
In the East Asian economies that also posted lower per capita GDP growth between 1980 and 
2000, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, growth ranged from 6% to 4%. China’s 
economic reforms started in late 1978. Table 2.2 shows China’s GDP per capita and 
population from 1980 to 2009. 
 
Table 2.2: China’s GDP per capita and population 
Country: China  
    
 
1980 1990 2000 2009 
GDP per capita 
(current US$) 193 314 949 3744 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 6 2 8 8.5 
Population, total 
981,235,0
0 
1,135,185,00
0 1,262,645,000 
1,331,460,00
0 
Population growth 
(annual %) 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.5 
Source: Source: calculated from World Bank Data, 2011b. 
 
In 1980, when the country was just beginning to introduce liberal market policies, China’s 
GDP per capita growth rate was 6%. By 1990, it stood at only 2%. However, unlike other 
countries that underwent liberal market reforms, China’s economy is only partially liberalised. 
It mixes the public and private sectors and the state still plays an important role. Since the late 
1990s, China has achieved a stable GDP growth rate of around 8%, while the population 
growth rate has decreased from 1.3% in 1980 to 0.5% in 2009. China thus continues to 
combine high GDP growth rate and low population growth. On the positive side, the fact that 
China has controlled its population growth may reduce the pressure on its food supply. 
Furthermore, since population control affects the surplus labour force and given that the 
country already has a huge population of 1.3 billion people, China’s population control should 
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assist in preventing an oversupply of labour and the consequent downward pressure on wages. 
For example, if a population is large, the labour surplus will be high, and the wage rate will 
then decrease as a result of the large population.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Chinese state takes population control more seriously 
than other countries and despite China’s apparent control over its population growth, there 
remains an oversupply of labour because the country has huge surplus labour in rural areas. 
Ultimately, this means that there are still too many low-skilled workers among the Chinese 
workforce. Large numbers of people leave rural areas to compete for industrial or service jobs 
because the majority of jobs in these sectors are only available in certain regions. Since there 
are too many people competing for the same jobs, it is likely that employers will offer low 
wages. As a result of the competition for low-skilled jobs, the wages of these workers do not 
increase, and the income security risks for low-skilled workers are increasing. As a result, the 
benefit of control over population growth is not yet being felt in the labour market. 
 
As the world’s economy becomes more globalised and integrated, state regulation becomes 
less influential and the effects of globalisation can be seen in areas geographically distinct 
from one another. This is particularly evident when it comes to recent economic crises. This is 
shown in the Mexican ‘tequila crisis’ in 1994, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998, 
the bankruptcy of Enron in the early 2000s (the world’s biggest corporate collapse) the UK’s 
Northern Rock crisis in 2007 and the world financial crisis in 2008, the factors behind each 
crisis lay in the increasingly globalised and deregulated world economic system. These crises 
led to many people losing their jobs and houses and plunged millions of people into economic 
insecurity. Globalisation and liberalisation placed large numbers of low skilled workers and 
informal sector workers into an unstable and precarious situation, and the gap between the 
rich and the poor became increasingly bigger. The emotions that arise from such inequality 
may result in social unrest, leading to yet another potential social risk. 
2.6	  How	  does	  neo-­‐liberalisation	  affect	  income	  inequality?	  
 
There seems to be little doubt that neo-liberalisation is connected to the problem of social 
inequality. Certainly, in the distribution of income sector, there is currently a high degree of 
international inequality, and this inequality has grown over time. Table 2.3 shows an estimate 
of the range of per capita world incomes between 1960 and 1989. 
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Table 2.3: The distribution of world income, 1960-1989 
 
 Real GDP (PPP) 
per capita 
Real GDP (PPP) 
per capita 
Year Gini Coefficient Ratio of top 
20% to bottom 
20% 
1960 0.44 11.1 
1970 0.50 13.9 
1980 0.53 16.0 
1988/9 0.55 17.1 
                                   Source: (Griffin and Khan, 1992, p.4)  
 
As Table 2.5 shows, the Gini coefficient increased every decade, from 0.44 to 0.55. The 
second measure in the table, the ratio of top 20% to bottom 20%, is a calculation of the 20 per 
cent of richest group of people divided by 20 per cent of poorest group of people. As can be 
seen, this ratio also increased every decade. In 1960, the richest 20% of the population 
enjoyed 11.1 times more income than the poorest 20%, but by 1988, this had increased to 
17.1 times.  
 
Since the 1990s, Latin American countries have been strengthening the role of market 
mechanisms and weakening the role of government, including its role in the social arena. This 
approach has been called into question because Latin America had already experienced 
significant increases in income inequality during the 1980s. For example, after Mexico joined 
GATT in 1985, average tariff rates fell dramatically from 23.5% in 1985 to 11.8% 1987 
(Hanson and Harrison, 1999, p.275). Alongside this opening up of the Mexican markets, 
white-collar real hourly wages increased by 13% between 1984 and 1990, while blue-collar 
wages decreased by 14% (Kremer and Maskin, 2002, p.3). What caused this inequality? After 
Mexico joined GATT, the introduction of foreign investments greatly increased; the foreign 
companies involved exhibited more competitive behaviour than local companies and white-
collar workers, such as those employed by foreign companies, correspondingly received 
higher wage increases. Blue-collar workers, largely working for local companies, experienced 
a decrease in their wage rate. This was due to local companies being less competitive and not 
being able to match the profit margins of the foreign companies, which increased income 
inequality in Mexico. Income inequality problems also increased in Argentina (Robbins et al., 
1995) and Chile (Robbins, 1995), among other countries in this region.  
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This increase in wage inequality is not limited to Latin America. The wage gap between 
skilled workers and unskilled workers throughout the world increased after the introduction of 
further free trade and free market policies. Hanson (2003, p.6) estimates wage regressions 
between 1990 and 2000, and his reports show that there was a significant increase in the 
salaries of highly skilled workers living in regions with good access to foreign markets. Inter-
regional inequality in North America, for example, went from 443% to 489% of the world’s 
average.  
 
The growth in inter-regional inequality has continued across the world (ILO, 2004, p.58). One 
reason for the growth in inter-regional inequality is due to new foreign corporations having 
their own requirements and following their own protocols. Owing to neo-liberal free market 
policies, there is little or no state involvement in a multinational company’s setting up of 
operations in a country and no constraints on what the companies can do. Another reason is 
that states have freely allowed foreign companies to set up and establish new businesses in the 
most developed and wealthy areas rather than setting conditions on the locations in which 
they can operate. In the case of China, the result has been that globalisation and liberalisation 
have proceeded further in coastal regions than in inland regions, in urban areas more than 
rural areas. Income inequality is increasing significantly, with the income gap between rural 
and urban areas increasing by around 6% from the 1980s to the 1990s. In the same period, the 
income gap between coastal and hinterland areas increased very sharply, standing at 23% 
throughout this period (Fan et al, 2009, pp.21,22). 
2.7	  The	  ILO	  definition	  of	  economic	  security	  	  
Well-being, a good work life and good housing conditions are things most people would like 
to have. Economic security forms an important part of a person’s well-being. Without 
economic security, “people lose all sense of having control over their lives” (ILO 2004, p. 5) 
Economic security involves a wide range of protections to secure people’s living conditions in 
order to provide a fair social environment and a good opportunity to live a decent life. Given 
that guaranteeing economic security for citizens is a desirable objective for governments, it is 
necessary for policy makers to have an understanding of which factors contribute to economic 
insecurity. Briefly put, economic insecurity consists of several forms of economic uncertainty 
and risk. It should be noted that risk and uncertainty not synonymous here. Risk refers to 
when people are aware of the fact that they are engaged in risky behaviour. In such instances, 
those engaged in risky behaviour are usually able to calculate the degree of risk. Lupton (1999, 
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p.12) therefore defines risk in neutral terms: it is concerned merely with probabilities, or with 
losses and gains. North (1995, p.914) defines risk in broader terms as “the probability of 
occurrence of an adverse outcome and the severity of its consequences.” Since risky 
behaviour is a conscious and calculated action, people should be able to measure how much 
risk is involved in a given circumstance and protect themselves from the most damaging 
potential outcomes. For example, a business investment necessarily involves taking risks, but 
if the businessperson correctly calculates the probability of loss and gain, provided that they 
have a good investment strategy, the risks can be reduced or even avoided.  
 
Uncertainty differs fundamentally from risk in that it cannot be seen and anticipated. Epstein 
(1999, p.579) maintains “uncertainty refers to situations where the information available to 
the decision maker is too imprecise to be summarised by a probability measure.” The sheer 
unpredictability of life means that it is necessarily subject to some degree of uncertainty. For 
instance, accident, illness or other issues might end a person’s life unpredictably. While 
unpredictable events cannot, by definition, be anticipated, a person’s behaviour is constrained 
in situations where there is the fear of uncertainty. Standing (2010. P.294) argues that 
uncertainty drives people into a more risk situation than risks, because of people never know 
which outcome will occur, it could be catastrophic. Without a protection, uncertainly could 
push people into a serious economic insecurity. Risk is therefore a little more secure than 
uncertainty because people can measure the risk probability. Therefore, in an attempt to bring 
about economic security, security policies must be designed to deal with shocks, risks and 
uncertainties. 
 
People who are living in poverty suffer more from insecurity. “Notions of poverty overlap 
with notions of insecurity, one could have one without the other” (ILO, 2004, p.3). Those 
living in poverty are considered one of the most vulnerable groups in society as a whole 
because they lack both basic rights and finances. The ILO notes that “[p]eople suffering from 
impoverishment are likely to be among the most insecure” (2004, p.56). While people with an 
income below the official poverty threshold are usually thought of as living in poverty, the 
situation is in fact more complex. For example, according to the World Development Report 
(WDR) (2001), poverty is pronounced deprivation in wellbeing. Furthermore, it is important 
to be aware that poverty is not the same as insecurity. Some people are feel serious insecurity, 
but they are not poor. Others may feel relatively secure, even though they are have little 
money and do not own a house. Poverty is ultimately a relative concept. In China, a person 
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with no bicycle would be thought poor, but a person with a car would be rich, whereas a 
person without a car in the United States would be considered poor. Some very poor people 
living in mountain areas in China are without TV, fridges and cars. They have few 
possessions compared with people living in modern urban areas, but it cannot be said that 
they face insecurity.  
 
There are two main measures of poverty. The first is the relative poverty line, which relates to 
overall distribution of income in a country, so that the poverty line could be set at one-third or 
one-half of a country’s mean income, depending on how much income is considered to mark 
poverty in that country. The second is the absolute poverty line, which identifies the absolute 
standards of what a household requires to meet their basic needs. The latest World Bank 
estimate of the extreme poverty line is US$1.25 a day (in 2005 PPP $). Chen and Ravallion 
(2008, p.18) state that about 1.4 billion people worldwide in 2005 fell within the World 
Bank’s measure for extreme poverty (or around a quarter of the global population), and 1.751 
billion people were earning between US$1.25 and US$2.5 a day. “Between 1987 and 1998, 
the number of people in sub-Saharan Africa living on less than US$1 a day increased from 
217 million to 291 million” (ILO, 2004, p.56). This means that about half of the total 
population of the region were living in poverty. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Africa 
accounted for an increasing proportion of the world’s poor, rising from 15% to 28% during 
these years, and this makes consideration of the sub-Saharan African experience particularly 
important. The ILO (2004, p.56) reports that in South Africa, a third of people felt their 
household income was too low to buy enough food and some said that it was insufficient for 
rent and medical costs. In Ethiopia, “78% of men and 83% of women said their household 
income was inadequate for basic needs, while in Tanzania and Ghana most people said their 
household income fluctuated from month to month” (ILO, 2004, pp.82-87). Such poverty can 
quickly cause economic insecurity because it makes it difficult for the poor to defend 
themselves against possible misfortune and to cope with misfortune when they do encounter it. 
There is clearly a link between levels of extreme poverty and economic insecurity, especially 
since much of the population in poverty has either no employment, short-term employment or 
an informal contract with employers. In Africa, most workers are employed informally. 
Furthermore, many people also suffer from health problems such as HIV/AIDS and many do 
not live long enough or have good enough health for long-term jobs (ILO, 2004, p.58). The 
employment instability of such people means that they live under a cloud of uncertainty. 
Another issue concerns non-payment of wages, where poor workers cannot obtain full or part 
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payment for the work they have done. Furthermore, low wage rates in an economic system in 
which income inequality is growing compounds the issue of uncertainty. All these issues 
contribute to a person’s overall economic insecurity.  
 
It should be borne in mind, however, that poverty and low income are relative terms. Being 
poor in itself does not necessarily mean that one suffers economic insecurity; rather, a lack of 
stable employment or the possibility of job loss means that a household faces the threat of 
economic insecurity. In this way, economic insecurity threatens not only the poor but also the 
more affluent. Despite this, international statistics do not contain an ‘insecurity threshold’, 
because such a threshold is not as easy to measure as absolute poverty. It is relatively simple 
to ascribe a monetary value to the poverty line (for example, the World Bank’s income of 
US$ 1.25 per day), but insecurity is a more complex concept and includes various factors 
such as food insecurity, job insecurity, income insecurity and other relevant insecurity factors 
(ILO, 2004, p.14). At present, there is no reliable statistical data on the relationship between 
poverty and the wider concept of economic insecurity.  
 
Therefore, it is necessary for policy makers to consider the uncertainty and risks that people 
face and to understand the complex relationship between poverty and insecurity. The next 
section discusses the most important aspect of economic security, which is income security.  
2.8	  Background	  to	  income	  security	  
 
Before considering the background to income security, it may be useful to define income 
security in general terms.  In the prevailing economic form, almost all countries are market 
economies. This means that goods are traded via the markets and people have to buy 
according to their needs. To satisfy his or her needs, a person first must have a stable income. 
Income security therefore aims to guarantee that people have sufficient income to cover basic 
living costs, pay for health care and housing, and can afford to eat healthily. The ILO (2004, 
p.55) defines income security as follows: 
 
Income security consists of an adequate level of income, a reasonable assurance 
that such an income will continue, a sense that the income is fair, relative to 
actual and perceived “needs” and relative to the income of others, and the 
assurance of compensation or support in the eventuality of a shock or crisis 
affecting income. 
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For the ILO, income inequality is part of economic insecurity, as “[p]eople who are living in a 
highly unequal society will feel more vulnerable, anxious and resentful” (ILO, 2004, p.58). In 
highly unequal societies with a free-market system, income security measures themselves can 
perpetuate income insecurity. For instance, higher income earners are more likely to receive 
high benefits because they are able to afford to meet the costs of a variety of private forms of 
insurance in order to protect their levels of income. Under such private insurance schemes, the 
level of benefits paid is directly proportional to the level of contributions paid (Crosby and 
Stephens, 1987, pp.405-407). In such highly unequal societies, the disparities in income levels 
persist beyond people’s working lives. Those who earn large salaries during their working 
lives are likely to receive significantly higher benefit rates after retirement than those who 
earned lower incomes. For example, “senior executives of many US corporations are provided 
with retirement funds guaranteed a high rate of return” (ILO, 2004, p.61). 
 
The origins of modern income security systems lie in the immediate aftermath of WW2. 
Many countries in Western Europe based their income security policies on the British 
approach to income security, which included notions of  “jobs for all” and “social insurance 
against a rainy day” (Craig, 1975, pp. 124, 125, 130). These developments marked a 
significant victory in the fight against income insecurity. After the 1970s, however, when 
there was a significant economic transition towards globalisation, the service sector developed 
rapidly, the speed of industrialisation slowed down, and traditional family patterns began to 
change. In many countries more and more women joined the labour force and it became very 
difficult to maintain full employment. For European governments, the increasingly heavy 
outlay on social expenditure became problematic and the existing social protection system 
could no longer be maintained. To cope with the increasing problems, a new policy of welfare 
state retrenchment was established in Europe. This abandoned a full employment policy, 
increased labour market flexibility and aimed to reduce the size of government expenditure on 
social welfare. Under this new system, people began to bear the brunt of the risk of losing 
their jobs. However, Pierson (1996, p.173) argues that the retrenchment policy was not an 
attempt to weaken the political foundations of the welfare state. He claims: 
 
Economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an image of welfare states 
under siege. Yet if one turns from abstract discussions of social transformation to 
an examination of actual policy, it becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that 
these strains have generated fundamental shifts.  
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The era of retrenchment represented an effort to rein in the range and extent of social 
entitlements. One notable example is the social insurance net replacement rate in the UK. The 
UK saw the net replacement rate fall from 60%-70% in 1975 to 20%-24% in 1995 (Korpi and 
Palme, 2003, p.433). This low replacement rate has increased income insecurity, especially 
for unemployed people.  
 
The unemployment rate is one of the most important indicators of income security. Although 
European countries introduced various forms of unemployment insurance to protect the 
income security of citizens, it is still the case that “unemployment is the least covered of the 
standard forms of contingency risk” (ILO, 2004, p.76). Although unemployment insurance is 
a crucial component in protecting individuals against labour market risks, it fails to cover all 
individual income risks. Furthermore, the unemployment insurance payment may not be 
sufficient for people who are at risk of long-term unemployment. In general, developing 
countries do not pay enough attention to income security and many of them lack 
unemployment insurance policies entirely. Most developing countries have changed the 
structure of their economies in order to facilitate their entry into the global capitalist economy. 
In so doing, however, traditional forms of welfare provision have been undermined and 
problems such as job insecurity, lower wage rates and high unemployment rates have become 
more prominent. Even in countries that have unemployment insurance policies, 
unemployment benefits cover only a small proportion of unemployed workers. For instance, 
in “Latin America, some countries have a scheme, but coverage is very low. In Argentina, 
unemployment benefits reached just 6% of the unemployed in 1999, which was less than in 
previous years” (ILO, 2004, p.77).  
2.9	  What	  are	  the	  different	  types	  of	  income	  security?	  
  
Income security is a difficult concept to define because there are both different types of 
income and income security programmes. As to the differing forms of income, an individual 
citizen’s income might take the form of a personal salary or other material benefits obtained 
from work. Sometimes, however, non-monetary wealth can also be transformed into a means 
of physical income; owned property or land can be the source of a monetary income through 
people selling or leasing these assets via the market. The reason that there are different types 
of income security programme is due to people’s differing needs. Therefore, in order to 
simplify the issue, a starting point might be to consider whether the income security 
programme provides monetary or non-monetary benefits.  
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The ILO (2004, p.56) claims since there are various forms of income: 
Income does not come only in direct payments. A very important form 
of income consists of public goods, which are often provided for the 
whole community and are seen as one means of reducing the 
inequalities that arise in market economies.  
 
This kind of security is important to rural-urban welfare provision and in the developing 
world.  Furthermore, people may sometimes need support in the form of material objects 
rather than cash. For example, a homeless person would need to solve their housing problem 
before tackling other problems. Housing provision can be considered as the most effective 
policy to deal with this particular insecurity problem. 
 
As regards income security programmes that provide monetary benefits, one type involves 
fixed-income cash transfer; for example, retired people might obtain a fixed-income pension 
from the state or other organisation once a month. This pension income remains fixed and 
does not vary between periods. People living under conditions of extreme poverty might also 
obtain state support in the form of cash transfers once a month or once a year. This fixed 
income could guarantee a degree of income security for those people. Such fixed-income 
transfers afford poorer people or pensioners a degree of living security.  
 
In recent years, cash transfer schemes have been used as a means of reducing poverty and 
economic insecurity in developing countries. These schemes directly transfer cash to the poor 
and aim to satisfy people’s needs in the short term. Such schemes are generally composed of 
two distinct but complementary parts. The first part entails an unconditional cash transfer, 
which means that the beneficiaries can spend the money at their own discretion. The other 
part is a conditional cash transfer, which means that the money has to be used for a specific 
purpose. For example, the most well-known conditional cash transfer is “the requirement that 
recipients should send their children to school” (Standing, 2008, p.10). Many countries in 
Latin American have adopted a conditional cash transfer scheme in order to promote social 
development. In such schemes, the national government typically sets a nationally defined 
income standard against which households are measured and establishes the conditions that 
must be met for receipt of the benefit. The eligible low-income households then have money 
transferred into their accounts.  
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One popular form of conditional cash transfer comes from Standing (2008, p.10):   
A monthly sum of money paid to poor families, or more usually to 
mothers, on condition that their children attend school. The main 
claim is that incomes for school attendance lower the poverty and 
economic insecurity of women and lower child poverty 
 
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia programme is among the most well-established conditional cash 
transfer schemes in Latin America and has reduced poverty levels and increased school 
attendance (Standing, 2008, p.14).  
 
Another type of income security measure involves social insurance in various forms (for 
example, unemployment insurance and health insurance). When workers lose their jobs or 
those in poverty need medical attention, people who cannot afford the cost will be covered by 
such social insurances. The range of insurances on offer depends on the specific social 
insurance policy model that a country chooses to adopt. This issue is of particular relevance to 
countries that are in the process of developing social welfare systems. 
2.10	  What	  form	  do	  policies	  on	  economic	  security	  take	  in	  the	  present	  day?	  	  	  
Income insecurity most severely affects poorly educated and low-skilled people, who face the 
problems of unstable and irregular income, periodic unemployment, and a lack of available 
unemployment. At the present time, the effort to tackle income security is being undermined 
by growing income inequality, the political failure to collect information and allocate 
resources to tackle the problems faced by the most disadvantaged people in society, and the 
unequal access to the political decision-making process. For example, highly unequal 
societies tend not to keep accurate records on the living conditions of their most 
disadvantaged citizens (that is, the homeless and slum dwellers). In addition, many 
developing countries have weak taxation policies, which means that these societies do not 
have the money to help their poor. Compounding these problems is the fact that urban 
middle-class groups are more visible politically than poorer people because they are able to 
appeal to the state via political and media representatives. Poor people often do not have 
similar access to representation in politics or the media because they tend not to belong to a 
recognised organisation that exerts pressure on or reports directly to the state. In such 
circumstances, therefore, the lack of information available to policy makers hinders the design 
and implementation of effective income security policies for poorer citizens.  
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Globalisation and liberalisation have led to significant changes in the nature of work. The 
types of job available today have changed from the industrial jobs previously available, and 
manufacturing jobs are increasingly unlikely to be the main source of employment in many 
countries. The ILO (2004, p.116) notes “a clear trend of the globalisation era is that 
manufacturing jobs have been shrinking in much of the industrialized world”. Throughout the 
world, large parts of the global labour market work in an increasingly informal way. 
Particularly in developing countries, huge numbers of workers continue to enter the informal 
labour market. It has been estimated that “50% to 70% of the developing countries’ labour 
force is in informal work” (ILO, 2004, p.115). However, parts of the social security system 
are often inaccessible to informal workers because they were designed for those in formal 
employment. 
  
The ILO (2004, p.55) asserts that there are various ways to protect income, including 
“minimum wages, wage indexing, comprehensive social security and progressive taxation to 
reduce inequality and to supplement those with low incomes.” Many countries use a 
minimum wage to protect income and reduce the gap between rich and poor. In the United 
Kingdom, the USA, most Latin American countries, and many EU and Asian countries 
minimum wage legislation sets a minimum national standard for workers’ pay. Countries such 
as Denmark, Iceland and Switzerland have not introduced a minimum wage law but apply a 
minimum wage through negotiations between unions and employer associations. The 
introduction of rules on the minimum wage has increased the standard of living for many poor 
people. Many countries have also introduced job protection laws that help people to have 
more stable employment and income by reducing the risk of them losing their jobs. When 
viewed within the wider province of living security, however, it is clear that these methods 
alone cannot address the complex problems that arise from unemployment, housing issues 
and being unable to pay for medical treatment.  
 
Insurance is one method of helping to reduce income insecurity. It has become an 
increasingly popular method of providing income security, and most world governments are 
aware of the importance of unemployment insurance policies for social security. In 
developing countries, unemployed workers may face greater risks and insecurities than their 
counterparts in developed countries because the welfare systems in developed countries are 
comparatively less developed. Therefore, as a means to providing income security, 
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unemployment insurance has been paid much more attention in developing countries in recent 
years. Haagh (2006, p.386) claims that “unemployment insurance has emerged as a 
mainstream source of income support in developing countries” In East Asian countries in 
particular, unemployment insurance also has come to be treated much more seriously. As 
Kwon (2005, p. 5) notes: 
Some social programmes, such as unemployment insurance, which 
had been regarded as hampering economic development, were now 
understood as developmental as economic restructuring took place. 
 
Nevertheless, although insurance has contributed significantly to improvements in income 
security, it is sometimes overlooked when the achievements of anti-poverty schemes are 
assessed. 
 
Unfortunately, the dogma of liberalisation does not contain provisions for the development of 
comprehensive unemployment insurance systems. For the advocates of neoliberal 
globalisation, employment insurance is a private matter, independent of society. Many 
governments, however, still treat employment insurance as a public matter. The ILO (2004, 
p.77) reports that “[r]ich-country governments have not adopted plans to privatise 
unemployment insurance, as proposed by some ultra-liberal commentators.” In most East 
Asian countries, the state still plays a strategic role in economic welfare development. 
However, since unemployment insurance is focused on formal workers, it does not cover 
everyone and is available only for a limited time. It primarily covers those formal workers 
who have recently become unemployed and who have a stable work history. Mazza (2000, 
p.6) sums up the situation well “a very common aim for unemployment insurance is to 
cushion workers in the short-term transition to new employment.”  
2.11	  Conclusion	  
 
This chapter introduce the idea of economic security in terms of globalisation and discusses 
the literature in this area. Many countries have begun to experience social security problems 
as the influence of capitalism, privatisation and neo-liberalism over the welfare system has 
increased. Where once the state provided comprehensive protection, there has been an 
economic security policy shift towards welfare provision by the private sector. In general, 
poorer people and people living in poverty are receiving increasingly less social security. Of 
particular importance to people are changes brought about by the neoliberal globalisation 
project since the 1980s that have affected their income security, access to welfare provision 
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and quality of life. Neoliberal globalisation has affected the nature of employment and 
increased the role of competition in the labour market. This has had a follow-on impact on 
welfare provision and economic security. The world’s economy after the 2008 financial crisis 
remains in an unstable condition, and the unemployment rates worldwide are of great concern. 
Given the fundamental changes brought by neoliberal globalisation to the economic security 
of people in developing countries, the governments of developing countries must ensure that 
their economic security measures are appropriately designed so as to reduce the risk and 
uncertainty faced by citizens.  Owing to its enormous population, high levels of poverty and 
its socialist market economic system, China’s efforts to deal with the issues of living 
insecurity are worthy of particular attention. An analysis of the extent to which free-market 
ideology has been used in China’s welfare system, its ability to address China’s particular 
issues, and its effects will be discussed in later chapters. 
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Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  The	  background	  to	  Economic	  Security	  in	  China	  
3.0	  Introduction	  	  
Chapter 2 introduces the background and general context of economic security on a global 
level as a way into the topic of this research on the current economic security problems 
experienced by people in China. This chapter provides an overview of economic insecurity 
issues in China, tracing the historical changes to social policies, reviewing the relevant 
literature and discussing current issues in this area.  
China has experienced enormous economic and social changes over the past thirty years. The 
changes brought about by the economic reform in 1978 ultimately led to China’s adoption of 
an open market economy and consequently to changes in the social system as well. China’s 
strategy of economic liberalisation led to the substitution of market mechanisms for the 
instruments of state planning and to drives to increase economic efficiency and productivity. 
The economic policies implemented by the Chinese government since 1978 have certainly 
generated enormous economic growth, but for much of this time, the government’s 
development strategy was heavily weighted towards economic development, with far less 
attention paid to social policies, especially policies dealing with economic security.  
Alongside this market liberalisation and economic growth, there has been an increasing 
degree of informality in the labour market and the emergence of a new phenomenon: the mass 
migration of rural workers to more economically developed areas in search of work. Fleisher 
and Yong (2003, p.30) argue that dealing with labour market transformation has been one of 
the most challenging tasks that the Chinese government has had to face. On one hand, China’s 
thirty plus years of market-based reforms have produced staggering growth, but on the other, 
they have led to increasing numbers of informal workers, unsupported poor people, 
unemployed workers and economic migrants suffering from poverty. Recent developments in 
the Chinese social security policy arena are attempting to address these issues. Based on 
Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999), Ringen and Ngok (2013) suggest a new kind of welfare state 
regime has arisen in China, which they term a ‘fragmented liberal-conservative hybrid model’. 
They see the emerging welfare state in China as coming from a response to economic 
necessity rather than the traditional meaning of welfare state. Therefore, the state is providing 
a minimal level of support and the social insurance system contains irregularities (in the form 
of informalities).  
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In order to develop a better understanding of the above issues, Section 3.1 provides an 
historical overview of the development and progress of China’s social security system. 
Section 3.2 defines the importance of economic security development in China. Section 3.3 
explains Chinese income security policies. Section 3.4 shows how inequality has impacted on 
income security in China. Section 3.5 discusses unemployment benefits in China. Section 3.6 
defines the housing security issues in China. 
3.1	  How	  did	  the	  Chinese	  social	  security	  system	  change	  from	  earlier	  ages?	  	  
In the years immediately prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
the country was almost destroyed by WW2 and then civil war. During this period, no social 
welfare system existed in China, and lower-income workers and farmers had no social 
security protection. The social security system that emerged in China can historically be 
divided into three periods.  
The first period, which began soon after the PRC was established in 1949, lasted until 1978. 
China’s social security system was established around 1950, and during that time, the social 
security policy that was implemented was consistent with a planned economic system. 
Economic and social performance was completely controlled by the state and private sector 
businesses were forbidden. “Privately owned enterprises were all transformed into one form 
or another of state ownership and control” (Walder, 1984, p.5). In 1951, the Chinese state 
government announced official regulations concerning labour security, with provisions made 
for medical care, retirement and injury compensation. In the period between 1951 and 1978, a 
series of social security policies were enacted. In order to better control and manage China’s 
huge and growing population, the household registration system, which categorised areas as 
either urban or rural and thus classified citizens as urban or rural residents, was introduced by 
the government in the late 1950s (Wu and Treiman, 2004, p.363). Under this system, the 
central government applies different policies to the two area categories. In urban areas, the 
central government introduced social insurance programmes that included health insurance, 
old age pensions, workers’ compensation, maternity benefits and other welfare services 
(Saunders and Shang, 2001, p.276). In the urban public sector, where the ‘dan wei’ system of 
state-owned and collectively owned enterprises operated, official social organisations and 
government authorisations acted to provide comprehensive social benefits and insurance for 
their employees. Those in such employment were considered to have an ‘iron rice bowl’. 
Unless they committed a serious breach of regulations (such as committing a crime), they 
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would normally keep their jobs until they retired. Furthermore, they did not suffer from 
income inequality at all because the state protected public sector work units.  
The ‘food rationing system’ was also introduced in this period, and all cities and rural towns 
in China applied this system. The state equally allocated monthly standard food coupons to 
each family and guaranteed that people had basic food supplies. People used the coupons to 
purchase food instead of using money (State Council of China, 1955). Although this policy 
limited economic growth, it guaranteed people’s food security. Although this policy of 
providing universal food coupons restricted market economic efficiency, an alternative use of 
conditional food coupons might have helped the living security of the extremely poor without 
negatively influencing economic growth.  
When the Communist Party of China assumed the reins of government in 1949, China was 
suffering from widespread urban and rural poverty. The series of social policies that were 
introduced guaranteed living security for many people for the first time. By 1957, 94% of 
urban workers were under the social insurance system (Sun and Dong, 2000, p.20). Social 
expenditure on urban workers increased from 1% of total government spending in 1958 to 2% 
in 1963 (Dong and Ye, 2003, p.418). By the early 1960s, living conditions for urban residents 
in China had improved significantly from the early post-war period. However, the influence 
of the non-urban public sector was extremely limited before the 1970s and rural people 
largely had to rely on themselves. Although rural local authorities were able to provide some 
assistance, it was far less than in the urban public sector. This disparity in social policy and 
welfare provision between urban and rural areas also explains part of the reasoning behind the 
government’s strict control of labour movement through its use of the household registration 
system. The high levels of protection provided by the social insurance system for urban 
registered workers meant that if the same benefits were extended to rural workers, public 
enterprises and state finance would become unaffordable (Lu, 1993, pp.66-87). China’s 
increasing population and comprehensive social benefits meant that the state nevertheless 
bore an increasingly high social expenditure burden, and the social welfare system began to 
be criticised for its negative effect on economic growth.  
The second period began with the economic reform in 1978, which brought a renewed focus 
on economic development and the opening of trade barriers. After 1978, China opened its 
doors to the world and increasing numbers of areas of the economy began to be liberalised. 
International organisations also pushed developing countries to abandon state ownership and 
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transform their economies into a public-private partnership model. These reforms resulted in 
the state having less control over both the financial resources and the behaviour of many 
enterprises that contributed to comprehensive social insurance. After 1984, therefore, some 
regions in China began exploring alternative methods of raising funds for pensions and other 
social insurance for employees at state-owned enterprises and urban collective owned 
enterprises. Employees within the newly emerging private sector had far less cover from the 
social welfare system than workers in state-owned businesses at that time. Many of the newly 
privatised businesses had to bear the full cost of health insurance, pensions and so on 
themselves, because the social welfare security system was fundamentally grounded in state 
and public owned enterprises: the greater part of the welfare fund came from public owned 
enterprises and much of the social welfare support, such as housing and pensions, was 
provided by public enterprises. Furthermore, firms in the private sector were relatively small 
in size at the beginning, so the state paid less attention to them and their employees’ social 
welfare needs. However, as the economy entered a new stage of rapid economic growth, 
average living standards began to improve, the size of the private sector grew significantly 
and it became clear that China needed to develop a new form of social welfare system with 
regard to income, housing and health. In 1992, the government therefore began to enact 
deeper reforms of the social security system, which was clearly defined for the first time, and 
considered more carefully the social security system links between the private and public 
sectors. Society has had to bear a heavy burden during China’s transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy system. Saunders and Shang (2001, p.280) note that urban 
poverty was estimated to affect around 18.5 million in 1993, or 7.8% of the entire urban 
population. This figure had risen to 20 million in 1995, and it continues to increase. In 
addition, during the 1990s, a new phenomenon of a floating rural migrant population, moving 
to the cities to find work, emerged.  
The third period began in 2008 and has continued to the present. After the worldwide 
financial crisis in 2008, China’s social and economic environment changed significantly, with 
heavy price inflation, job reductions and massive rural migration of workers emerging as 
serious issues. As a result of these changes, China’s existing economic and social security 
system began to face new challenges. China’s current social security system is in need of 
solutions in order to address these challenges. For example, in this new period of massive 
rural to urban migration, the household registration system, which divides the 1.3 billion 
Chinese into official areas of residence along rural-urban lines, and controls and regulates 
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interregional migration and population mobility (Wang, 2005, p. xi), has severely restricted 
rural migrants’ access to social benefits. Under this system, social insurance benefits are only 
provided by the town in which a person is officially resident. If people move to other 
provinces, they are not able to access benefits in the new area of residence, and rural migrants 
have to return to their registration areas to access social benefits or insurances. Furthermore, 
since the social support payment standard in rural areas is much less than in urban areas, the 
benefits that rural migrants are eligible to receive are often insufficient to meet their needs in 
new urban surroundings. For example, if a rural migrant needs to receive medical treatment in 
an urban area, his/her health insurance benefit is paid at the rural payment standard and is 
therefore unlikely to cover the costs of treatment in an urban area.  
Another problem is the limited coverage of social security support and its unequal 
development between regions. In rural areas, the development of social security has been 
relevantly slow. In 2000, 56% of elderly people living in cities received an old age pension, 
compared with just 8.2% of older people in rural areas (Chan et al., 2008, p.78). In 2007, out 
of a total of over 76 million older people living in rural areas, just 3.9 million pensioners were 
drawing benefits from rural pension insurance schemes, a coverage rate of less than 5% of the 
rural population (Yang et al., 2009, p.6). By 2003, 15 provinces had set up a minimum 
standard of living scheme, providing financial support for 4 million recipients, but this only 
covered 0.4% of the rural population (Chan et al., 2008, p.70). The problems are not limited 
to the rural-urban divide. For example, in Wuhan city, the most populated city in central 
China, the average annual MSLS (Minimum Standard of Living Scheme) benefit was only 
16.6% of the average personal annual income, and over 60% of MSLS recipients said that the 
level of assistance was too low to afford daily necessities (Chan et al., 2008, p.72). 
Furthermore, there are large differences in the levels of coverage and social security support 
within cities and provinces. For example, in 1997, the level of social insurance benefits was 
highest in Shanghai and Guangdong provinces, but the benefits ranged from a high of 1,326 
yuan per month to a low of only 100 yuan a month (Wu, 1997, p.7). 
Even with its extraordinarily high rate of economic growth, China’s unemployment rate still 
remains high and labour market insecurity in China is very widespread. According to the ILO, 
many millions of workers in China are on extended lay-offs or unpaid leave. However, these 
workers are not counted in the official unemployment figures (ILO, 2004, p.120). In 2001, the 
unemployment rate announced by China was 3.6%, but this figure included only the 
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registered unemployed in urban areas. Workers in rural areas are all considered to be in 
employment. However, when the actual level of unemployment in rural sectors is analysed by 
including migrant workers and laid-off workers, the rural unemployment rate might be as 
high as 7.5% (ILO, 2003a, p.26). In 2011, the unemployment rate in China is expected to 
show little change, remaining at around 4.0% (ILO, 2011, pp.38–41). Compared with 2001, 
the unemployment rate has increased about 0.4%, but this figure still only corresponds to 
unemployment in urban areas. If it included unemployment among the rural labour force and 
migrant workers, the predicted unemployment rate in 2011, if calculated using the same 
methodology as is currently used in China, might be at least double or triple the official 
figures. China is not alone in exhibiting this high level of unemployment. Other countries that 
have undergone economic transition, such as the Russian Federation and Ukraine, also have a 
high unemployment rate. Much of the current unemployment problem can be seen to have 
stemmed from the structural economic changes that took place in the 1990s. For example, 
according to the ILO, total employment in the Russian Federation fell by more than a quarter 
in the 1990s (ILO, 2004, p.122). India, a country with a similar population to China, also had 
a high unemployment rate in this period, with 10.9% of the population unemployed in 1999 
(ILO, 2004, p. 123). 
China’s traditional form of social security is moving away from a strong state welfare model. 
State welfare provision has been reduced in line with China’s development of its distinctive 
form of socialist market economy, which combines the public and private sectors in a 
complex relationship. China’s current income security protection mechanisms are based on 
this system. China’s current socio-economic situation, which is neither purely capitalist nor 
socialist, necessitates the development of a modern and efficient social welfare system. The 
social system in China contains some forms of informal development. Ringen and Ngok 
(2013, p.16) discuss how the welfare system in China is: 
…shot through with irregularities, such as non-participation by enterprises, 
shortfalls in contributions, mispayment of benefits to non-eligible persons, 
excessive overhead costs, and very considerable misappropriation locally of 
social insurance funds, including by corrupt means. 
These irregularities will be discussed in later chapters as informality, with the thesis 
examining the degree of informality in welfare system China in later chapters. 
As China’s official statistics provide only partial data on the effectiveness of China’s social 
security system, this thesis aims to explore its effects on hitherto ignored groups – rural and 
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migrant workers – and to bring them and their experiences into the analysis. In its current 
form, the household registration system adversely affects social security efficiency and 
effectiveness. This particularly results in economic insecurity for migrant workers, because 
most migrant workers only have social rights where they are registered, not where they are 
working. ILO (2004, p.15) argues that income security is a basic human right. However, the 
household registration system is strangling the right of migrant workers to enjoy such income 
security benefits. The household registration system might be a barrier to approaching a 
universal social type. This will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8. It should be particularly 
emphasised that the household registration system limits economic security for rural people.  
In addition, China is currently moving towards a universal model but not fully universal 
welfare system, for example, by the end of 2011, over 90% of China’s population was 
covered by medical insurance (Ringen and Ngok, 2013, pp. 13,17). They argue that the main 
exclusion is migrant workers. This discussion will be examined in later chapters. Given that 
economic security continues to be an important issue in China and that income and housing 
security are the fundamental areas dealt with by China’s economic security system, this thesis 
investigates these two areas with a focus on recent times (roughly 2008 to the present). First 
of all, however, an understanding of why social security is important for China is necessary.  
3.2	  Why	  is	  economic	  security	  development	  important	  to	  China?	  	  
Economic security is widely regarded as one of the most important matters for social and 
economic development. The economic security situation in China is worth investigating 
because of China’s unique circumstances: the country has the largest population in the world; 
it is the largest of the developing economies; and it is the world’s second largest economy. 
China’s market economy system is socialist in nature, in that although it merges the public 
and private sectors, the public ownership sector has most control over the market. When 
considering the social security system, therefore, both public and private systems must be 
taken into account. Establishing a proper economic security system that can maximise the 
servicing of people’s needs is an extremely difficult task. In the following sections, the 
Chinese government’s efforts to establish such a system (for example, via the MSLS) and the 
increase in private influence on the social security system will be discussed. The changes in 
social insurance provision in China that are relevant to the thesis will be outlined as well as 
the effect of the rural-urban household registration system on the Chinese social security 
situation.  
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China’s system of social security was much stronger in the past. The state formerly provided 
strong protection for people; all economic and social activities were protected by the state, 
including economic security. Following economic reform, China’s economic and social 
system swung significantly towards a market system. The change in China’s approach was 
highly influenced by neo-liberal globalisation. State intervention was dramatically reduced 
and the economy and movement of social goods became increasingly defined by 
commoditisation. Even though state-owned enterprises still play a large role in China, the 
private sector is growing fast and plays an important role in the market economy. Standing 
(2010, 2011a) asserts that insecurity is not natural, and that it was an outcome of a new kind 
of regulation (in the form of reregulation) from the influences of neoliberalism.  In China, 
also, the new social welfare system shift did not come naturally, rather the state created the 
new form of insecurity because of the new market reforms. Standing (2010, 2011a) is rather 
pessimistic about new regulation; however, Chang (2007, 2010) is more optimistic. He argues 
that to deal with the new reforms (such as neoliberalism) in the economic, social and political 
system, governments could increase state intervention against ‘market signals’ from 
neoliberalism (Chang, 2010, p.200). This is about planning the right things at the right levels 
so as to improve national economic and welfare performance (Chang, 2010, pp.208-209). The 
question is, does China have a good plan to deal with market signals?    
In the past three decades, a series of reforms have been introduced to transform the old social 
security policy associated with the planned economic system into a new social security 
framework that better corresponds with China’s new market economy system. The once 
strong state welfare provisions have either been reduced in scale or have disappeared 
altogether in the areas of housing and food provision. China’s new social security system 
includes social insurance programmes, social welfare schemes, the special care and placement 
system, social relief measures and housing services. Social insurance is central to the new 
social security system, with insurances including unemployment insurance, pension 
insurance, medical insurance and so on (State Council of China-White Paper, 2004). However, 
this system is not yet complete, and the new market economy has generated many new 
security problems, such as the issues of rural migrant workers’ income and housing security. 
Over the past two decades, China’s income and housing security problems have grown 
considerably. Furthermore, China’s uneven economic development across different regions 
and large income inequality gap means that income insecurity in China is increasingly 
prevalent. Poverty is widespread. Job insecurity is another issue, particularly for the less 
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educated and unskilled, whose employment tends to be informal with little labour security. 
The current eligibility requirements for social security insurances and benefits mean that these 
workers are largely excluded from receiving benefits from employers or the state. There are 
also problems with the public healthcare service in China. Poor people are unable to afford 
health costs when there are high medical bills and are therefore denied access to sufficient 
healthcare. ‘The high out-of-pocket cost of medical care and drugs has become a serious 
concern for Chinese residents in both urban and rural areas’ (Blomqvist, 2009, p.605). 
Although the health insurance coverage is very wide,  the payment is low and only goes part 
way to covering the high costs of healthcare. 
The Chinese economic security system has faced increasing criticisms from social welfare 
experts and academics. Ringen and Ngok (2013, p.9) assert 
The outsourcing of social responsibility from work and production units 
was taken forward in a painful process of trial and error. The old support 
system was dismantled early on while a new system emerged gradually, 
tentatively and much later. The interim was a period of policy neglect, 
social chaos and misery. 
The Chinese welfare system is still in a transitional period, where the new system is gradually 
replacing old system. They argue that reforms to the welfare system have changed the social 
support structure and have been taken by legislative, administrative and other policy signals 
(Ringen and Ngok, 2013, p.10). However, during this period, there have been new forms of 
economic insecurity. Chapters 5-8 will address those new forms of economic insecurity in 
more detail. 
Lim and Zhao (2009, pp.4–5) claim that since the responsibility for healthcare and other 
social services provision remains at the local level, central government’s efforts to address 
China’s social security issues have suffered from a lack of efficiency and transparency. Local 
government is unwilling to listen to the public’s concerns and projects such as affordable 
housing and low rental housing (LRH) policies therefore fail to satisfy public needs. 
Blomqvist (2009, pp. 605–610) argues that social insurance plans in China only offer a 
limited level of protection against the high cost of medical care. He therefore suggests that the 
government should increase subsidies to healthcare providers in order to reduce healthcare 
costs to users and guarantee that all rural and urban areas citizens are able to obtain basic 
healthcare. Given Blomqvist’s suggestion, more details about healthcare will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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In the area of employment security, the ILO (2004, pp.120-123) reports that the labour 
surplus in China remains at a high level, which has greatly influenced employment 
opportunities and wage rates, but China’s social security system has failed to address fully the 
needs of the unemployed and the low paid. Given that income security is one of the most 
important factors in economic security, the next section examines income security in China in 
more detail. 
3.3	  What	  are	  the	  income	  security	  policies	  in	  China?	  
 
Several kinds of income security support have been provided by the state and state-owned 
enterprises since the 1950s. Old age (pensions) security was provided by state-owned 
enterprises, which “were responsible for both the delivery and administration of basic 
pensions to their own retirees according to the years of employment and the wage received 
before retirement” (Wang, 2006, p.103). Employment was found by the state for those 
seeking work, such as school leavers and the unemployed, as part of the job security policy 
(Leung, 1995, p.140). Jobs assigned or provided by the state were normally on a long-term 
basis; most of them were for life. Once a person had obtained a job, it was very difficult for 
them to lose it or transfer to a different occupation, and people were guaranteed a lifetime of 
employment (Gang et al., 1998, p.15). Under Mao, income security was protected by the state 
and the ‘social security policies made by the central government [were aimed at] full 
employment and income equalization’ (Wong, 1994, p.310). Unfortunately, the pre-reform 
economy suffered from slow development and low productivity and the welfare system 
provided only a low standard of living. Wong (1998, p.63) argues that Mao’s regime left the 
nation backward and impoverished. Before China’s economic reforms, the state also provided 
healthcare provision, with central government providing “a low-cost medical service and wide 
coverage for the general public” (Chan et al., 2008, p.115). 
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping rose to power and initiated reforms that would 
fundamentally change China’s economic system. The state and public-owned sectors reduced 
significantly after the 1980s, and the private sector became increasingly prevalent in Chinese 
society. In the wake of the economic reform, social security also changed greatly. State and 
public welfare provision gave way to market provision, and many people no longer enjoyed 
the benefits of job security, and free housing and medical treatment, but instead had to pay the 
market price for them. As the state no longer had to provide guaranteed job opportunities, the 
unemployment picture also changed due to the market economy reforms.  
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In order to provide adequate income security for unemployed people, China first established 
an unemployment insurance (UI) system in 1986. The benefit from this insurance was 
between 50% and 75% of basic pay up to a maximum of two years (Chan et al., 2008, p.102). 
In comparison with similar schemes operated by developing countries, the Chinese UI system 
appears relatively generous. For example, Brazil also implemented its first universal 
unemployment insurance programme in 1986. This provided benefits to recipients at their 
average wage rate for the past three months of employment for a maximum duration of four 
months (Cunningham, 2000, pp. 2–4). Thailand introduced UI in 1990, with the laid-off 
receiving 50% of wages for up to six months (180 days) within 1 year of becoming 
unemployed (Chandoevwit, 2008, pp. 58–59). Compared to these two countries, China’s UI 
programme actually provided relatively good benefits for a reasonable period. However, this 
benefit did little to secure the living standards of low-income workers because their income 
was already at or close to the poverty line, and if they lost their job, unemployment benefits 
would not be enough to provide living security. In the late 1990s, an improved formal 
unemployment insurance scheme was established by the central government (State Council of 
China, 2005b). The scheme’s payment rate was set between the local poverty line and the 
local minimum wage rate. The maximum duration of the benefits was 24 months. 
Furthermore, informal workers were unable to claim this benefit. However, the scheme’s 
payment rate was still very low, meaning that unemployed workers continued to suffer living 
insecurity. In 1999, the central government announced a solution to the situation, the MSLS 
(Minimum Standard of Living Scheme), which was introduced in urban areas in that year. It 
was designed to protect, ‘city dwellers with non-agricultural households and where the 
average income of family members is below the level of the minimum living standard of a 
region’ (State Council of China, 2005a). In 2007, more than 22.72 million people received 
MSLS support in China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007b). In Xinjiang 
province, around 0.61 million people were enjoying this benefit in 2009 (State Council of 
China, 2009a). However, the speed with which the MSLS has been applied to rural areas has 
been relatively slow. It took until 2007 before the central government introduced MSLS 
protection for rural residents. Rural MSLS is designed to provide protection for ‘agricultural 
residents and where the average income of the family is below the poverty line’ (State 
Council of China 2007b). In 2007, 35.63 million rural residents were in receipt of MSLS 
support.  
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While the introduction of the MSLS as a universal income protection scheme is welcome, the 
level of support offered under the MSLS has been criticised as being too low to secure a 
satisfactory living standard. Chan et al (2008, pp.76,78) assert that the recipients of MSLS 
“do not have sufficient resources to buy nutritious food or to pay for medical fees” and it is 
very difficult for them to lead a normal social life because “[t]he existing level of the MSLS is 
hardly able to meet the basic daily necessities of poor families.” This issue is compounded by 
the fact that there is no nationally set MSLS payment rate. MSLS payment rates are 
determined not at the national level, but at the local level. Statistics show that while nationally 
the average monthly MSLS support rate was 182 yuan (US$26) per person in 2007 (Wang, 
2010, pp.1,2), the average monthly MSLS rate in Xinjiang Province was only 156.5 yuan per 
person, or US$22.85 at 2009 rates (State Council of China, 2009a). According to the World 
Bank, the absolute poverty line is US$1.25 a day, yet the MSLS support rate is lower than this 
measure of poverty by around US$14.5 per month. As a result of such low payment rates, 
China’s MSLS scheme cannot be said to provide effective assistance to those in poverty or 
solve their living problems.  
Another important policy for income security is a minimum wage policy. China officially 
introduced such a policy on 1st March 2004. This policy applies to all private enterprises, 
individual businesses and workers who are in an employment relationship and also includes 
state organisations, institutions and public organisations and workers who are working under 
an employment contract (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2004). In designing this 
policy, the state considered the risks that people might face during the development of the 
socialist market economy and expected that this provision would meet the basic needs of 
workers. In practice, however, the policy has not met expectations. A major flaw of the policy 
is that it grants the power to set payment rates to regional and local government. In other 
words, the system does not provide a national standard minimum wage rate, but instead 
allows local authorities to set minimum wage standards. This is problematic because many 
provinces (for instance, Heilongjiang and Shannxi) set the minimum wage standards just 
above the poverty line or the minimum threshold for MSLS eligibility (State Council of 
China, 2006a, State Council of China, 2006b). By the end of 2006, the average minimum 
wage standard was 536.03 yuan per month. However, this average rate masks considerable 
disparities in minimum wage levels between regions and especially between urban and rural 
areas: the highest minimum wage standard was in Shenzhen city at 870 yuan per month and 
the lowest was in Jiangxi province at 270 yuan per month (Ministry of Labour and Social 
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Security, 2006). Furthermore, statistics show that average monthly expenditure per capita in 
2006 was 724.75 yuan and in rural areas the average monthly expenditure per capita was 
235.75 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007a). Therefore, average spending in urban 
areas was significantly higher than the urban minimum income rates in 2006, and this 
suggests that the minimum monthly wage rates set were insufficient to meet the needs of 
urban low-income workers. Although it may seem that the minimum wage standards for rural 
areas were adequate because they were above the average expenditure per capita for rural 
residents, it should be remembered that the vast majority of businesses and formal workers 
are in urban areas in China. As a result, the figures for rural areas cannot indicate whether the 
minimum wage standards for rural areas in 2006 were acceptable or not. This problem has 
been recognised in recent years and as a result the minimum wage rate has increased 
considerably in every province. For example, in Xinjiang province, the minimum monthly 
wage was increased by more than 120 yuan (US$17.7), or 24.6%, in 2010 (Chinese 
Government’s Official Web Portal, 2010), and Shanghai gave a 14% increase in the minimum 
wage level to aid people earning a low income (Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 
2008). 
China’s current UI and MSLS income security policies will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapters 5-8. For now, the discussion will turn to another important factor that adversely 
affects income insecurity, inequality. 
3.4	  How	  much	  does	  inequality	  affect	  income	  insecurity	  in	  China?	  
3.4.1	  Changes	  in	  inequality	  since	  the	  1950s	  	  	  
Under Mao, China introduced the household registration system. This system was set up to 
control the movement of people and to allow the state to manage benefits. The welfare 
benefits the state provided to urban citizens were much better than those provided to rural 
citizens, for example, urban dwellers had special housing benefit and health benefit. In this 
period, China also introduced the ‘food rationing system’, which began in 1955. As described 
in Section 2.1, the state allocated monthly standard food coupons equally to each family, 
which much improved families’ income equality. 
The state’s welfare policies ensured that the inequality level in this period was relatively low. 
The Gini coefficient1 between the 1950s and the 1970s stood at around 0.30 (Adelmen and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Gini coefficient is commonly used to measure inequality: a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents 
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Sunding, 1987, p.454). Income inequality increased significantly after the economic reform 
after 1978. Since then, the state’s responsibility for economic and social development has 
been gradually reduced and social and economic decisions have moved increasingly towards a 
market-based approach. In today’s China, market price has become one of the most important 
elements in people’s lives and China is no longer a country with low levels of inequality. In 
recent decades, China’s Gini coefficient has increased. It reached almost 0.412 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011b) in 2000, and by 2005 it had increased to 0.415 (The 
World Bank Gini index, 2011). Although this figure compares favourably with other 
developing countries – Brazil’s Gini coefficient was 0.564 in 2005 and Chile’s was 0.520 in 
2006 – the issue is that China’s Gini coefficient is increasing. In contrast, the Gini coefficient 
in Brazil and Chile is displaying a downward trend. In 2009, Brazil and Chile’s Gini 
coefficients were 0.539 and 0.523, lower than for 2005. Figure 3.1 shows that, although 
China’s inequality level has historically been better than South American developing 
countries, inequality in China is worse than in selected Asian developing countries and that 
China’s Gini coefficient shows an upward trend.  
 
Figure 3.1 Gini Indices from developing countries 
 
 
 
 
China’s Gini coefficient was similar to Japan and South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s, 
and during this period, the Gini coefficient was quite stable for Japan and South Korea. In the 
1970s, the Gini in Japan was around 0.339 and in South Korea it was around 0.30 (Mizoguchi, 
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absolute inequality (Bosi and Seegmuller, 2006, pp.35–40). 
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South Korea it was 0.3499 in 1999 (Cheong, 2001, p.55). Since the 1980s, both Japan and 
South Korea have experienced a slight increase in inequality levels over time, as their 
economic growth caught up with China. However, the inequality is these countries has not 
increased a great deal. Although globalization and neoliberalism has influenced the inequality 
rate in many countries due to the economic development, China seems to be in a worse 
position than most.  
 
The income inequality gap in China continues to increase in both rural and urban areas. The 
current pattern of wealth distribution is highly imbalanced, with social wealth concentrated 
among a relatively small number of people. According to China Economic Net (2010, p.1) 
‘China’s Gini coefficient passed the 0.40 red alert line ten years ago, and it continues to 
increase.’ The gap between rich and poor has crossed the line of acceptability in China. 
Despite this, there has been no official report by the Chinese government on the country’s 
Gini coefficient since 2000. Even in the most recent economic report, it is only briefly 
mentioned that the Gini coefficient in 2010 was a little higher than it was in 2000 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011b).  
 
The rural-urban contrast is of particular importance to the analysis in this thesis. Changes in 
income inequality can be observed in relation to the different development of inland-coastal 
areas and rural-urban areas. Cities in coastal areas such as Beijing and Shanghai have 
undergone dramatic development since the economic reform. Income inequality in rich 
coastal areas is increasing faster than in inland poor areas. For example, according to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011a), the income difference between Beijing’s rural 
and urban citizens in 1995 was 3,011.35 yuan per annum. By 2005, it had increased to 
10,306.69 yuan, a growth of about 3.5 times. In Xin Jiang, an inland area, the rural-urban 
income difference in 1995 was 3,026.99 yuan. By 2005, it had increased to 5,508 yuan, an 
increase of around 1.8 times.  
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Figure 3.2 Rural-urban income differences by distance from the coast (1995-2005) 
 
   
Figure 3.2 shows the average rural income as a fraction of the average urban income in 
different regions of the coastal area. The areas up to 400 kilometres from the coast used in 
this table are Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong and Guangxi. Those 400 to 1,000 kilometres from the coast are Shanxi, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi and Guizhou. Those 1,000 to 1,500 kilometres from the coats 
are Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Sichuan and Ningxia. Those over 1,500 kilometres from 
the coats are Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet (see Figure 3.3 below for a map of the largest cities 
in China). 
 
The average income in coastal regions is higher than the average income in inland regions and 
income inequality between the coastal regions and inland areas has increased over time. 
Between 1995 and 2005, the difference in average income between coastal regions and inland 
regions grew at 5%. It should be noted, however, that the inequality in average income over 
time within each region also shows an increase. Furthermore, inside the rich coastal regions, 
income inequality between rural and urban areas grew faster than inside the poor inland 
regions. In coastal areas lying up to 400 kilometres from the coast, the gap between rural and 
urban incomes increased by about 7% between 1995 and 2005. In inland areas which are over 
1,500 kilometres from the coast, this gap increased by only 1%, less than in coastal provinces.  
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Given the above, it appears that income inequality is increasing both across and within 
regions in China. However, wealth differentials are not the only important indicator of 
welfare provision. It is also important to consider the quality of life afforded by a welfare 
system.  
 
Figure 3.3 Map of China 
 
 
 
3.4.2	  Domestic	  movement	  of	  labour	  due	  to	  income	  inequality	  	  
China’s household registration system stopped labour migration for a number of decades, 
which led to a massive labour surplus in many rural areas. In 1952, the urban labour force was 
16 million, whereas the rural labour force was 182.4 million. By the end of the 1970s, the 
urban labour force was 99.7 million, and the rural labour force had increased to 310.3 million 
(Yang and Zhou, 1999, p.118). Early in the 1990s, as the central government decided to stop 
the ‘Food Rationing System’, the urban and rural labour forces increased to around 150 
million and 440 million, respectively (Yang and Zhou, 1999, p.118). Because of the many 
barriers to rural-urban migration, there was little such movement before China’s economic 
reforms, and rural-urban migrant workers numbered less than 2 million in the late 1970s (Li, 
2008, p.4). In the late 1970s, less than one per cent of the total labour population was 
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composed of rural-urban migrants. After the introduction of liberal economic reforms, the 
regional inequality gap drew many people from rural and inland areas to urban and coastal 
areas in search of higher incomes. 
As Figure 3.4 shows, the rural-urban migrant workforce had increased to 30 million people by 
1989. When the food coupon system was abandoned in 1993, the migration level doubled 
from the 1989 level. Following the expansion of economic reforms and the opening up of the 
market, the rural migration trend continued to increase. By 2006, rural-urban migrants 
numbered nearly 140 million, and this trend has continued since then. According to the most 
recent report by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010), 229.78 million people were 
registered as rural labourers and of these 145.33 million were migrants to urban areas. 
Furthermore, rural-urban migration in 2009 increased by 3.5% over the 2008 level (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010). China’s National Bureau of Statistics reports that rural 
migrant workers have five main characteristics. First, most rural migrants are male and most 
of them are married. For example, in 2009, 65.1% of rural migrants were male and 56% were 
married. This statistic is unsurprising given that in traditional Chinese culture, the 
Figure 3.4:Number of rural migrant workers in China, 1989-2006 (millions) 
 
  
male is both the head of the family and the main breadwinner. Second, their education level is 
generally very low. In 2009, around 10.6% of rural migrants had primary school level 
education (age 6-12), 64% had completed senior school education (age 12-14) and only 13.1％ 
had high school (age 15-17) certificates. Third, around half do not obtain any skills or training 
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formal employment training and the statistics indicate that those with lower levels of formal 
education also have less skills training. Fourth, they typically find employment in the 
manufacturing sector, the construction industry or the service sector. As of 2009, most rural 
migrants were employed in manufacturing. Fifth, nearly all working rural migrants are 
directly employed by an employer (rather than being self-employed or subcontracted labour), 
which means they are dependent on the employer-employee relationship (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2010).  
As a result of these characteristics and China’s huge surplus of rural labour, this mass 
migration of workers has generated huge employment security problems. ILO research (2004, 
p.126) shows that migrants have often taken jobs that local residents might not be prepared to 
do and that they are willing to take almost any type of job at low wages. When rural workers 
move to urban areas, they find it very difficult to get formal jobs. Most employment taken by 
rural workers involves hard physical work or unsanitary conditions, jobs that urban residents 
are not keen on doing. The Council of China-Research Office Project Team (2006, p.7) 
asserts that in 2006, rural migrant workers occupied 68% of jobs in manufacturing and 80% 
in construction. It also reports that rural migrant workers comprised the largest proportion of 
the workforce for those jobs with physical labour requirements. These might include textile 
manufacturing or electronics assembly. Most jobs were concentrated in the private sector and 
with foreign enterprises, and there were also many informal jobs and types of employment. 
Employers preferred to hire rural migrant workers because they could pay them lower rates 
than urban residents. This issue will be discussed more in Chapters 7 and 8.  
It is necessary to ask where these huge migrant populations come from and where they go. 
After the economic reforms, the eastern areas of China were most influenced by neoliberal 
globalisation because they are all coastal areas, and it is therefore easier to trade and organise 
business with foreign companies. The west and central areas of China have been far less 
affected by foreign investment. Foreign investments and foreign companies’ skills and 
technological advantages influence the pattern of development and create considerable 
regional income gaps and these factors have generated a high-level of regional and intra-
regional income inequality in China. Since most of the economic migrants in China are from 
poor areas, they are driven to leave home to seek higher incomes and a better life. Their most 
popular destinations are therefore those with a wage rate significantly higher than that in the 
rural areas from which they originate, which generally means the larger cities. Other areas 
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where there is a large income inequality gap between rural and urban areas are also attractive 
for migrant workers. Li (2008, p.8) states that around 70% of rural migrants originate from 
central and west China and move to eastern areas: Guangdong province, Zhejiang province, 
Shanghai and Beijing are popular destinations. Given the problems facing migrant workers, 
the research looks at how far the rural migrant workers suffer from income insecurity in urban 
areas. 
3.4.3	  Insecurity	  problems	  due	  to	  income	  inequality	  	  
The rural migrant sector might be considered one part of a new and insecure working class in 
China, a class that Standing (2011a) terms the precariat. Standing (2011a, p.59) states that 
migrants ‘have a relatively high probability of being in the precariat’. As a result, the case of 
rural migrants is one that society needs to consider when discussing insecurity as related to 
income inequality. Rural migrant workers normally obtain a very low income. At the heart of 
the low-wages problem for rural migrants in China is the fact that there are very large 
numbers of rural migrant workers, which has reduced the average wage rate in urban areas 
due to the large labour surplus. In 2006, the national rural migrant worker’s average monthly 
income was only 966 yuan. Average monthly spending on food and accommodation was 463 
yuan, which is nearly half of the total monthly income (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2006, p.2). By 2009, the migrants’ wage rates had improved, with the average monthly 
income increasing to 1,417 yuan. Nevertheless, around 40% of rural migrant workers had a 
monthly average income of under 1,000 yuan (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, 
p.1). A large number of people received a very low income, and general spending still 
accounted for a high proportion of a migrant’s monthly wage. For example, rural migrants’ 
average monthly accommodation cost was 245 yuan in 2009, around a quarter of the total 
average monthly income (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, p.1). These workers 
also needed to spend money on food, clothes and other necessities, while their savings were 
normally sent to their families in rural areas. If they experienced problems such as ill health or 
an accident, they had little or no money to cover the cost of treatment. Such problems, 
associated with low levels of income, affect not only rural migrants, but also other low-
income working class people.  
Another problem relates to job security. Migrant workers’ job mobility is much higher than 
that of local urban workers. Li (2008, p.14) states that almost 98% of rural migrant workers 
had changed job at least once since they moved to a city. This high mobility indicates that 
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their employment relationships are very unstable. It also points to the fact that a high 
proportion of migrant workers are employed in informal jobs. According to Li (2008, p.14), 
79% of migrant workers did not have formal labour contracts in 2004 (Li, 2008, p.14). This 
means that once they lose their job, they receive no benefits from the company or the state. 
Informal jobs also bring other problems, such as not being paid on time or in full or even 
receiving no payment whatsoever from employers. In sum, many migrant workers’ incomes 
are insecure due to their employment being in informal types of job. Poor housing conditions 
are another problem that migrant workers face. Most rural migrants have limited housing 
space or live in otherwise poor housing conditions (often in tents). For example, it is common 
for such workers to live in housing without a bathroom or toilet. Housing costs are also a 
major problem for migrant workers.  
In general, local urban workers are entitled to social security support such as unemployment 
insurance, pensions, health insurance and even some subsidies for housing. In contrast, the 
majority of rural migrant workers do not enjoy these social benefits. In 2005, 13% of rural 
migrant workers had insurance which covered injuries at work or illness, 10% had medical 
insurance and 15% contributed to a pension scheme (State Council of China-Research Office 
Project Team, 2006, p.13). While the income insecurity problems faced by migrant workers in 
China are clearly unsatisfactory, they are not alone in suffering income security. Other 
workers, including urban workers, also experience considerable income insecurity issues.  
What needs to be done, then, to guarantee the income security of such people? What lessons 
can be learned from the experience of other countries, and what approach should China 
adopt? While equalising incomes is one of the main targets in improving social security, it is 
not necessarily the most important one. The most important aim is guaranteeing greater 
income security. The aim, therefore, should be to provide the former worker with a 
replacement income that is not too different from their situation before the loss of their job. In 
the Danish case, the replacement rate has been divided into different levels. For example, 
those who earned under a certain level can get more than 90% of their former wage, while 
those who were earning above a certain level receive a lower (but still generous) percentage 
of their previous wage. The aim is not to make everyone more equal, but to make people more 
secure. The UK operates a different system. The unemployed all receive the same level of 
support regardless of their previous earnings. While this might appear more equitable on the 
surface, it does not guarantee income security, because some of these unemployed workers 
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might have to meet high mortgage repayments or might have higher expenditures on utility 
bills and other necessary spending. Under the current neoliberal framework, social security 
issues have increasingly become a matter for the individual, and people are less likely to find 
state support available.  
3.5	  Overview	  of	  unemployment	  benefit	  in	  China	  	  	  
Unemployment benefit is regarded as one of the main pillars of the social insurance system. 
Since the 1980s, globalisation has led to significant changes in the nature of work, with 
increasing labour-market informalisation a global phenomenon and this has brought with it 
changes to workers’ social protection. Income insecurity associated with unemployment has 
increased significantly, and the unemployment insurance (UI) system has become a very 
important factor in protecting people’s income security, especially in developing countries. 
For example, in Brazil before 1994, unemployed workers who were eligible for UI had to 
have worked in a formal job for at least six months prior to losing their job. If they had 
worked in a formal job for six to fourteen months in the previous two years, they could get up 
to three months of UI payments. If an individual had worked in formal employment for more 
than fifteen months in the past two years, he/she could get four months of benefits 
(Cunningham, 2000, p.4). After 1994, Brazil extended UI benefits to more people by 
changing the eligibility criteria and increasing the duration of UI payments. In this new 
system, unemployed workers who had worked six to eleven months in the previous three 
years in a formal job were entitled to three months payment. Those who had worked in a 
formal job for between 12 and 23 months in the previous three years could receive a 
maximum of four months payment, and people who had worked for more than 24 months in 
the previous three years in a formal job were entitled to up to five months payment. The value 
of the monthly UI payment was the average wage rate of the previous three months of 
employment (Cunningham, 2000, pp.4–5). In Thailand, the Social Security Act 1990 
established an unemployment insurance scheme (Thongtip, 2006, pp.6–7). To be eligible, six 
months of contributions must be paid in the 15 months before they lost their job and they 
must register with the employment centre. Anyone who is laid off receives 50% of their 
previous wage for a benefit period of up to six months (180 days) within 1 year 
(Chandoevwit, 2008, pp. 58–59). The UI programme in Denmark is one of the most 
successful economic security policies. The level of UI protection is high, with UI benefit 
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levels of up to 90% of previous earnings. The benefit period was four years within six years 
in 2009 (OECD, 2009, p.2).  
As mentioned in Section 2.3, China established UI in the early 1980s. It was designed to 
protect unemployment workers’ basic living security. Compared to Brazil and Thailand, 
China’s 24 months protection was better as it allowed more time for unemployed workers to 
seek work. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the coverage of China’s UI system was 
limited; it only applied to urban public or state-owned companies, and private firms and other 
sectors were not included in this system. As a result, large sections of the public were not able 
to enjoy this benefit. The UI system of the time was also found to be inadequate because only 
small groups of people paid the insurance fee (People’s Daily Online, 2001, p.1). Furthermore, 
the UI system did not consider those people who worked for foreign companies as it was 
designed at the very beginning of the period of economic reform and there were few foreign 
companies investing in China at that time. By the end of 1998, 79.28 million people had 
joined the UI system and 1.58 million people had obtained benefits from UI. Despite this 
apparent success, it should be borne in mind that China had a total of 705.86 million 
employees in 1999 (Population and Family Planning Commission of Gansu, 2006, p.1). The 
UI system therefore covered only around one out of every nine workers and its role in 
providing income security to the general population was limited. Following the further 
development of China’s economic system towards the neo-liberal market model, a huge 
proportion of the population came to work in the private sector and with foreign companies. 
This fundamental shift in the nature of employment in China led to an urgent need to protect 
these workers’ income security. Fortunately, the central government recognised the problems 
with the existing UI system and established a revised unemployment insurance scheme in 
1999. This covered both private and public sectors, including enterprises such as state-owned 
companies, urban public-owned companies, foreign investment companies, urban private 
companies and others (State Council of China, 2005b). By the end of 2010, 133.76 million 
people were participating in unemployment insurance programmes (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2011c). Nevertheless, this figure is still far lower than the total employee population and 
the new UI system still only performs successfully in urban areas. The majority of rural residents 
still cannot obtain these benefits. Furthermore, the current UI payment rates are low: the UI 
system provides benefits that vary between 70% and 80% of local minimum wage (Saunders and 
Shang, 2011, p.282). These rates are too low to satisfy cost of living needs. Finally, the current UI 
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system only applies to those in formal employment. Workers in informal jobs cannot get this 
benefit and therefore experience a lack of social security protection.  
3.6	  Overview	  of	  housing	  security	  in	  China	  
 
Housing security is another important issue for economic security in China. After China 
opened up in 1978, many areas began to reform and the transfer from state ownership to 
private ownership began. Prior to the period of economic reform, China used to have blanket 
state provision of housing in urban areas. Over the past three decades, the nature of housing in 
China has transformed from being a state welfare housing provision into a market 
commodity.  
After 1949, the government was deeply involved in the housing system, with nearly all 
aspects of housing production and consumption controlled by the state. “[M]assive resources 
[were] invested in cities and towns to provide accommodation for urban residents, particularly 
those employed in the state sectors” (Wang and Murie, 2000, p.399). State-owned enterprises 
distributed houses to their workers in urban areas. Workers paid little or nothing for the 
houses and poorer workers had priority in obtaining housing. “Housing was regarded as part 
of the wage costs of enterprises and public-sector housing was freely distributed to 
employees. No deposit or other payments were required before the tenants moved in” (Wang 
and Murie, 2000, p.402). However, housing was one of the most heavily subsidised 
commodities, and owing to China’s rapid population growth, the provision of housing to 
every urban resident placed heavy fiscal and management burdens on the state. In addition, 
although housing provision was public policy, the allocation of housing was not equal. There 
was no department of housing to allocate houses, with control over housing allocation instead 
decentralised to individual work units. To qualify for  housing, applicants had to be formal 
urban residents and permanent employees. Houses were small, however, and it was common 
in many households to have three generations living in a 100-200 square metre house. Such 
eligibility criteria and living conditions attest to the failings of the state’s direct provision of 
housing. Nevertheless, these problems still exist today in China, although now people pay for 
their own houses. 
China’s housing reforms started in the 1980s with the adoption of privatisation and 
liberalisation in the housing sector. The government began to allow private firms to provide 
and sell houses, and the banking system was liberalised so as to allow people to purchase 
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houses via mortgages. These housing reforms reduced the pressure on the state to provide 
housing, re-established housing as a commodity and pushed individual citizens into taking on 
their own housing costs. By 1998, the state was no longer the main provider of houses; the 
traditional welfare housing provision policy had ceased. Private firms took the role of housing 
providers and individual citizens relied on the housing market to acquire housing (State 
Council of China-White Paper, 2004). Today, the housing business is booming in China. In 
recent years, housing construction has taken place at a rapid pace largely because of the high 
profits to be made by selling houses and the cost of houses has risen sharply. However, due to 
the high cost of housing, poor people cannot afford to buy houses. Even relatively affluent 
young people or graduate students often have to ask their parents for financial help to meet 
housing costs. Even then, many young people still cannot afford the down-payment for a 
mortgage. Over time, housing inequality in China has become worse and the risk of housing 
insecurity has become apparent to every middle-class and working-class family. Relying on 
the market is not going to solve the housing problems people are facing. Currently, there are 
three main policies for housing reform in China: the housing provident fund system, the 
affordable housing policy and the low-rent housing policy (LRH).  
Both employer and employees makes a contribution to the housing provident fund system and 
it can only be used to purchase housing, build housing or for housing repairs (State Council of 
China-White Paper, 2004). However, the amount of money that people can obtain from the 
fund is small and it cannot fix the problem of rapidly rising housing prices. Furthermore, 
people who are unemployed or have informal jobs cannot get these benefits. 
The second policy is the affordable housing policy, under which ‘the government employs 
preferential policies to restrict the housing types, size of the property in square meters and 
selling prices of the housing offered. Supply of these houses is to low-income urban 
households who have difficult housing conditions’ (State Council of China-White Paper, 
2004, p.1). Under this system, housing is sold at low prices to low-income earners.  However, 
this state-run system is poorly organised, inefficient, and not very flexible. For example, a 
poor person may not remain poor, and if there is a favourable change in their circumstances, it 
is hardly possible to require that they move out of the house that they have purchased and 
legally own. This inflexibility means that other truly poor people who need houses must wait 
until more housing is available. Furthermore, because this is a government welfare policy, 
construction firms earn significantly less than they would for similar construction projects in 
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the private sector, and this lack of financial incentive for construction companies means that it 
is difficult to guarantee housing quality and fitness for purpose. A Chinese national 
committee member, Professor SongHai Guo argues “the economic affordable housing is 
sensibly priced but is not fit for purpose. To keep costs low, many of the affordable houses 
come to be built at the city margins. Such areas lack hospitals, schools and other facilities. 
Transportation costs and other related costs have increased the difficulties of poor families” 
(State Council of China, 2008a). 
The third policy is the low-rent housing policy (LRH). This policy covers low-income urban 
residents and aims to provide very low rental properties to poor urban families (State Council 
of China-White Paper, 2004, p.10). This policy combines monetary subsidies and low-rent 
houses. In the first instance, the government provides financial subsidies to poor urban 
families to rent houses. In the second instance, the local government provides low rent houses 
to poor urban residents. However, this policy only protects urban residents, and the huge 
numbers of rural migrants in the cities are not eligible for either the subsidies or the low-rent 
housing. Furthermore, the subsidies and low-rent houses are limited, and there are many poor 
urban residents who also cannot obtain assistance under the policy. The analysis chapters will 
examine such low rental policies designs and implementation in local cities level in China. 
3.7	  Conclusion	   	  	  
China is a country with a vast population, a huge number of workers and a great many poor 
people. As a socialist country moving towards a market economy, China has many challenges 
to face. The large rural population and migrant workers need better social policies that can 
guarantee living security. After many years of careful consideration, China has introduced a 
framework for reforming the social security system. However, this new system has many 
shortcomings, such as low coverage and low support rates for rural and migrant workers. 
Therefore, China might not have the well-developed plan advocated by Chang (2010) (see 
Section 3.2). Currently, the situation for people in urban areas displays higher levels of risk 
and uncertainty than for people in rural areas. Overall, workers’ economic security, and 
especially that of migrant workers, is getting worse. For workers facing the highest degrees of 
risk and uncertainty, social policies such as unemployment insurance and the MSLS are 
vitally important. More attention needs to be directed towards the factors that might influence 
the successful operation of a programme in China, and in particular, how factors such as the 
lack of administrative capacity, the huge population and the prevalence of the informal labour 
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market directly affect the operation and performance of a particular social policy. For some 
academics, China’s introduction of a market economy, while producing spectacular economic 
development, has led to the emergence of a new set of economic security challenges. 
China’s policies for economic growth have not been accompanied by policies that will ensure 
economic security for the country’s poorer citizens and sooner or later this will negatively 
affect social and economic development. Although, the liberalised market economic system 
has had a significant impact on the social welfare system and China has made considerable 
improvements to its social welfare system in response (especially as regards social insurances 
of different types), it still has a long way to go to achieve the aim of economic security. 
 
The next chapter describes the methodology used for this research and sets out how this thesis 
analyses income and housing security in China. 
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Chapter	  4	  -­‐	  Methodology	  	  
4.0	  Introduction	  	  	  
This chapter shows how the data used in this research was collected. It details the 
methodology employed to obtain the data used in examining the changing nature of economic 
security arising from transformation in the economy and in state provision. The previous 
chapters set up the context regarding economic security and introduced income and housing 
social security problems that put people’s living conditions at risk. The main purpose of this 
study is to investigate the kind of income and housing insecurity that is currently happening in 
China with a focus on how the problem is addressed at the local level, and how the Chinese 
state designs and manages its social welfare system, in order to provide a better environment 
for citizens. To assess income and housing security as the main focus of economic security in 
China, considering social welfare theories and the modern social security systems, the 
research considers the characteristics of China’s political, economic and social development 
through primary data obtained from participants and secondary data in the form of 
government documents.  
 
Triangulation of different levels, using direct and indirect methods to produce primary and 
secondary data was used. The data obtained was as follows: 
 
1. Primary data - questionnaire  
2. Primary data - interviews  3. Secondary Data - official documents	  	  
By using triangulation, the study looks at social security issues on three different levels, the 
national level, local government level and recipients level. These three different levels form a 
systematic chain link for China’s economic security.  An analysis of how these three different 
levels of policies interact and have an effect on individuals is shown in the analysis (Chapters 
5-8). Therefore, this method will help to pursue the answers to the research question.	  
 
The previous chapter gives the background to economic security in China. As discussed, 
insecurity continues to affect many people throughout their lives, especially as the increases 
in income and housing insecurity have brought serious consequences for their wellbeing. As 
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the country with the highest population, China has gained considerable attention in this area. 
Partly because of this, one obvious insecurity issue is in China’s overcrowded labour market, 
where rural migrant workers, informal and self-employed workers are given comparatively 
much less support than urban formal workers. The literature shows that the threat of economic 
insecurity is manifesting itself in China. This chapter explains how data was collected and 
analysed in order to examine these claims in more detail. 
 
To discuss the above issues, this chapter is divided into ten sections. Section 4.1 broadly 
indicates the methodology used in the thesis. Section 4.2 explores data gathering. Section 4.3 
introduces the case study. Section 4.4 describes the multilevel research method. Section 4.5 
discusses the methodology used at the national level, which is divided into three sources: 
government departments, the ILO and a university. Section 4.6 discusses the methodology 
used at the local government level, using a case study from Tangshan and interviews in 
different local departments. Section 4.7 investigates the methodology used at the recipients 
level in Tangshan city. Sections 4.8 and 4.9 explain the ethical issues and the limitations of 
the research. Section 4.10 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.1	  Qualitative	  and	  Quantitative	  methods	  	  
 
The purpose of this research is to understand and analyse the current social security system 
and the impact of social policies on economic security. It also examines ideas for a better 
system to reduce insecurity in China. The data obtained in this research is mainly qualitative; 
however, some quantitative data is also used.  
 
An important factor when doing research is that the research method needs to fit the aim of 
the research and allow for good analysis to explain the research questions. The analysis in this 
research relies on primary data from mainly qualitative sources and information but also uses 
a small amount of quantitative data. The aim is not just to demonstrate the processes and 
problems of the current social welfare system in China, but also to understand which factors 
have influenced China’s welfare system as well as looking at the barriers to the development 
of a better social security service. Therefore, this research also uses historical analysis and 
international comparisons. The research data comes from a variety of sources, a review of the 
international literature, a case study based on questionnaires and interviews, data from 
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interviews with representatives of the Chinese national and local governments, benefit 
recipients, academic scholars and the ILO.  
 
Qualitative data is primary focused on and emphasises words rather than numbers (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007, p.731). Shaw (2003, p.72) argues that a qualitative study promotes research 
for facilitating complete and valuable outcomes. Guba and Lincoln (1989, pp.85-98) indicate 
that the researcher is influenced by the concept of the qualitative and theoretical approach. 
The researcher needs to accept or consider the existence of various realities and understand 
that knowledge is generated by both the researcher and the researched outcomes. Therefore, it 
is important to acknowledge how the researcher and interviewees’ own knowledge or 
experiences might influence the investigation activities. This was important in the research, 
especially in the analysis in Chapters 5-8. There are arguments on the influence of the 
researcher’s own experiences, the interviewees’ experiences and theoretical debates in 
relation to the research questions.  
 
Although qualitative research forces on the development of knowledge in different ways, it is 
still necessary to consider quantitative techniques to evaluate the data. Unlike qualitative 
analysis, quantitative analysis is a systematic empirical investigation using a numerical format 
such as statistics or percentages (Given, 2008, p.713). Aliaga and Gunderson (2000, as cited 
in Muijs, 2004, p.1) define quantitative research as “explaining phenomena by collecting 
numerical data that are analysed using mathematically based methods”. This research 
collected quantitative data on the increase in housing security, income security and the labour 
market from the participant questionnaires. The research also relied on secondary sources, 
such as government documents to obtain quantitative data. The data was used to observe the 
trends in these areas. 
 
By combining qualitative and quantitative methods, the results are more reliable with higher 
validity. The method employed in this research, using mainly qualitative data backed up with 
quantitative data provides a richer and more accurate picture of the issues the thesis 
investigates. It still needs to ensure the research is credible, for example, that the data was 
collected as accurately as possible and that the analysis of the qualitative research was as 
effective as possible.  
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4.2	  Data	  gathering	  
4.2.1	  Primary	  data	  
In obtaining the data from the different levels, semi-structured interviews were used, which 
allowed new ideas to be introduced during the interview and provided more freedom for the 
interviewees to discuss relevant topics. The interviews are the most important data-gathering 
technique in this research. The research interview seeks to describe the meanings of central 
themes in the lives of the subjects. During an interview, open questions are used to introduce 
the topic and interviewees answer on the basis of their knowledge (Flick, 2002, p.81). 
Additionally, hypotheses-directed questions can be asked. Flick states that related questions 
“serve the purpose of making the interviewee’s implicit knowledge more explicit.” Bickman 
and Rog (1998, p.481) assert that interviews help the researcher to appreciate the 
interviewee’s knowledge and understanding in the research context. Kumar (2011, p.149) 
argues that an interview is the most appropriate method of data gathering for complex 
situations and is also useful for collecting in-depth information. During the interview, the 
interviewer has good opportunities to ask sensitive questions, to ask for details about complex 
issues and obtain more in depth information by probing the interviewee. For example, 
questions on inefficient ways of implementing social policies by the local government and 
arbitrary and unequal implementation of social policy in the cases of different applicants. In 
this research, it allowed the interviewees to discuss their personal ideas about the current 
social security system problems in China. 
 
Questionnaires were used to gain information at the recipients level to provide better and 
more accurate data on participants’ economic security. The questionnaire method offers 
greater anonymity as the participants’ name is not revealed. Kumar (2011, p.148) argues that 
questionnaires help to increase the likelihood of obtaining more accurate information because 
they provide good anonymity and the researcher can ask sensitive questions. Questionnaire 
also save time and are convenient. A questionnaire was designed and used at the recipients 
level to collect data about each participant’s experience based on direct social support issues. 
Demographic data such as education level and category of residents was also collected.  
 
4.2.2	  Secondary	  data	  
Collecting relevant official documents on social security issues was another central job in data 
collection. This applied particularly at the government level. Reviewing documents such as 
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official reports, plans and data sets, provided evidence and other useful information for the 
research. Official documents were also useful in historical analysis to help with knowledge of 
unexamined areas, and in particular helpful in systematic and direct data analysis. In addition, 
by using historical data and academic literature to define the welfare state in different regimes, 
comparisons of welfare regimes in different countries was possible.  
4.3	  Case	  study	  	  
A case study was used in the research. The case study is an in-depth, multifaceted 
investigation research method (Feagin et al, 1991, pp.2-5). Because China has such a huge 
complex administration system, it is necessary explain the information on the Chinese welfare 
state using a case study. A case study can span different dimensions and different methods 
and can use a large number of data sources. In particular, case studies can be used to 
investigate a wide variety of sources, such as interviews, field surveys, documents and 
observations. The variety of documents helps to build up a complete story and give a clear 
picture of the research area. The case study in this research examines Tangshan city in China.  
 
This case study is new in the research field of economic security in China. Feagin et al (1991, 
p.9) assert that a case study can permit the researcher to examine complex issues and 
“discover complex sets of decisions and recount the effect of decisions over time.” The case 
study is this research does not just focus on central areas, considering only neoliberalism. It 
also looks at what is happening on the ground, in the local area of administration. Therefore, 
it can see really specific economic security issues, not only general cases such as general 
economic insecurity arguments. The literature discusses general issues of welfare systems, 
models and policies related with economic security (Standing, 2011b; Chang, 2003; Esping-
Andersen, 1999 among others). However, the case study in this thesis examines the 
complexity and institutional aspects of what really happens in China. The literature gives a 
very broad general view without much detail; the case study at local level focuses in on the 
fine detail. Qualitative and quantitative methodologies were used in the local area, in the form 
of interviews and questionnaires, which were then used to develop the case study.  
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4.4	  Multilevel	  research	  method	  	  
Economic security research regularly involves problems in the relationship between 
individuals and society. Hox (2002, p.1) argues that individuals are influenced by society and 
society interacts with individual contexts. He asserts that in order to do research into the 
interaction between individuals and groups, multilevel research should be the main method 
used.  
 
A multilevel analysis was used in this thesis. It draws on three different levels, the national 
level, the local government level and the recipients level. Multiple levels of data collection 
and analysis were used as the research methodology, because the research question needs to 
be examined at more than one level of analysis. This not only applies to groups and 
organizations, but also at the individual level. The proper level of analysis has important 
implications for both data collection and analysis (Bickman and Rog, 1998, p.12). In 
multilevel research, sample data can be viewed as multistage samples from a hierarchical 
population (Hox, 2002, p.5). Therefore, this thesis tries to build a systematic analysis of 
income and housing security from the macro national level (Society) to the middle local 
government level (Group) and then to the micro recipients level (Individual). In this 
multilevel method, it is necessary to use a strategy to triangulate on economic security 
problems from several directions, thus lending additional confidence to the research results. 
The following sections look at the different levels in more detail and explore the methodology 
issues discussed above in detail.  
4.5	  National	  level	  	  	  
In the analysis of the national social reform plan, it is important to investigate which 
economic security policies have changed, what current policies are and how the state 
implements those security policies, as well as how the current policies affect people with 
different levels of average income. In this level, the triangulation method was used. 
Triangulation is a method of gathering different data sources to allow the testing of one 
source of information against another to strip away alternative explanations and provide a 
hypothesis (Bickman and Rog, 1998, p.495). Erzerberger and Prein (1997, pp.149-151) argue 
that triangulation is more accurate as it is designed to disclose the convergence, 
complementarity and dissonance of findings. Triangulation takes different positions that occur 
in the research, it can increase the size of understanding of the research subject. 
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Figure 4.1. Data used in triangulation at the national level 
 
Triangulation uses data from three positions the central government of China, the ILO and 
academics in the social welfare field (shown in Figure 4.1). Comparing the data from these 
three different sources gives more knowledge and diverse points of view. These three 
different levels view economic security issues from different angles, as they are separated 
from each other in their own specialist knowledge areas. Therefore, the discussions and 
research results come from different domains, so the analysis in the following chapters is 
more accurate in confirming the research outcomes. The different directions enhance the 
validity of the research results. The areas in the triangulation are explained in the next 
subsection.  
 
4.5.1	  Source	  1	  -­‐	  The	  Central	  Government	  of	  China	  
 
In China, the central government is the highest executive body in the country and therefore 
dominates social policymaking. For instance, the reforms introduced in social insurances, 
housing provision and other social policy regulations were made by the central government.  
 
Data collection – Ministry of Civil Affairs Office 
 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs Office is responsible for designing, monitoring and modifying 
urban and rural MSLS policies. It is the highest government level that directly manages this 
Central Government of China 
International Labour Office Academics 
  Economic Security  
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basic income support. The previous chapter described basic income as one of the most 
efficient ways to secure living conditions. It provides a ‘floor’ support that should guarantee 
every individual has some sort of income to live on. However, many studies show that MSLS 
levels are too low to satisfy people’s needs (Chan et al., 2008; Zhang and Tang, 2005; Mei 
and Liu, 2005). 
 
In order to examine this, telephone contact was made with the administrative reception office 
at the Beijing Civil Affairs Office, who arranged for Ms B, a civil servant from the Beijing 
Civil Affairs Office, to do an interview about the economic security policy in China. The 
following questions were asked in the interview: 
 
1. How is central government dealing with the current economic insecurity? 
2. Has central government designed MSLS to be a very low payment? 
3. Did the state learn about basic income security policies from other countries? If so, when 
and where?  
4. Will central government increase the level of support? 
5. Has the state considered using the MSLS to support rural migrants and has it considered 
rural migrant’s income and housing benefits?  
6. Did the state design social policies without considering citizen’s complaints or academics 
suggestions?  
7. What do you personally think the income policy should be, for example the MSLS? 
 
Data collection – Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
 
The civil servant Ms B from the Beijing Civil Affairs Office introduced me to the deputy 
department head of the Beijing Human Resources and Social Security office, Ms Z, who 
agreed to be interviewed. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Office deals 
with social insurance and human management. All of the current social insurance such as 
pension and unemployment insurance was designed and introduced by this government 
department. 
 
Since the 1980s, social policies have been regulated and issued by central government or its 
agencies (such as the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s 
Republic of China) rather than through legislation (Chan et al., 2008, p.49). So, there were 
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less social laws monitoring China’s social insurance system. As a result of the weak legal 
effectiveness of social administrative regulations, many welfare policies have not been 
implemented successfully. This was especially true in the social insurance sector. For 
example, people may have been unequally treated. Fortunately, in order to regulate the 
delivery of social insurance and ensure citizens get the correct social benefits, the Chinese 
Government has recently attached great importance to improving the legal framework for 
social security. The state is now writing social insurance into the legal agenda. The first 
Chinese social insurance law came into force on 1st July 2011 (Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2010) and has already been 
implemented for several months.  
 
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security is mainly responsible for social 
insurance schemes. Social insurance such as unemployment insurance, health insurance and 
pensions are very important to income security.  
 
Table 4.1: Social insurance coverage in China by branch, 2003-2008 
 
Year & 
Growth  
/Branch 
2003* 
 
2004* 2005* 2006* 2007* 2008* 
Urban Basic 
Pension 
116.46 
45.42% 
122.50 
46.27% 
131.20 
48.00% 
141.31 
49.92% 
151.83 
51.73% 
165.87 
54.91% 
Urban and 
rural medical 
care 
189.42 
14.66% 
231.04 
17.77% 
317.83 
24.31% 
567.32 
43.16% 
953.11 
72.13% 
1133.22 
85.33% 
Urban 
unemployment 
103.73 
40.46% 
105.84 
39.98% 
106.48 
38.96% 
111.87 
39.522% 
116.45 
39.98% 
124.00 
41.05% 
Source: (Asher, 2009, p. 8) *(Million + coverage ratios)  
 
The figures above show that social insurance coverage rates are increasing significantly, 
especially on urban and rural medical care insurance; by 2008, 85.33% of the population was 
covered by medical care insurance. The interviews discussed movement in the figures, such 
as significant increases in health care, and why and how it happens.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the household registration system in China has negatively affected 
income security, especially for rural migrants, and most rural migrant workers cannot obtain 
equal social benefits compared with local urban residents. They also lack social protection. 
On these points, the following questions were asked:  
 
1. Is the government going to make any changes to the current household registration system? 
If yes, what changes will be made in the area of social security? 
2. How is the new law working in the current situation? How has it has improved people’s 
income security? 
3. Why did central government introduce the social security law? Were there any particular 
reasons for introducing it? Will it mean better protection for people of a particular income 
level? 
4. Rural migrant workers are associated with many insecurity problems, is central government 
considering making any changes to current social system to protect them? 
5. Does the state think the current household registration system has been a barrier to the 
process of social security?  
6. How does the state implement insurance policies and have there been any recent changes?  
7. Why has the medical care insurance coverage rate increased so much in a short time? Is 
there any special strategy for developing social insurance policies?   
8. What do you personally think about the problems in the current income security system in 
China?  
 
Data collection – Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
 
The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development was visited to find out how central 
government applies the housing provision policy to local areas. This department is the highest 
government body directly responsible for social housing policies. Telephone contact was 
made with the administrative reception office, who arranged an interview Mr L, a civil 
servant in the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. 
 
Housing provision is another area that this research considers as a necessary guarantee for 
social security. In recent years, the state has increased the intensity of construction of low 
rental houses and affordable houses. In 2010, the state reported that 5.8 million social houses 
had been built that year (State Council of China, 2010). The state requires that local 
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government has to increase the speed of social housing construction, especially low rental 
housing. The purpose of this policy in particular is to satisfy lower-middle income and lower 
income housing needs and to solve lower income people’s accommodation difficulties. 
However, although there has been a significant increase in social housing, there are still a lot 
of complaints about housing insecurity. The following questions were asked during the 
interview: 
1. Has social housing policy, such as low rent housing, truly reduced the pressure on housing 
problems?  
2. Are there any problems hidden behind the low rent housing policy? 
3. Is central government giving the same support to each province and offering local 
government flexibility over the building of houses or does the central government set the 
same percentage targets for each province? 
4. Is there an isolation problem in housing recipient communities?  
5. Does social housing include rural migrants? If not, how does housing policy protect rural 
migrants? 
6. What do you personally think social housing should be in the future?  
4.5.2	  Source	  2	  -­‐	  International	  Labour	  Office	  	  	  
Economic security includes two dimensions, income security and housing security. ILO (2004) 
attempts to measure social and economic security in each country and in people all over the 
world, based on a range of issues related to security such as income, labour and employment. 
It takes account of policies, institutions, academic literatures and outcomes, including a range 
of historical performance data in the research. ILO (2004) also considers the how various 
attributes of globalization impact on to economic security.  
 
During the process of economic transition, the Chinese government has introduced many 
social security policies. But it might be difficult for the Chinese government to remain 
objective about where they make the policies. It is very important to know what international 
organisations think of Chinese social security. Therefore, an interview was conducted at the 
ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand to obtain their views. 
Looking at experiences outside the Chinese government is very important as views and 
observations could be a more objective evaluation about Chinese social security policy. The 
ILO is the international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing international 
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labour standards, therefore was a suitable organization to visit. The ILO Regional Office for 
Asia and the Pacific works in close collaboration with the Chinese government and workers’ 
and employers’ organizations to promote suitable work for all.  
 
Part of exploring the details is to engage with an idea from the ILO (International Labour 
Office, 2004) which suggests that through labour market reforms, the neoliberalists have 
intensified income insecurity since the early years of the 21st century, when governments all 
over the world sought to cut social spending. Neoliberalism has been very influential in 
defining the welfare system and labour market, with policies such as deregulation and less 
government intervention. It advocates an “individual responsibility model” rather than state 
protection (ILO, 2004, p.168). This has generated employment instability and a wide range of 
social hazards, making the welfare system tilted towards economic insecurity. However, in 
doing so, the costs of income security provided by the state have been reduced (ILO, 2004, 
pp.55, 69). This thesis considers which state policies will secure individual wellbeing (in 
terms of basic economic security).  
 
Through email contact, I arranged to interview Ms C from the ILO Regional Office for Asia 
and the Pacific in Bangkok. We met to discuss economic security issues and her job related to 
Asian social insurance and employment services. Figures from Liu (2009) on the number of 
people participating in insurance schemes were also discussed.  
 
Liu et al (2009) shows that participation in pension schemes increased from 104.475 million 
in 2000 to 141.31 million in 2006. There was also an increase in people participating in 
unemployment insurance. At the end of 2006, there were 111.87 million people (staff and 
retired people) participating in unemployment insurance with an increase of 5.39 million from 
2005. The growth rate of those participating in medical insurance was 15.5% compared with 
2005 (Liu et al, 2009, pp.48,49). 
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Figure 4.2 Basic information about unemployment medical insurance 
 
  
Source: Calculated from National Bureau of Statistics: China Statistical Yearbook 2007.   
 
Those figures indicate that China has expanded social insurance coverage. However, 
compared with the total population in China, the people participating in each of the two types 
of social insurance are less than 10%. Furthermore, there are problems in the development of 
different sectors. Those working for the government or a state-owned enterprise have a high-
level of social security protection, unlike the self-employed or those employed by private 
companies, who do not have the same level of social security protection. Compared with the 
formal sector, people who work in the informal sector have a much lower level of social 
security protection. These problems threaten income security, not only in China, but 
worldwide, especially in developing countries. Therefore, taking these existing problems into 
consideration, Ms C from the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific was asked the 
following questions: 
 
1. What does the ILO think about the reforms to social policies in China? 
2. Is China promoting livelihoods for its citizens and also promoting economic equality 
at work?  
3. Does the ILO believe this is due to the effects of neoliberalisation on the labour 
market? Does the ILO think that neoliberalisation is the key factor threatening 
people’s income security? 
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4. Is China getting better economically and socially under the current policies, and in 
China’s special situation, should China take advice from developed Western countries?  
5. What kind of modern security policies will work in China? 
 
In contrast to many regions around the world, narrowing income inequalities, providing a 
stronger social protection system and ensuring income are critical elements to economic 
growth. The gap in income inequality in China is large, for example according to the ILO “the 
incomes of urban households are on average three times higher than those of rural 
counterparts.” (ILO, 2012, p.41) Therefore, the ILO was asked whether this was a threat to 
China’s social security and whether China needs to focus on inequality and labour market 
policies. These questions are important and relevant to the research in this thesis.  
 
4.5.3	  Source	  3	  -­‐	  Academics	  
In order to get better analysis results, an interview was also conducted with an academic from 
this field. The views of academics are important in contributing theoretical opinions. 
Therefore, an interview was conducted at the Renmin University of Beijing, which is a top 
university in social policy in China. Following phone contact with the Social Policy 
department, an interview was arranged with Dr Y an academic researcher and lecturer. Dr Y 
was asked similar questions to those in the previous sections: 
 
1. What do you think about the current social security situation in China? 
2. China is in the process of economic transition, what are the characteristics of China’s 
social security policy? 
3. Did the government take advice from the university when they were considering 
social policies? 
4. What are the existing problems in the social security system? 
 
In recent years, the market system has increasingly influenced China. The government 
response has lessened compared to previously, especially on social protection. In light of this, 
the academic social researcher was asked whether the Chinese government should enhance 
the management of the social welfare system and increase the fiscal support level of social 
protection. 
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In order to draw out the most complete data about the various situations under investigation, 
the triangulation method must be used in the survey instrument. Therefore, the next section 
investigates the local government level.  
4.6	  Local	  government	  level	  	  	  
The local government level is focused on a coastal urban area, Tangshan City, which is in the 
Northeast of China. It belongs to Hebei province, and is close to Beijing. There are over 7.35 
million residents in this city. Tangshan is very important for heavy industry in Northern China, 
as it has large coal-mining, iron and steel industries. Tangshan is also called the porcelain 
capital of North China (Tangshan City Council, 2011). It mixes a large middle-income class, 
a low-income class and migrants. Considerable research has focused on big cities, like Beijing 
and Shanghai, perhaps because those cities are international metropolises, with more public 
attention and greater influence, and the data in those places might be easier to get. However, 
there are not many places like Beijing and Shanghai. Most places in China are not that 
developed, they are still developing. So Tangshan, as a middle-developing city, is most 
representative of the actual situation in China. It reflects many people’s lives. The researcher 
also has an advantage, because he comes from this city. He is familiar with the city and 
knows where to find data on the research questions. Research in such a local city is very hard 
for many international researchers to do so. 
 
Kaiping District Government in Tangshan 
At the local government level, an interview was requested with a representative of the 
Kaiping District government to discuss income and housing security in Tangshan. 
Government views are very important to the research, providing a more specific explanation 
and government plans to implement social security policies. Tangshan government official, 
Deputy Mayor of Kaiping District – Ms X, with responsibility for social security, education 
and employment area – agreed to be interviewed. The following questions were asked: 
 
1. What has the local government in Tangshan done to promote income and housing 
security in recent years? 
2. How does Tangshan city implement state security policies and have there been any 
recent changes? 
3. How does the city protect recipients’ economic security? 
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4. Are the recipients satisfied with the current situation? 
5. Do you think globalisation has generated economic insecurity in Tangshan? 
Tangshan Bureau of Civil Affairs Office 
Various social insurance such as unemployment insurance, health insurance and pension are 
very important to income security. Therefore, income security subsidies need to match the 
speed of inflation. In order to have a better understanding of local government take on these 
issues, a Director of the Tangshan Bureau of Civil Affairs Office, Ms L. was asked the 
following questions about this problem: 
 
1. Has local government changed the support rate over time?  
2. What are the current income protection policies in Tangshan? 
3. What are the main problems for income security policies in Tangshan? 
4. How does Tangshan city set the level below which it will give assistance? 
5. How does Tangshan city implement insurance policies and have there been any recent 
changes?  
6. What are the coverage rates for social insurances in Tangshan? 
7. Are there any problems with social insurances that protect people’s income security in 
Tangshan?  
 
The MSLS has been seen as one of the most important income security policies in China. In 
2008, the urban average MSLS rate was 205.3 yuan per person per month (China Net, 2009). 
Regarding MSLS policy in Tangshan, other questions were also asked: 
1. What does the Tangshan government think of the MSLS policy?  
2. How did Tangshan set the MSLS level?  
3. What are the main problems in implementing MSLS in Tangshan?   
 
In addition, official figures on MSLS support in Tangshan, a historical MSLS planning 
documents, and the 12th five-year plan documents for the state and Tangshan were also 
gathered from this office. 
Tangshan bureau of housing and urban-rural development office 
In Hebei province, the urban resident’s average spending was 7,343.5 yuan in 2006, the 
growth rate was 9.6% compared with 2005. The rural residents average spending was 2,495.3 
yuan in 2006, it had increased by 15.2% over the prior year (National Bureau of Statistics of 
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China, 2007). These figures indicate that average spending is increasing significantly in this 
area. The main reason is because of fast economic growth and a high inflation rate. It also 
reflects that under a market economy, the rapid economic growth rate will lead to significant 
changes in price levels, especially in rent and housing costs.  
 
Local government has a responsibility to provide low rental houses. These houses are usually 
built in a particular location. The local government also verifies which recipients can obtain 
the houses, based on income. The recipient’s income has to be lower than a particular local 
income level. In Tangshan, the city accelerated the implementation of the construction of 
affordable housing facilities. By June 2011, 39,583 affordable houses had been built. The 
Tangshan city council plans that by 2015, housing security for urban residents will reach 25% 
coverage. However, this does not take rural residents and migrants into account.  
 
Housing security in China is mainly focused on low rental housing provision and local 
government takes responsibility for building lower rental houses. The debate in this area 
mainly centres on whether current economic security policies are sufficient for the recipients, 
the benefits they can obtain and what they actually need. I was interested in whether the 
people inside the area were provided with security in income and housing terms. In addition, 
once people hand in their housing benefit claim form, they have to wait for their claim to be 
processed. It is important to ask how long it takes to sort out a claim for housing benefit. If 
the process takes too long to get back to participants, this may result in people losing patience 
and moving to dangerous living conditions. In order to improve housing security, it is 
necessary to ask the office about the group of people whose income is just above the support 
line, and whether they are going to have housing subsidies. Furthermore, in Beijing, the 
average space in each low rental house is around 60 square meters (State Council of China, 
2007a). Compared with Beijing, Tangshan is less developed; therefore, there might have been 
considerable difficulty for Tangshan in implementing social housing policies. An interview 
was arranged with Ms D from the Tangshan Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development to discuss these issues. The following questions on the current housing security 
protection level were asked: 
1. What has Tangshan local government done to promote housing security? 
2. What kind of people would be qualified to obtain housing support?  
3. How did the government set up the housing support line? 
4. What are the main problems for housing security in Tangshan? 
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5. What is the capacity of housing support in Tangshan? 
6. How many low rental houses have been built and what are the future plans? 
7. Has the government considered migrants’ housing security?  
8. What has the government done for migrants’ housing security? 
9. What is the average size of social houses in Tangshan?  
10. Is this enough for a normal three-person family? 
 
Various statistical data was also collected from the Tangshan City Bureau of Statistics, which 
included the fiscal support figures in recent years, the official income and housing security 
development plans in the next five years, figures of those on the poverty line and below the 
poverty line, and MSLS data in recent years in Tangshan city.  
 
Development and Reform Commission Bureau of Tangshan 
This Bureau conducts comprehensive research and formulates policies for economic and 
social development for the guidance of overall economic reform in Tangshan City. It provides 
strategies and middle- and long-term social and economic development plans and suggestions 
to the city government committees. Talking to an interviewee from this department, this 
research was able to find out how the city designed its social development and also future 
plans for the social welfare system development. An interview was arranged with the Deputy-
Director of this department, Mr Lv. He was interviewed, and talked about and commented on 
social plans in Tangshan. The following questions were asked: 
 
1. How does the city design social policies, and has the city learnt from any experiences of 
other cities or areas in China? 
2. Is there any future consideration of changing the current household registration system? 
3. Does local government consider social security for rural residents and rural migrant 
workers? 
4. How do you personally judge the current economic security policy in Tangshan, and do 
you have any suggestions for it? 
 
Tangshan Lubei District local court 
As discussed in Section 4.4.1, a new social security law has been introduced, which provides 
people with the right to social security. In particular, it provides a system for regulating the 
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labour market. However, the state does not provide much detail about upholding the standard 
of the law, for example, the state does not require any social payment standard, and does not 
show the penalties in cases where the law is not upheld. The state has left setting the standard 
to local government. Therefore, the informal labour market in particular might be a big issue 
that needs to be considered from a legal viewpoint. Mr Lv from the Development and Reform 
Commission Bureau of Tangshan introduced me to the Lubei court judge to talk about legal 
issues. The Chief Justice Mr W was then contacted directly by phone. 
 
Lubei District Court Judge Mr W was interviewed on social law and informal labour market. 
The following questions were asked: 
1. How does the law influence economic security, especially in formal work? 
2. Will the court consider informal jobs or informal workers breaking the law? If yes, is there 
any penalty for them? 
3. Are there many cases related to informality, for example, informal work or migrant 
workers’ employment contracts? 
4. Does the court help to regulate the labour market? 
5. What do you think the court should do in the area of social security, especially in the 
informal labour market? 
 
The next section explores the recipient level. 
4.7	  Recipients	  level	  
 
In order to find authentic and reliable data for this research, a survey questionnaire and an 
interview was used at the benefit recipients level. In the benefit recipients group, there are 
three different sub-groups: 
1. Migrant workers 
2. Lower-income people 
3. Lower-middle income people 
Participants in these three different classes from Tangshan city were selected. Finding a 
sample population was at first difficult, as according to income and housing policy, benefit 
recipients should all be experiencing poverty. Therefore, social benefit recipients were used as 
the sample population.  
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In China, people who obtain income support and housing subsides are normally at the lower 
income level. In the lower income sector, the Kaiping District Office provided a list of MSLS 
recipients containing 70 people. Thirty households were randomly selected from the recipient 
list and visited. Ms D, the Director of the Tangshan Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
Office, also provided a housing subsidies recipient list of 60 people from which 30 
households were randomly chosen to visit. The recipients of this provision were asked 
whether the low rental houses were affordable, whether there was enough space for the whole 
family and whether they felt secure about the housing provision. In general, the head of each 
household received a questionnaire. The questionnaire is in Appendix C. 
 
For the lower-middle income group, local working class people were chosen from the Rong 
Chuan Auto Industrial Park, this is a large well-known industrial park in Tangshan. Workers 
in this industrial park are typically classified as low skilled lower-middle income working 
class. At the industrial park, around 35 basic workers were randomly asked to answer the 
questionnaire. They also gave some short interviews. I also had the chance to meet one of 
private business owners based on the park. He agreed to be interviewed about local workers’ 
income and housing security, migrant workers’ benefits and informal jobs, such as: Does 
local government allow any kind of informal jobs or workers?   
 
Another middle-sized private company in Tangshan (YanShan Gas) was also visited. An 
appointment to carry out the questionnaire and interviews in this company was made 
following a phone call to the company’s manager. Fifteen manual workers from the gas 
company completed the questionnaire. The workers earned a basic salary that was 
comparatively stable and higher than the local support level. The company’s owner was also 
interviewed and asked the same questions as the company owner in the Rong Chuan Auto 
Park interview.  
 
In order to find migrant workers, the Tangshan Development and Reform Commission Office 
provided the locations of the three main temporary residents areas in Tangshan (Kai Fa Qu-
Longze Road, Feng Run Qu-Yanshan Road and Feng Nan Qu-Tangxu Road). These three 
areas correspond to huge industrial construction areas. Fifty migrant worker participants 
answered the questionnaires, with 20 from Kai Fa Qu, 20 from Feng Run Qu and 10 from 
Feng Nan Qu. At the same time, many of the participants also gave an informal interview. 
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The data gathered from the questionnaires was analysed quantitatively, to show for example, 
statistics trends and graphs (see Chapters 7 and 8).  
4.8	  Ethical	  considerations	  
 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of York Humanities and 
Social Science Ethics Committee. A research information sheet explaining who I was and the 
purpose of the study was given to all interview and questionnaire participants in advance. The 
information sheet, consent form and questionnaire are written in both Chinese and English 
(Appendix A-C). Research information sheets were provided to all interviewees prior to the 
interview and all were asked to sign an interview consent form. Permission to use their words 
in the research was sought and signatures obtained to show this. Participant’s full name is not 
used. The data from participants was assigned a code for anonymity and a key linking codes 
to participants was kept separately from the research data.  
 
At the benefit recipients level, the lists provided by the local government were very long, with 
a large number of household names. The respondents were identified by random selection. 
The local government did not know which people were selected, so if the household chose 
anonymity, the local government would not know who they were. The survey sheets were 
anonymised using numbers.  
 
The local government provided the participants’ lists, which showed their support for the 
survey and Chinese researchers in China now more commonly conduct such surveys. 
Furthermore, people are free to talk about their own life and experiences in China, which is 
protected by the Chinese law. The nature of the questions was not political, but a way of 
investigating practical aspects of how to improve details of government policies. Therefore, 
there was no risk for respondents to talk about their views. All government interviewees were 
happy to be identified using their job title and an initial.  
 
4.9	  Limitations	  
 
The methodology does have some limitations. The most obvious limit might be the sample 
size and location, as China is a very huge country with a massive population, the sample size 
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is rather small and it will not perfectly reflect the real state of economic insecurity all over 
China.  
 
The study was commenced in autumn 2011, the interviews and data collection took place 
April to September 2012, and the final writing up, completed in September 2014.  The 
economic and social factors might have significant changes during this period. 
 
4.10	  Conclusion	  
This chapter summarises the data collection and analysis used to answer the research 
questions. It discusses the different methodologies used to examine income and housing 
security policies in China. In particular, it describes using a triangulation method by 
investigating three levels, the Central Government of China, the International Labour Office 
(ILO) and an academic in the social welfare field.  
 
It also describes acquiring the data for a case study in Tangshan City. Using information 
collected on the Chinese welfare state for a case study helped to understand the complex 
administration found in China. Since the economic reforms, labour mobility has increased and 
income security reduced, with the unemployment rate increasing. Therefore, investigating 
migrant workers with a lower-middle income, and lower-income people is important to the 
analysis of the current situation in China.  
 
The findings are discussed in the next chapters with Chapter 5 examining the national level 
analysis, Chapter 6 the local government level and Chapter 7 the recipient level. In addition, 
Chapter 8 provides an in depth discussion on economic security in China, examining all levels 
and providing a key debate on the issues.  
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Chapter	  5	  -­‐	  China’s	  national	  social	  security	  policy	  
5.0	  Introduction	  	  	  
The Chinese social security system has developed remarkably in the past five years, and the 
framework for an urban-rural social security system has been created in China for the first 
time. Regarding policy design, it might be asked whether China is adopting a universal or a 
targeted model of social security. The answer to this question is not as clear as it might seem 
at first glance. While Chinese officials appear to have designed social security policy around a 
more universal than targeted model, is it the case that any of China’s social security policies, 
whether singly or in combination, can be regarded as pure universal-type policies?  
 
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Guang Xi Province (2012), the Urban-Rural 
MSLS is designed to help families who have an average income per capita lower than the 
locally set MSLS level. This means that anyone who meets such conditions is able to enjoy 
the benefit, and this suggests that the MSLS therefore represents a form of universal social 
security policy. However, the MSLS prioritises the provision of support to the elderly poor, 
the disabled poor and extremely poor families lacking the ability to work. When this is 
considered, the model upon which the MSLS is based appears to shift from an ideal universal 
type to a targeted model. Why then, has the Chinese government created a social policy that 
seems to combine aspects of a universal and a targeted model? In order to answer this 
question, this chapter will investigate the purpose and nature of China’s current social 
security policies. It also examines an approach towards policy design that might allow the 
state to design social security policies that better meet the particular needs of people in a 
given area. This is important because China has less protection now than under the pre-
economic reforms regime.  
 
Regarding the implementation of social security policies, it should be asked whether China 
has adopted a centralised or a decentralised model? The answer to this question is 
complicated by the fact that the responsibilities for policy design and implementation are 
divided and shared between central government and local government. While central 
government is ultimately responsible for the overall design of social security policies, which 
suggests that China has adopted a centralised social security policy model, local government 
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has the right to modify and set their own standards when applying social security policy in 
their own area. 
 
In order to have a systematic and clear view of how China is developing its social policies, 
Section 5.1 will focus on the history of and recent developments in social security policy in 
China. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 then consider the issue of whether the policies are universal or 
targeted in nature. Section 5.4 explores the degree to which the social security system can be 
considered centralised or decentralised. Section 5.5 considers the degree to which China has 
drawn on and used the social policy experiences of other countries to influence its design of 
social welfare policies. The sixth, and final, section asks how the social welfare system can be 
protected in the face of the changing market economy in China. 
5.1	  History	  and	  recent	  developments	  
 
China’s social security system is socialist in nature with specific Chinese characteristics. 
China’s social security reform has been comprehensive and has brought profound institutional 
change. The social security policy changes have been driven by central government and there 
is widespread public support for the new economic and social security policies.  
 
Under the planned economy system, urban and rural areas were strictly separated as regards 
social security provision. In rural areas, there was no social security provision at all, while the 
urban social security system relied on the dan wei system, which mainly covered government 
employees and workers of state-owned companies. Employees’ benefit levels depended 
entirely on their employers, and those working in well-developed dan wei received more 
benefits than those in a less developed dan wei. In recent years, considerable effort has been 
made by the Chinese authorities to develop and expand social insurance systems and increase 
their coverage. As a result, China’s social security system has developed considerably, and it 
covers many more people today than it did in the 1980s and 1990s. Social security benefit 
levels have also increased significantly. 
 
In particular, China has undergone a rapid enlargement and strengthening of its social security 
system since 2000. In an effort to meet the goal of social security reformers to guarantee 
coverage for the majority of the population in China in a short period of time, the Chinese 
state has dramatically expanded coverage of its major social insurance programmes and has 
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implemented many new ones. Today, China has a relatively high level of social expenditure. 
According to the ISSA (2013), government expenditure on health reached 1754.2 billion yuan 
in 2010, or around 5.2% of GDP, while social security expenditure (excluding health) was 2.3% 
of GDP in 2010 (ibid). Therefore, the total expenditure on social security was about 7.5% of 
GDP. However, compared with Europe, America and Latin America, public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is far less in China. Figure 5.1 compares international public social 
expenditure with and without China. It shows that in most developed regions, social security 
expenditure is on average over 15% of GDP, which is a higher rate of expenditure than that in 
developing regions. Compared to the wider Asia and Pacific region, the green bar and light 
blue bar shows that China’s expenditure on social security is not higher overall, it is about 2% 
of GDP. 
 
Expansion of medical insurance has been one of the most important projects undertaken in 
China, and the Chinese government has paid a great deal of attention to it. China has created a 
wide-reaching medical insurance system, which has been implemented for almost all citizens, 
with basic urban medical insurance protection, the new cooperative rural medical insurance 
protection and the urban-rural assistance system. In 2007, 254.42 million people joined the 
medical insurance programme. This included 180.2 million formal workers in urban areas, 
31.31 million rural migrant workers and 42.91 million urban town householders (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012, p.1). By 2011, 
the total number of people with medical insurance had increased to 473.43 million, marking 
an 86% increase over the figure for 2007 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2012, p.1).  
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Figure 5.1 Public social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP 2010  
 
Unemployment insurance (UI) has also greatly expanded in China in a short time period. By 
the end of 2007, 116.45 million people had joined the UI scheme (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, p.2), a figure that 
equates to about 1/10 of China’s 2007 total population. Over the next three years, the number 
of people who joined the UI scheme increased to 133.76 million (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2010, p.2). By 2011, the 
total number of people enrolled in the UI scheme had increased to 143.17 million (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2010, p.2), an 
increase of 9.41 million over the previous year. Since 2007, the rate of increase in UI uptake 
has been about 7% per year in China. 
 
Furthermore, the coverage of the Minimum Standard of Living Scheme (MSLS) has been 
extended from urban to rural areas and from state-owned enterprises to all other types of 
companies. Since 2007, the entire population has been covered by the MSLS. 22.77 million 
urban residents and 53.06 million rural residents had benefited by 2011, and the programme 
has an expenditure totalling 66.77 billion yuan (ISSA, 2013, p.116). However, it is a means-
tested scheme and has low support rates because the benefits have to be equally divided and 
allocated.  Since such a large number of poor people are covered by the MSLS, it is inevitable 
Source: (GESS, 2010)  
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that the benefit levels will be low. Besides the MSLS’s low benefit levels, does the MSLS 
coverage actually protect all poor people? The number of people living in severe poverty in 
China has progressively fallen in recent years, but there are still very large numbers of people 
living in poverty. In particular, the rate of relative poverty in urban areas is increasing (Pan 
and Wei, 2010, pp.133–143), and according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(2011, pp.130–150), more than 50 million urban residents were living in poverty in 2011. 
This increase in the rate of urban poverty has led to a doubling of the number of people 
receiving MSLS support in urban areas. Although MSLS coverage is being expanded at a 
very fast rate, there are still a large number of people who do not have access to basic income 
protection. This basic income security policy will be examined more details in the rest 
chapters. 
 
In addition, China’s social housing programme has developed significantly through a series of 
social housing policies on low-rent housing, affordable housing and housing security. Of 
these, the main focus of China’s social housing policy is on the provision of low-rent housing. 
In recent years, the amount of public social housing has increased significantly. In 2010, the 
state started to build 5.8 million houses (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2010, p.1). This figure has nearly doubled since 2010, and 
by the end of 2011 the state had 10 million new homes under construction covering all types 
of public housing. In 2011, the number of urban residents reached 690.79 million, and low-
income families in urban areas accounted for around 37% of the urban population. People 
with housing difficulties amounted to about 30 million (Li et al., 2012, p.7). Given the scale 
of this issue, it is very difficult for the state to provide secure housing for everyone, and it will 
continue to be a considerable challenge for the state in the long term. 
 
Currently, the fiscal budget for social housing is drawn from three main areas: the central 
government budget, the local government budget and the public housing fund. In 2011, the 
fiscal budget for security housing was 103 billion yuan, an increase of 265 million yuan on 
the previous year (State Council of China, 2011, p.15). Although the Chinese central 
government is making efforts to continue to improve the social housing system and related 
policies, there is a large gap between the targets set for the number of social houses to be 
constructed and the centre’s actual financial investment. In 2011, the 10 million new social 
houses cost 1,300 billion yuan, but central government funding contributed only 10% towards 
the overall costs of construction (Li et al., 2012, p.2). This imbalance in the sources of 
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funding for social housing is the most important thing that the state needs to address, 
particularly given that this shortfall in central funding might influence the quality of social 
housing and especially the choice of security housing location. For instance, in order to 
achieve the targets set on the amount of social housing to be constructed, local government 
might choose to build social housing in a less developed area or in areas far away from the 
city centre lacking in basic services. Given that there is no national standard on the quality of 
services that must be available for residents of new social housing areas, governments at the 
local level are granted considerably freedom to manage housing development in their own 
way. As a result, many current social housing projects are failing to function as intended and 
fail to meet the needs of residents because they are situated inconveniently for public services. 
 
The next sections examine two questions: firstly, are the current social policies universal or 
targeted in nature?  Secondly, is the social security system centralised or decentralised? 
  
5.2	  Universal	  and	  targeted	  policy	  issues	  
 
There are on-going debates among academics, international organisations and policy makers 
on the relative strengths of universal and targeted social policies. Two of the most influential 
international bodies in this arena, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World 
Bank, differ in their assessments of the merits of universal and targeted social security 
policies. While the World Bank promotes the virtues of a more targeted model, the ILO 
favours a universal model. The ILO’s position is based on the argument that a universal social 
security policy provides universal flat-rate protection to all members of a community (ILO, 
2012, p.1, p.73). In this way, a universal social security policy means that benefits are 
available to everybody (Korpi and Palme, 1998, p.661) and that everybody is insured either 
for all kinds or for a particular kind of social security. By contrast, the World Bank points out 
that targeted programmes can allow governments to allocate social protection funds more 
effectively and can deliver a higher poverty reduction impact (Walle, 1998). From the above, 
it seems that both forms of protection might offer solutions to social protection problems. 
Ultimately, whether a country decides to adopt a universal or targeted system of social 
security policies depends on the particular perspective of policy makers.  
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Korpi and Palme, (1998, p.662) also argue that in the universal welfare state, the key factor is 
to include the middle class, which leads to what they call the redistribution paradox. There are 
two extreme welfare state models. Developing countries, especially in Latin America, 
historically use public assistance to benefit the rich, and in some cases the middle class, but 
give barely anything to the poor. However, this has started to change in recent years. Some 
developed countries, such as the US model which focuses public access on the poor, in a 
targeted welfare state model. This type of welfare state is very distributive. The rich are taxed 
to give to the poor, leaving the middle class pretty much out. The middle class might get 
something, but not a lot. 
 
However, in Scandinavia, it is different from these two extremes, they focus on all groups. 
The amount of public assistance for the very rich is not high, but importantly, they include the 
middle class in the high quality of public services. Therefore, this group has less incentive to 
pay for private insurance and instead remains loyal to the public sector. They do not mind 
paying tax, which leads to a greater amount paid in taxes. That leads to better support for 
welfare for everyone, which benefits the poor. In the United States model, a large part of the 
state welfare budget might be given to the poor, whereas Scandinavia might give only half of 
the state budget to the poor. However, the poor still get more money in Scandinavia, because 
of the Paradox. The whole budget is bigger in Scandinavia, so although the US model sounds 
a lot, the whole budget is not very big (Korpi and Palme, 1998, pp.675-678). Therefore, the 
amount for the poor is not much. It is very fair in the sense that taxes are disproportionally 
taken from the rich, because the poor and middle class pay less tax. So the rich don’t pay for 
everything, but they help to pay for the rest. In Scandinavia, the middle class pay a lot but 
they also get a lot, in both services like schools and hospitals as well as cash income support. 
Therefore they feel more confident and secure in their living conditions. Esping-Andersen 
(1990, pp.27, 69) also argues that the social democratic welfare state regime has generated a 
more equal system, which makes universalism include middle class standards.  
 
Certainly, wide coverage can be achieved under a universal social security model as everyone 
is eligible for coverage, and many countries have adopted a universal social security welfare 
state model. The Scandinavian model is the one of the most popular reference models for 
those seeking social security reform and development. This model has high coverage and 
provides generous services and benefits. In the UK, the state used to provide a universal type 
of child benefit to every family with children, irrespective of income. However, due to fiscal 
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problems, the government has reshaped the child benefit programme into a more targeted 
model. People earning more than £50,000 a year are affected, and those who earn over 
£60,000 can either opt out of receiving the benefit or have it taxed at 100%. According to the 
UK government, these changes will affect more than 1.1 million families. 
 
However, universal policies also have a weak side. Standing (2004, p.614) asserts that the 
effectiveness of existing universal social security policies is open to question because 
recipients obtain low levels of support due to the low payment rates that result from everyone 
being entitled to money from the collective pot. By contrast, targeted social security policy 
focuses on a particular group of people or particular choices so as to meet social security 
protection needs. In this type of policy model, the state only establishes social security 
policies for the poor (Korpi and Palme, 1998, p.661). It is argued that a targeted model can be 
more effective in assisting particular groups of people or individuals who are at risk because 
not everyone is eligible to receive state social security support and resources can be better 
deployed to meet the needs of the most vulnerable people in society. In Brazil, for example, 
the Conditional Cash Transfers project is targeted at impoverished families and is conditional 
on children receiving education and accessing basic health care (Ravallion, 2009, p.15). Such 
targeted social policy models have been widely adopted in a number of developing countries 
in recent years and have become one of the most popular approaches to the development of 
social security policies in the world today. 
 
In should be noted, however, that the Brazilian social security system is not entirely a targeted 
model. In reality, Brazil’s social security system employs both universal and targeted policy 
models. Its social security contribution system, in which people who contribute from their 
employment are eligible for all available forms of social welfare support, is a form of 
universal support for all contributors. The targeted conditional cash transfer social security 
benefits are available only for the poorest people among the groups that do not make direct 
social security contributions from employment.  
 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) policy is another policy area in which there is debate over 
whether a universal or targeted model is most effective. The simplest way to clarify the 
problem with a means-tested universal UI policy model is to compare people who have a 
middle or high-income with those on a very low income. For example, in general, UI 
payments are based on a person’s previous wage rate. If we assume that the UI rate is 70% of 
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the previous wage rate, unemployed middle-income class people might be able to live 
relatively comfortably on UI benefits for a period, but very low-income people will receive 
almost nothing from UI as their previous wages were very low. Moreover, if the universal UI 
coverage rate is increased or the coverage period is extended, another problem might emerge: 
some low paid workers might take advance of the system to remain unemployed and enjoy 
the UI benefits instead of looking for a job.  
 
The efficacy of social policies such as basic income protection, UI or pensions in developing 
countries is often questioned because of their low coverage rates or payment levels. For those 
advocating social security reform, therefore, the eligibility conditions that developing 
countries set for these social policies is an area of particular interest. Given the huge 
population of China and its position as a rapidly developing country that is currently 
undergoing a process of social welfare reform, choosing the most effective policy model is a 
very difficult task for Chinese policy makers. The next section will examine the current social 
policy situation in China to examine which model China is adopting. 
5.3	  A	  universal	  model,	  a	  targeted	  model,	  or	  both?	  
 
Before the formation of the People’s Republic of China, many people in China suffered 
extreme poverty, sometimes finding it difficult to survive, as well as facing other risks such as 
Japanese aggression and civil wars. Prior to 1976 and the end of Mao’s rule, social policy in 
China was based on socialist principles, protecting basic needs and controlling social stability. 
The state offered a set of universal social welfare services and protections to people, 
especially in urban areas. For example, the guaranteed employment policy meant that 
everyone could get a job in a state-owned enterprise. In addition, the central government 
implemented an economic and social subsidy system for the main goods necessary to support 
every citizen. For example, many citizens were eligible to obtain food and clothes coupons 
that were allocated by the authorities and could use these coupons in place of money to 
purchase goods. This strategy was useful in safeguarding and maintaining people’s living 
standards. Under the socialist economic system, the government managed all aspects of 
economic and social development with the aim of providing some level of protection to all 
individuals. Many social security policies were run in a way that was close to a pure universal 
model, especially in the basic income security category, and the government was responsible 
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for supplying all the means to improve the quality of life of citizens through the welfare 
provision system (Chan and Chow, 1992, pp.21,22). 
 
As Chan and Chow (1992, p.25) state: 
 
Public welfare is the most important form of protection of living standards 
for the urban population. The State has committed to provide employment 
for all. From their jobs, the working population is guaranteed standard 
wages and is also provided with a full range of subsidies in cash and in kind. 
Besides controlling prices of essential commodities, the State also subsidises 
meat and basic food items in order to keep prices down. It is a form of 
economic redistribution and protection for all. 
 
The state offered this job security in terms of income security to workers, a policy known as 
the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’. As Chan et al. (2008, pp.28, 29) note, “social welfare provisions were 
based on socialist equality and people were guaranteed a lifetime of employment.” Although 
the socialist society ideology and egalitarian distribution policy did not bring about great 
economic prosperity for the people, almost every citizen enjoyed some kind of basic income 
security. Even if citizens experienced poor living conditions, no one feared for their life. The 
combination of a socialist planned economy and universal social security policies resulted in a 
narrow inequality gap. Figure 5.2 shows that socio-economic inequality was very low under 
Mao, with China having a Gini coefficient of only 0.3 before the economic reforms in the 
1980s. 
 
Figure 5.2 China’s Historical Gini Index 
 
 
Source (Chen et al., 2010, p.20) 
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China’s economic and social reforms have fundamentally altered the economic structure and 
social security policies of the country. The government has dramatically reduced its 
intervention in the economy in China, and as in many Western countries, market mechanisms 
have come to play a central role in the economic sphere. As discussed in Chapter 2, many 
social security policies were abolished following the economic reforms, and the government 
no longer provides income and housing support to all citizens. With rapid economic 
development, however, it has become clear to Chinese policy makers that China must 
revitalise its social system so as to address some of the social issues that have resulted from 
the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and widening socio-economic inequality. This 
recognition on the part of policy makers has led to a range of social security reforms over the 
past decade that have created a unique Chinese model of economic and social development. 
 
From the outset, China’s current social policy development strategy was founded on the 
adoption of ostensibly universal social security policies with the aim of fostering wide social 
security coverage and high standards. In order to appreciate the approach that the Chinese 
state has taken towards social security policy, it is helpful to illustrate this in a systematic 
form as shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 Overview of the structure of China’s universal social security policies 
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As can be seen in Figure 5.3, China’s universal social policies can be placed into four main 
categories. Basic income security is one of the most important categories and consists of three 
main programmes. First of all, the Minimum Standard of Living Scheme (MSLS) is the most 
effective income support policy in China. In theory, everyone is insured in all cases where 
their income falls below the set minimum standard. In other words, it is a benefit paid to 
anyone deemed to be in extreme poverty, all citizens are potentially eligible, and eligibility 
for receipt of the benefit is determined by an applicant’s income falling below a certain level, 
although the benefit level is rather low. This policy was implemented in all provinces in 1997, 
and by the end of 2007, it covered the whole population. The state is obliged to provide cash 
support and other related support for benefit recipients. The second major policy within the 
income security category is the minimum wage policy, which sets the legal minimum wage 
rate that workers can receive from their employers. This policy covers the entire country, but 
rates differ according to area/region because different parts of China have different levels of 
economic development. The third major policy is unemployment benefit. The unemployment 
insurance (UI) system is a worker- contribution based system, and nearly all formal workers 
are eligible for unemployment insurance (Chan et al., 2008, p.103). The government has also 
established a series of unemployment support measures such as re-employment services, job 
training and vocational information services. Unemployment benefit coverage is gradually 
expanding to include all kinds of work in urban areas.  
 
The government also adopted an apparently universal model for its pension policies. The 
most important pension policy in China is the basic pension scheme, which covers all urban 
employees. According to ISSA (2013, p.112), it covers employees at nearly all state-owned 
and collective enterprises, and will be extended to cover all urban workers in private 
companies and the self-employed. For non-urban residents, the New Voluntary Rural Pension 
Scheme, which was established in 2009, covers all rural residents above 16 years of age 
(ISSA, 2013, p.113). 
 
In health insurance, as in other areas, the principles of universalism have also been adopted. 
This health care policy is fast approaching full coverage of the population. As the ISSA (2013, 
p.117) points out:  
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In April 2009 the Government unveiled a three-year CNY 850 billion 
medical reform plan, under which two-thirds of the budget is to be 
spent on consumers (as premium subsidies, etc.) and one-third on 
service providers with a focus on extending health insurance 
coverage and improving grass-roots health care facilities and 
services. The plan aims to provide, by 2011, over 90% of the 
population with universal access to basic health insurance in 
parallel with the introduction of an essential drug system. 
 
The Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance Scheme (URBMIS) has had a greater impact 
for urban residents than other urban health care policies. It is financed by both personal 
contributions and government subsidies. Commencing in 2007, URBMIS pilot schemes were 
conducted in one or two cities in each province, and the scheme was implemented in all cities 
in 2010 (ISSA, 2013, p.118). 
 
The New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) is another important part of the 
health care system. This was launched in 2003 and is designed to cover all rural residents. The 
NRCMS fund is collected from the government and individuals, with the government 
covering 80% of the premiums (ISSA, 2013, p.119). The scheme has been implemented in 80% 
of villages across various regions (ibid). By 2011, there were around 832 million rural 
residents participating in the NRCMS programme, with a coverage rate of over 96% (Wen, 
2012).  
 
The fourth element of China’s social security system is housing policy. Under Mao, housing 
policy took the form of public housing provision. The central government provided capital 
construction investment and other departments or local authorities took responsibility for 
allocating houses and providing services to individuals (Chan et al., 2008, p.170). In recent 
years, the provision of social housing has broadly remained the responsibility of the state. For 
example, the low-rental housing policy is the most important social housing policy in China. 
It consists of two elements: the provision of low-rent houses and cash subsidies for renting. 
According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China (2007, p.1), 
the government either provides cash transfers to poor households with housing difficulties or 
successful applicants can be allocated low-rental houses provided by the government. 
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Although most social policies adopted in recent years can regarded as more universal than 
targeted in nature, analysts have considered the degree to which China’s social policy reforms 
might also be viewed as targeted policies. Figure 5.4 shows the Chinese social security 
policies that have adopted at least some aspects of a targeted model.  
 
Figure 5.4 Targeted forms of social policies 
 
 
The areas of Chinese social security policy that can be considered to have adopted aspects of 
a targeted model are the precisely the same as those set out in Figure 5.3: health care, 
pensions, income and housing security. The majority of health care policy is targeted at urban 
residents. For example, the Urban Employees Basic Medical Insurance Scheme is targeted 
only at formally employed workers in urban areas and is based on a contribution of 2% of 
total salary from employees (ISSA, 2013, p.117). The Urban Residents Basic Medical 
Insurance Scheme (URBMIS) is mainly used to cover the hospitalisation and serious illness 
costs of non-salaried urban residents (ISSA, 2013, p.118). The New Rural Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (NRCMS) is targeted at people resident in rural areas and is designed to 
cover the costs of hospital treatment and serious illnesses (Wen, 2012). 
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The pension policy operates in a similar way to the health care policy. The voluntary urban 
pension scheme is focused on people who are not eligible for the basic pension scheme and 
are also not engaged in employment. According to the ISSA (2013, p.115): 
 
Enrolled residents can elect one of the ten scales ranging from CNY 100 to 
CNY 1,000 as an annual contribution to their individual accounts, for 
which the Government will provide a subsidy of no less than CNY 30 to 
each person every year. The scales may differ in different regions. 
 
The MSLS is the main income security scheme in China, and while it is a universal policy in 
the sense that all citizens are potentially eligible for the scheme, it is a means-tested benefit 
that is targeted at the poor. If an applicant’s income is below the minimum income rate set by 
the local government, they are eligible to receive MSLS support from the government. 
However, this policy is limited by some conditions and is particularly aimed at selected social 
groups from among the poor. As the state council of China (2007b) points out:  
 
The major point of the rural MSLS is to support people who lose their 
ability to work, have poor living conditions and are exposed to other 
persistent causes of a difficult life.  
 
As a result of these conditions, while poor people with physical disabilities are likely to be 
eligible for support, it might be reasonable to assume that a large proportion of extremely 
poor people could be excluded from any support under this policy. Moreover, MSLS benefit 
levels are unequally distributed. Benefit levels differ both from city to city and between urban 
and rural areas. In an effort to address these shortcomings, the central government aims to set 
increased levels of support in the most developed urban areas first (Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou) and then demand that all of the provinces gradually increase MSLS benefit levels. 
This approach is not limited to the MSLS, but also applies to health care and other social 
security protections. 
 
The housing security policies are designed for urban poor people who lack sufficient housing 
space and do not earn enough for a decent standard of living in the local area. As such, they 
are targeted at the urban poor with an income lower than the locally defined poverty line, and 
especially at MSLS recipients and other social security beneficiaries. Since such groups are 
clearly unlikely to be able to afford to buy a house at any stage of their lives, the 
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government’s targeting of them through its social housing policies (by granting financial 
subsidies or low-rental houses) appears to be a sensible approach. 
 
From the above, it appears that China’s social security policies are not purely universal and 
that the principles of universality and targeting in social security policy overlap in some 
respects. Because of fiscal pressures and administration costs, the country is no longer 
offering purely universal protection to everyone. This pattern of overlapping universality and 
targeting in social security policy in China is shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5 Universal and Targeted  
 
 
While China’s social security policies are universal in the sense that all those living in poverty 
in China are able to get some kind of support and that everyone is potentially eligible for it, 
all those potentially eligible for support must meet certain requirements or conditions, which 
identifies the policies as both universal and targeted in nature. Given its huge population, 
China cannot afford pure universal-type support as the costs would be prohibitive. In addition, 
its geographical size and its internally inconsistent economic and social development limit the 
government’s ability to implement and administer universal-type policies effectively and 
efficiently. Ensuring that social policies effectively target those (or an area) most in need has 
therefore become the government’s preferred option. While the state claims to continue to 
favour the universal model of social security, the definition of what constitutes universal 
coverage has changed from the meaning it held in China before the period of economic 
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reform. Today, the ‘universal’ social security policies in China in fact contain aspects of both 
universal and targeted policy models.  
 
China’s social security reforms are very wide ranging, involve a complex mix of mechanisms 
and policy systems, and the pattern of distribution is characterised by considerable variation. 
Generally speaking, when a social security system has problems, the government will take 
steps to address the problems, and the social security system can be seen to be constantly 
absorbing new valuable experiences and lessons. The case in China is no different, and the 
central government appears to be gradually advancing reforms to progressively transform the 
old social security system into a new modern system. In the next section, the question of 
whether the Chinese social security system is centralised or decentralised in nature is 
examined.  
 
5.4	  Is	  the	  Chinese	  social	  security	  system	  centralised	  or	  decentralised?	  	  	   	  
 
The evidence from examining several decades of social policy development in China shows 
that China has established a systematic arrangement for social security administration. 
China’s social security administrative system combines elements of a centralised and a 
decentralised structure. The central state government or state council is the highest organ of 
state administration and is responsible for setting the principles for and the overall design of 
policies (The State Council of China, 2008b, p.1). The state council has considerable 
influence over all factors of development in China, including the social and economic security 
system. It has the power to formulate national social security regulations, policies and 
standards.  
 
At the national level, three key departments in the central government deal with social 
security policy in China: the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development (MOHURD). These government departments are the primary decision makers 
and designers of social policy in China and thus set the guidelines for social security policy. 
However, central government does not strictly control or set standards for every aspect of a 
given policy. According to Xu (2005, pp.281,282), central government formulates the basic 
principles, policies and the overall aim of the social security system and then devolves its 
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powers to lower levels of government for implementation of the policies. Figure 5.6 shows 
the policy administration system in China. The state has overall control at the macro level and 
sets the direction, major focus and intensity of the social security initiative. The provincial 
governments have responsibility for implementing the central government’s policy directives, 
but they are granted considerable autonomy both to decide how policies are actually 
implemented at the local or regional level and to create their own development policies to 
assist in meeting national social security strategies. Local city governments are also afforded a 
discretionary power to set support rates and standards for some of the social security policies. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the MSLS is one of China’s most effective policies in 
protecting the people’s economic security. As the Chinese authorities consider this 
programme one of their flagship social protection policies, it can be used as a representative 
example of the current system of administration of social policies in China. In its current 
format, the central government applied the MSLS policy to the whole country, but did not 
establish a national benefit standard. Instead, the central government provided only policy 
guidelines, and the provincial and lower level governments set the standards. As a result, 
different provinces have different benefit standards. Due to differences in regional 
development, national standards for social policies are difficult to set in China as GDP level 
varies greatly between provinces. The considerable variation in regional GDP figures is one 
of the most important factors determining social security policy payment rates under the 
current socialist 
 
Figure 5.6 Social security administration systems in China 
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market economy system. For example, economic development in Shanghai and Beijing is 
high, and the urban MSLS standard benefit rate in Shanghai is 570 yuan per month per head 
(Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, 2012), while in Beijing it is 580 yuan per month per head 
(Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau, 2012). However, in less developed areas, the standard is much 
lower. In Gansu province, for instance, the average MSLS benefit rate in 2012 was only 260 
yuan per month per head (State Council of China, 2012c). 
 
Central government has macro control over the social security system. When problems appear 
during or after the social policy implementation stage, the state is able to make 
comprehensive changes to the social policy. For instance, because the MSLS lacks a national 
benefit standard and local authorities are free to set benefit rates for their area, many 
commentators, including academics, have complained about the low benefit rates currently 
afforded by the MSLS. The central government has therefore asked all local governments to 
increase the MSLS support standards gradually. As a result, the MSLS support standard is 
increasing every year in each province. Nevertheless, in a country as diverse as China, it 
makes sense for the MSLS level of support to vary depending on the cost of living in a given 
area, although this solution might not be appropriate for all social policies.  
 
Other social security policies are run in a similar way. For example, the benefit rates for the 
minimum wage and health insurance depend on the degree of regional economic development 
and the local income level. Although the central government is trying to establish a systematic 
social security management structure and construct a comprehensive social security service 
platform, the differing standards of support afforded to recipients of social security benefits 
create barriers to the efficient management of the social security system in China. These 
barriers include low standard support rates and difficulties in accurately monitoring the 
situations of benefit applicants. The latter issue is a particular problem because the 
decentralised nature of social security provision at the local level and the lack of national 
standards mean that there is scope for those tasked with assessing and monitoring applicants 
to display discretionary behaviour in their assessments. In the interview with Miss B, an 
officer from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China in Beijing, she stated that existing personal 
relationships between assessing officers and applicants could lead to the rules on allocating 
resources being broken; that is to say, applicants who are acquainted with local authority 
officials might be prioritised by assessing officers for receipt of benefits or might even 
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receive higher rates of support. An effective monitoring system with nationally defined 
standards could assist in allocating the limited benefits to recipients efficiently and equitably. 
 
Because the majority of centres of employment are located in urban areas, China’s economic 
development is centred on its cities. There are far fewer work opportunities in rural areas than 
in urban areas, and those that do exist are mainly within the agricultural sector. Rural 
residents may also have at least some means of feeding themselves via subsistence use of 
their plots of land. Consequently, urban residents have an advantage in terms of economic and 
social security support, and urban support rates are higher than in rural areas. Generally, the 
types of social policies tailored to urban areas are quite specific and comprehensive. The main 
targets of social security policy are different in urban and rural areas. Urban social security 
development is more concerned with working benefits (unemployment insurance, pension, 
health insurance) and housing benefits.  
 
Alongside the economic development in urban centres and the opening up of the property 
market, property prices have risen enormously, and housing provision in urban areas has 
become one of the most pressing issues facing China’s government. Many people in urban 
areas now experience great difficulty in buying a house. Given the high cost of existing 
property and the fact that land for new housing construction is at a premium in the cities, 
there is limited housing capacity in urban areas. Because of this, many poor people experience 
housing insecurity owing to housing shortages, high property prices and expensive rents. 
Furthermore, the prohibition on slum developments in Chinese cities (unlike cities in, for 
example, India) means that finding a place to live within the city area is extremely (and 
increasingly) difficult for lower income people.  
 
In recent years, the central state government has been trying to implement its public housing 
policy in every city. The policy combines affordable public housing and low-rental housing 
policies, with a particular focus on low-rent housing services. However, the entry 
requirements for low-rental housing benefit are strict. For example, in Beijing, the low-rental 
housing service applicant has to meet one of the following conditions in order to the eligible 
(Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 2010): 
 
1. The household has received urban MSLS benefit for more than two years 
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2. The household income is lower than Beijing’s minimum income standard, and the family 
members must be aged over 55 (males) and 50 (females) 
3. One member of the family is seriously disabled 
4. The family contains a person who is seriously ill 
5. The family is living in a house deemed unfit for human habitation and does not own any 
other houses 
6. The family is confirmed as have housing difficulties by the housing security departments  
 
Under these conditions, therefore, middle aged or young people cannot receive low-rental 
housing benefit without serious health problems. In addition, it is impossible for rural 
migrants to apply for housing benefit. It should be noted that the conditions above only apply 
to Beijing; the conditions set by other cities might make it even more difficult to access low-
rent housing benefit. Once again, the decentralised nature of policy implementation and the 
lack of a national standard for a specific social security policy appear to compound the 
problems for those targeted by the policy. 
 
From the above evidence, it can be seen that China is centralised in one sense and 
decentralised in another. The next section looks at the question of whether the hybrid system 
that China has today is partly the result of borrowed social policy experiences from other 
countries. 
 
5.5	  The	  impact	  of	  other	  countries	  experiences	  on	  China’s	  social	  security	  policy	  
design	  
 
China’s social security system is unique in that it combines the characteristics of Chinese 
socialism and the experiences of other countries. Throughout its social security development 
process, China has drawn many lessons from the successful experiences of other countries. 
However, it is hard to pinpoint precisely from where specific policy lessons have been taken 
because official records are difficult to obtain and a synthesis of many of the policy lessons of 
other countries has been used as the basis for policy decisions in China. As a result, this issue 
can only be broadly explored. 
 
It appears that the social insurance model has taken on board many of the experiences of 
European countries, particularly as regards the social security legal system and the overall 
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structure of the social insurance system. In Europe, social security law was established very 
early in the development of welfare states, and the legislation covering social security policy 
and provision is therefore well developed. An officer from the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security of the People's Republic of China described how Europe’s experience 
served as guidance both for China’s social insurance security system and for its social 
security legislation.  
 
China’s social security funding system learned much from the experience of Singapore. Of 
particular interest to the Chinese government was Singapore’s individual accounts system 
with its central provident fund. In Singapore, individual workers contribute from their salaries 
and have their own individual insurance accounts. These contributions make up a fund or 
capital pool for paying the contributors’ health, housing and other economic security factors. 
Once the accounts have become sufficiently large, people can withdraw a portion of money 
for a variety of economic security services (Friedman, 2009, p.17). The Chinese government 
was clearly influenced by Singapore’s system and made efforts to increase the number of 
workers making individual contributions towards social security insurances. For example, in 
the middle of, reform in health care financing was piloted in Zhenjiang and Jiujiang among 
participating enterprises and their employees. As shown in Figure 5.7, contributions were 
taken from both employers and employees, and the employee’s contribution went towards 
their individual account fund. The success of these experiments led to the adoption of the 
social fund principle in China’s subsequent health reform policies.  
 
China also learned from the experiences of Latin American countries. Chile provided China 
with a successful example of an old age social insurance system. In Chile, the old age pension 
includes a mandatory personal retirement savings account, which provides a secure minimum 
income (Li, 1999, p.436). China adopted an old age pension insurance system that combines 
“basic old age insurance, employer based supplementary old age insurance and individual old 
age savings accounts” (Li, 1999, p.439). 
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Figure 5.7: Average contribution rates to health insurance funds in the Zhenjiang and Jiujiang 
experiments 
 
 
 
It should be noted that China has not simply taken lessons from the experiences of foreign 
countries. Rather, it has actively engaged with other countries and obtained direct support and 
help from foreign nations and organisations in order to develop China’s social security system. 
For example, in May 2007, the European Union and the United Nations Development 
Programme signed an agreement with the Chinese government to support large-scale 
development of civil society and the rule of law, especially in areas such as reducing poverty 
and improving health-related social services (Schwartz and Shieh, 2009, p.3). With such 
external assistance, China has increased its capacity to address public health care services.  
 
China also took considerable interest in the German experience. On one hand, as China is a 
developing country, it needs to find a balance between social welfare system development and 
economic growth and international competitiveness. On the other hand, China has a huge 
population and the resources per capita are limited, and the country therefore also needs to 
continue to develop and make every effort to increase wealth. The lessons from the German 
experience of employing a contribution-based social insurance system, in which citizens have 
to contribute money to the fund in order to have social insurance protection, were considered 
worthy of close study by the Chinese government because such a system appears to balance 
the needs of citizens for social security with the need for economic development. In the 
      Source: (World Bank, 1997, p.58)  	  
The ‘two-jiang model’ went beyond institutional adjustment of the free health care system,
and commenced institution building for a contribution-based health insurance system to
replace the existing one. In spite of many local variations, one characteristic feature common
to all local health reforms was that certain Singaporean-style arrangements for compulsory
savings were introduced under the institutional framework of social insurance, a practice that
has come to be called the ‘combination of social pooling and funded individual accounts’ in
China. Unlike most countries in the world today, Singapore requires people to take full indi-
vidual responsibility for their own retirement through a contribution-based compulsory saving
institution, the Central Provident Fund (CPF). CPF contributions are made by both employers
and employees, and all funded accounts under the administration of the CPF belong to indi-
viduals. CPF funds function over and above pension provision, and also ￿nance a wide range
of programmes and options including the health care expenditure of fund owners and their
family members (Aw & Low, 1996). In China, the new principle of combining social pooling
and funded individual accounts was ￿rst experimented with in Shenzhen. From then onwards,
the principle has been applied to almost all health (as well as pension) reforms in China.
In the ‘two-jiang model’, the contribution was shared by both employers and employees.
Employers contributed 10 per cent and employees 1 per cent of their total payroll to the
health insurance fund. Retirees had no contribution duties. The fund was divided into two
accounts: the individual account and the social coordinating account. The savings plus inter-
est in the individual accounts were owned by employees, and they could be passed on upon
the employee’s death. The employee’s contributions were deposited in the individual
account. The proportion of employer’s contributions distributed to the individual account
was basically based on the employee’s age, and distribution rates differed slightly in differ-
ent places (see Fig. 1). In Zhengjiang, the distribution rate was set as follows: (a) 4 per cent
for those who were 45 years old and below; (b) 6 per cent for those who were above 45; and
(c) 5 per cent for retirees. In Jiujiang, the distribution rate for those who were 45 years old
and below was the same as that in Zhenjiang, but for both those who were above 45, and for
retirees, the distribution rate was set at 5.5 per cent (The State Commission of Economic
Reform et al., 1996, pp. 73–74, 91).3
In the ‘two-jiang model’, health care expenditure for insured patients was funded from
the following sources: (a) by the funds from individual accounts; (b) by workers’ personal
210 Edward Gu
Figure 1. Average c ntribution rates to health insurance funds in the Zhenjiang and
Jiujiang experiments.
Source: World Bank (1997b, p. 58, with minor revisions).
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German case, it guarantees that people enjoy a high level of welfare support, and at the same 
time, it also helps to maintain Germany’s economic development and international 
competitiveness. China also took lessons from Japan, another developed country with a high 
level of both economic development and welfare support. After WW2, the economic growth 
rate in Japan was very fast, and great efforts were taken to balance economic growth policies 
and social welfare policies (Zheng, 2011, p.21). 
 
Although China has learned many lessons from the social security policy experiences of 
foreign countries, China’s social security system is not entirely based on imported models. 
Given China’s particular context as a developing economy with a huge population, China’s 
social welfare system cannot be viewed as a classical welfare state model (such as the 
Scandinavian welfare model or the liberal welfare state). The social security system reforms 
undertaken in China should be viewed as having drawn on influences from both inside and 
outside the country and as having created a unique and evolving social security system. 
China’s current social security system reflects the country’s current situation and cultural 
context: for example, the state pays a lot of attention to the role of Chinese traditional family 
security; it has adopted a mixed pattern of policy orientation; and it has displayed a certain 
amount of social security system innovation.  
 
Despite its successes, China’s current social security system still has shortcomings. A modern 
and efficient social security system requires a comprehensive system of rules that guarantee 
basic social and economic security. Only then can a certain level of basic cover for the entire 
country be acknowledged as a fundamental social right. As things stand, the Chinese social 
security system is not a mature system, and the comprehensive rules that would guarantee that 
basic economic and social security were afforded the standing of fundamental human rights 
are not yet in place. The social security system in China is still a work in progress, and a lot of 
people, especially rural residents and migrants, are still lacking protection. 
 
5.6	  How	  can	  we	  protect	  the	  social	  welfare	  system	  against	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
changing	  market	  economy	  in	  China?	  
 
Chang (2007, p.68, p.218) proposes a solution, which he terms ‘Asymmetric Protectionism’, 
that would enable developing countries to develop within the prevailing international neo-
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liberal economic system. Under this solution, richer countries should be allowed to protect 
their trade less than poor countries, and poor countries should be given the chance to develop 
their own industries and scientific knowledge. Could this asymmetric protectionism principle 
be used to solve the problem of income insecurity in China? Because China is a very large 
country, each province is developing at a different speed, with the coastal areas generally 
developing faster than the inland areas. In addition, inside each urban-rural and coastal-inland 
area there are also large differences in income level. In many ways, this situation resembles 
the international economic system, in which developed countries have strong income security, 
and developing countries are comparatively poor, and where asymmetric protectionism 
provides a strategy to support developing countries in the face of the inequalities of market 
competition. It should be considered, therefore, whether the principle of asymmetric 
protectionism might be applicable to the context of unequal income conditions in China and 
so serve to protect people’s security.  
 
 Figure 5.8 Central control          Figure 5.9 Decentralised Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are three dimensions to instituting asymmetric protectionism in regards to welfare 
policies. The first dimension concerns centralised control of policy design and direction 
(figure 5.8), in which the central government designs the welfare policy plans, plays the main 
role in setting goals and benefit levels and exercises overall control. Local authorities would 
then implement these plans. For instance, if central government were to set up an income 
security policy that called for minimum benefit levels to be set at 10% of average income, 
then local governments would be liable to provide 10% of local average income to those in 
poverty. Simultaneously, central government could provide special support, such as reducing 
taxes in or providing financial support to poorer districts.  
 
City	  A	  $1000*10%	   City	  C	  $3000*10%	  City	  B	  $2000*10%	  
City	  E	  $4000*10%	  
City	  F	  $2000*10%	   City	  D	  $1000*10%	  
Centre	  10%	  	   Graph 1  
City	  A	  $1000*20%	   City	  C	  $3000*80%	  City	  B	  $2000*50%	  
City	  E	  $4000*10%	  
City	  F	  $2000*30%	   City	  D	  $1000*50%	  
Centre	  	  	   Graph 2 
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The second dimension concerns measures that can be taken at the decentralised level (Figure 
5.9). In this dimension, central government devolves authority to local governments and 
allows them the freedom to make their own plans. As such, it offers the possibility of a more 
flexible system. Central government might then play a role only as a monitor; local 
governments would decide on the benefit rates and specific coverage. For example, in such a 
system, central government would provide financial support to local government, which 
would then decide what percentage of that money to spend on welfare in their local area.  
 
The third dimension (see Figure 5.10) concerns the central average model, under which the 
central government sets a single payment rate to cover the entire country. Under this model, 
the central government would use the national average income as a marker and set a specific 
percentage of this amount as the national minimum income, which in turn would be the 
benefit rate at which people in poverty would be supported. For example, as shown in Figure 
5.10, if central government were to measure the national minimum income line at $1000, 
every local city would be required to provide the same amount of minimum income support to 
those in poverty. 	  
For example, a minimum income standard report for the UK claimed that the minimum 
income standard was 60% of national average income. In 2009, a single person required £175 
a week excluding rent, a couple with two young children required £403 a week excluding rent 
and childcare, and a lone parent with a 1-year-old needed £234 (Davis et al., 2010, p.3). It is a 
matter of location, with basic income security, everyone could obtain a least certain amount of 
payment to secure income, currently in UK, if you qualify and have no income you’ll get at 
least 57 pounds a week (GOV.UK-Income support, 2014).    
 
Figure 5.10 Central average 
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Both centralised and decentralised systems have a number of advantages and disadvantages. 
Decentralisation can be used in circumstances where there are significant differences between 
different regions and localities. Seabright (1996, p.62) claims that one of the benefits of 
decentralisation is that allowing local jurisdictions the discretion to compete in the provision 
of public goods will tend to increase the efficiently of allocation of those public goods. 
Tiebout (1956, pp.416–417) contends that flexible decisions using a local supply of public 
goods can induce individuals to reflect their true preferences. Dur and Roelfsema (2005, 
p.395) argue:  
 
Centralisation of political decision making often fails to produce the desired 
results. For instance, it is frequently argued that decision making within the 
European Union results in overspending and overregulation in some policy 
areas, while too low spending and too little regulation persist in others. 
 
On the other hand, other studies argue that centralised policies provide a strong basis for 
effective social welfare efforts. Hicks and Swank (Hicks and Swank, 1992, p.670) describe 
the effect of centralised states on the welfare system has worked historically, structurally 
centralized states with histories of early consolidation of major social security programmes do 
indeed appear to capacitate the national welfare effort. 
 
The Chinese central government is aiming to build a social policy base nationwide. However, 
if the government were to set precisely the same policies or general plan for everywhere in 
China, it may help some areas, but because of the large developmental inequality between 
regions, a single centralised policy framework or plan may not work effectively in other areas. 
For example, if central government decided to set the support rate for poor people in each 
province at 10% of the average national income, problems might arise due to people’s 
differing needs. In Beijing, for example, while someone may need 100% of the average 
income to live, others may need 200% of the national average income to support their living 
security. Some people may also need other support in the form of housing or medical 
treatments. Furthermore, given China’s geographical size, huge population and regional 
diversity, a complex range of social welfare policies are in operation in China. Social security 
policies in China incorporate a wide range of social services, including various social 
insurance protections such as old-age pension insurance, health insurance and unemployment 
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insurance, the Five Guarantees2 for older people, the disabled and minors in rural areas, and 
the minimum standard of living scheme (MSLS). The central government has therefore 
devolved some of its powers of policy implementation to provincial and regional 
governments and has urged local authorities to develop their own initiatives to satisfy their 
residents’ needs. It appears, therefore, that Chinese policy makers have decided that a 
relatively decentralised policy implementation system might provide the best option to ensure 
universality of social welfare allocation in China. The central government’s role is limited to 
monitoring how local governments implement social policies and assuming macro-control 
over the social welfare system’s resources allocation process. Lin and Liu (2000, p.2) assert: 
 
The central government can assign its representatives to local offices where 
they could gain sufficient knowledge about the local preferences and thus 
play a role in the resource allocation process under a centralized fiscal 
system...[T]he central government can also involve officials at the 
subnational level in the decision process  
 
As regards a specific Chinese social security policy, how does the centralisation/ 
decentralisation discussion relate to the implementation of the MSLS in practice? The MSLS 
is China’s main response to the new social security challenges under the market economy, 
and its purpose is to ‘provide a basic living for individuals or families to overcome their 
difficulties, maintaining social stability and promoting social development’ (Shanghai, 1996). 
It was first introduced in 1993 by the Shanghai local authority (Chan et al., 2008, p.67). After 
the MSLS was rolled out nationwide, the State Council of China state “all levels of 
government should place the MSLS onto the list of important tasks” (State Council of China, 
2011). Since its nationwide implementation, the local governments of each region of China 
“have worked out the levels of MSLS on the basis of their own local financial condition” 
(Chan et al., 2008, p.72). As with other social welfare provisions, the majority of funding for 
the MSLS comes from local government income. But if the revenues of a province (local 
government) could not cover specific social welfare expenditure, the central government may 
provide some subsidies to those provinces (Lin and Liu, 2000, p.2). 
 
Despite the apparent success of the MSLS, there are still many problems with it in its current 
form. In each region of China, local government sets the minimum standard level by 
themselves, which results in very different levels of MSLS payment between regions in China. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Recipients of benefits under the Five Guarantees are provided with food, clothing, housing, medical care and burial 
expenses (Fraser, 2011, p.3). 
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In addition, since the local government has to bear the majority of the costs of the social 
security benefit, the MSLS payment rate is normally set too low to satisfy the needs of poor 
families. Furthermore, because the funding for MSLS is collected and managed by local 
governments, it makes it very difficult for central government to monitor the process and 
funds may be used by local authorities to fund projects other than the intended ones. A fairly 
recent example of Chinese local authority mismanagement of social funds might prove useful 
here. Like MSLS funding, “the old age pension fund is collected and managed by local 
authorities” (Chan et al., 2008, p.83). According to the National Audit Office, in 2006, about 
1.7 billion yuan of pension funds were misused in overseas investments, construction projects 
and illegal lending (China Daily Online, 2006). 
 
It might be argued that collecting national statistics on all of the regional MSLS standard rates 
would allow for the setting of an average rate, a baseline standard that could address the 
problem of low benefit rates. Clearly, however, living costs vary greatly between regions in 
China, and variations in MSLS payment rates are in some way inevitable. For the more 
economically developed cities, and thus higher income cities, the MSLS payment rate has 
been tied to the local average income. For developed cities such as Shanghai or Beijing, the 
MSLS payment has been paid at a significantly higher rate than the national average, but for 
the poorer developing cities, a national average rate has provided a decent income and 
standard of living. As a basic income security, the MSLS payment rate at least needs to cover 
people’s basic needs. However, because of the various payment standards and conditions, the 
MSLS does not act as a basic universal income security, instead it is a policy targeted at 
particular groups. Ms C from ILO Asian Department, Bangkok said that economic 
development in China is growing fast, but economic security is not performing as well as its 
economic growth; for example, with the lack of national standards, it is hard to guarantee that 
everyone obtains sufficient support. It is even hard to ensure that everyone gets some support 
whether it is sufficient or not. 
 
In addition, many poor people are not covered by the MSLS or other social benefits. For 
example, in the existing old age pension system, people who are outside of the labour market 
get little protection (Chan et al., 2008, p.79). There is also a huge number of highly mobile 
migrant workers in China, most of whom are informal workers or contract workers, and the 
existing social support system also fails to address the financial burden that paying insurance 
premiums places on migrant workers. As Meng et al (2004, pp.17–38) point out: 
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The precise number of this floating population is uncertain, but it is 
thought to be at least double estimates. This population is not covered by 
any social insurance system. Whether they have any insurance status at 
all is determined solely by their employer, if they have been fortunate 
enough to secure a job. 
  
Obviously, decentralised social policies would not work well for such migrants as China has a 
restricted household registration system, and the social security insurance benefits payable 
depend on a person’s officially registered place of residence. Because one region’s living 
standards are different from another, in some areas the gaps in benefits that rural migrants and 
urban residents might receive are very large. Furthermore, people whose earnings are 
marginally above the minimum benefit rate also need basic protection. For example, those 
with an income just above the MSLS support threshold could easily fall into extreme poverty 
without protection. The current MSLS support threshold in every city is still under the United 
Nations’ (UN) extreme poverty line of $US1.25 per day. The income of those just above the 
MSLS support threshold still meets or falls below the UN’s figure for extreme poverty, but 
they not eligible to receive cash support. It seems clear, therefore, that steps needs to be taken 
to protect those at the margins of eligibility for MSLS benefits. More careful practical use of 
social and economic security policies could allow marginalised people to receive similar 
support to that enjoyed by formal MSLS recipients. For example, they might be afforded the 
education benefits that are currently enjoyed by MSLS recipients. This could help to protect 
the marginalised from falling into an even worse situation than they currently experience. 
Indeed, in an interview conducted during the fieldwork for this study, Ms B from the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China said that China’s social security system 
should be focused not only on extremely poor people, but also on the marginalised with an 
income just above the income support threshold. She stated that the authorities in Beijing are 
now trying to help marginal groups by granting them some of the benefits previously afforded 
only to MSLS recipients, but excluding direct cash support. She claimed that people from 
these marginal groups who are now receiving these benefits are very happy with the new 
arrangement and are worrying less about their living conditions. 
 
The question, then, is how can an effective and equitable income support policy or income 
security system operate in an economy that is so complex that it has needed to generate 
complex forms of security? The complexity of inequality and insecurity in 21st century China 
means that there is no simple answer to this question, especially given that the continuing 
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pace of economic development in China keeps the situation dynamic and fluid. If there is a 
solution, then the principle of asymmetric protection could provide the basis for a system 
combining universal and targeted types of protection to people. In such a system, everyone 
will get kind of protection, but protection will weighted depending on a person’s income level 
and living standards.  
 
China’s rapid economic reforms have influenced the Chinese welfare system and have 
resulted in a decline in social service provision by the state. Some major challenges to the 
social security of Chinese people have resulted from these changes, and the major insecurity 
problems of income and housing security for informal workers, migrant workers and self-
employment workers, must be addressed. The ‘asymmetric protection’ principles discussed 
above could shed light on ways to address income and housing security within each region in 
China.  
5.7	  Conclusion	  
 
After many years of investigating the social policy experiences of other countries and years of 
practical policy development, the Chinese social security system framework is nearly 
complete. Nevertheless, the development of the Chinese social security system will remain an 
on-going task due to the emergence of new issues related to changes in the labour market 
brought about by economic reform. These issues include the need to provide protection for 
informal workers, migrant workers and self-employed people, improve the quality of social 
benefits, and increase the current low benefit rates. All of these issues create new challenges 
for China’s social and economic security system. If the Chinese social security system is to 
run smoothly and be a mechanism for sustainable development, then effective social security 
policies to deal with these issues need to be developed.  
 
As a huge and complex country, the question of how best to allocate and operate basic income 
support and housing security policy has proven problematic for the Chinese authorities given 
that there are advantages and disadvantages to both universal and targeted models and to 
centralised and decentralised models. While the Chinese government should take on board the 
opposing views of such international players as the ILO and the World Bank, the decision on 
the best policy course ultimately rests with the Chinese government, and the decision that is 
taken should best reflect the unique Chinese context. 
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One of the most important tasks facing the Chinese government at the time of the social 
security reforms was to increase the rate of welfare support coverage. The central government 
has certainly taken steps to address this issue and has designed a mixed universal and targeted 
economic security strategy to protect people’s income and housing security and maintain 
sustainable development. Nevertheless, the benefits of operating income security and housing 
security on the basis of compulsory and universal social protection are compelling. China 
could therefore consider introducing a national social protection floor covering the entire 
population while continuing to target those in need. Given the large proportion of needy 
people not covered by current social security policy, the Chinese government could consider 
expanding the coverage of particular social benefits to those people whose income currently 
places them at the margins of eligibility for social security benefits. 
 
The positives and negatives associated with universal/targeted models and 
centralised/decentralised social welfare systems means that the decisions of China’s policy 
makers must be grounded on a comprehensive and systematic understanding of these issues 
and the lessons that can be drawn from other the policy experiences of other countries. Of 
these issues, one of the most important in the Chinese context is the issue of decentralism 
because the power to set both the threshold for support and benefit payment rates power is 
granted to local government. The next chapter will therefore examine this issue in more detail.  
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6.0	  Introduction	  
 
The picture of social security at the state level presented in the previous chapter indicates that 
China’s social security system is moving towards a combination of universal and targeted 
social security provision. On the one hand, the state is developing the welfare state and 
increasing the coverage rate in key areas such as health insurance, with over 90% of people in 
China currently participating in health insurance programmes. On the other hand, the Chinese 
welfare system is focusing primarily on lower income groups, with policies offering cash 
support to extremely poor households and developing housing policy for poor urban residents. 
However, the rapid and relatively unsystematic growth of the Chinese social security system 
has led to a range of problems.  
 
As shown in the previous chapter, one important issue is the lack of a national standard for 
welfare provision and coverage. Because China is so vast and has such a large population, the 
lack of a national standard means that many local regions have set social support payments at 
such a low rate that they are unable to satisfy people’s basic needs. In addition, the level and 
types of social protection offered vary across regions. For example, social payments differ 
greatly between rural and urban areas and inland and coastland regions.  
 
In China, policies designed at the national level are not always put in practice at the local 
government level in the way that was originally intended. For example, while the central 
government’s main policies regarding income security and housing security have been 
broadly implemented across the country, the considerable administrative freedom granted to 
provincial governments means that the specific implementations of these policies and the way 
in which social security is delivered to people varies according to the province. This chapter 
therefore looks at the provincial government in order to analyse social security in China. This 
chapter explores to what extent Chinese local government efficiently implements national 
social security policies at the local level. This issue is especially germane in the Chinese case 
because at present central government set the overall social policy, while the actual social 
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policy details, standards and implementation are worked out and managed at the local 
government level.  
 
This chapter explores two of the main issues raised by the research. Firstly, it looks at how the 
nature of Chinese local government fundamentally influences the way in which social 
security policies have been developed and implemented in China. Secondly, it examines how 
local government has failed to implement and administer policy in an equitable way, 
especially regarding the differing outcomes of specific policies for rural and urban people. To 
explore these issues, Tangshan City will be used as a case study.  
 
This dual separation of responsibility for policy design and implementation in the Chinese 
state welfare system is mirrored in one of the most important debates within the field of social 
security theory, which focuses on the degree to which national or local government should 
assume responsibility for and intervention in social security provision. The main theoretical 
perspectives within this area include the debate on free-market provision versus state 
intervention and centralisation versus decentralisation. Some critics have argued that social 
security provision under decentralised authorities can lead to problems such as the setting of 
low benefit rates and inadequate support for housing security. Others have contended that 
countries in which decentralisation plays a prominent role in the implementation of social 
policy tend to have a lower level of welfare provision than countries with a more centralised 
implementation (Cameron, 1978; Castles, 1999; Swank, 2002). Crook and Sverrison (1999) 
and Smith (1985) argue that the lack of resources available to local government ultimately 
limits its ability to provide public services to citizens. In contrast to such criticisms, however, 
Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis (1993) found that decentralisation in Asian developing 
countries improved the capacity of local administrators and made local governments more 
responsive to local needs. In addition, a World Bank case study showed that decentralisation 
had improved local services in Colombia (Mundial, 1995). In the developed European welfare 
states, public welfare systems are characterised by varying degrees of centralisation and 
decentralisation. For example, Sweden is characteristic of a decentralised state, with much of 
the control over policy implementation having been transferred from national to local 
government, which assumes political, social and financial responsibility for large parts of the 
welfare system. In contrast, the UK social benefits system is largely administered by a 
national agency. For example, in the case of one of the most important income security 
measures, unemployment benefit, the system is centralised.  
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In China, the social welfare system is highly weighted towards decentralisation. Although 
social policies are designed by central government, local governments are able to modify 
central government policy to some extent and to set their own local social support standards 
and rates. As China contains many provinces that are developing at different speeds, it is 
necessary to examine how income support in one state differs from that in another. In any 
analysis of the effects of China’s decentralised system on welfare provision, it is necessary to 
examine whether decentralisation enables local government to be more flexible in responding 
to regional needs to provide services that are effective in protecting the economic security of 
welfare recipients.  
 
What, then, does the administration of welfare provision by local government mean for the 
design and implementation of social policies in China? In an effort to answer this, this chapter 
explores two main questions raised by this thesis. Firstly, does the nature of Chinese local 
government fundamentally influence the way in which social security policies have been 
developed and implemented in China? Secondly, has local government failed to implement 
and administer policy in an equitable way, especially in terms of practical differences in the 
implementations and outcomes of specific policies for rural and urban people? To explore 
these issues, current social policy practices in Tangshan City will be used as a case study. 
This chapter presents some of the findings from the Tangshan city case study to examine 
whether current income support rates in Tangshan are sufficient to guarantee income security 
for welfare beneficiaries and whether there are problems with the housing security policies 
that have been implemented in the city. Section 6.1 explores local government responsibility 
for the social security system in the city. Fiscal policies are discussed in Section 6.2, social 
insurance issues in Sections 6.3 to 6.5, the local implementation of the MSLS programme in 
Section 6.6, and local housing provision in Section 6.7. 
6.1	  The	  administration	  of	  social	  security	  by	  local	  government	  
 
In China’s single-party state, the organs of state operate on a centralist principle under the 
central state government. The administrative division in China has the Central Government or 
State Council as the highest authority; under this are various ministries dealing with a broad 
range of political, economic and social issues (see Figure 6.1). Below this, three provincial-
level authorities constitute the next level of government. Most regions are organised as 
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provinces, with autonomous regions and municipalities operating only in some regions in 
China. The three provincial-level authorities, Province, Autonomous Region and Municipality 
authorities, have equal administrative powers, and provincial-level governance is a central 
feature of the system of government in China. In total, there are 31 provincial-level 
governments, including 23 provinces, five autonomous regions (Neimenggu, Guangxi, 
Xizang, Ningxia, and Xinjiang) and four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Chongqing) (State Council of China, 2013). 
Figure 6.1: The administrative structure in China 
 
 
The administrative structure of government in the different provincial-level authorities is very 
similar and is summarised in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2: Local government administrative structure in China 
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Below the province-level administrative structure, there is city and district/county level 
government. There are a total of 335 cities at the prefectural level, 2142 county-level 
authorities, and a very large number of local administrations at the township and village levels 
(Ahmad et al., 2002, p.3). Depending on the size of the city, it may contain many districts and 
counties. Districts are generally defined as urban areas, and counties as rural areas. Townships 
are generally defined as the areas in between urban and rural areas, and villages are 
categorised as rural areas.  
 
Within this administrative structure, governance at the central government level is mostly 
highly centralised, while at the provincial and other local government levels, administrations 
take either a decentralised form or lie somewhere between centralised and decentralised. It 
should be noted that administrations at local government level have greater autonomy and 
administrative power than in the past. Before the economic reforms of 1976, the entire 
government system in China was highly centralised, with local government having little 
independence. The economic and social development fiscal budget was obtained from and 
managed by central government, with all local government acting merely in an ‘agency’ role 
as implementers of central government policy. As a result, the responsibilities and functions 
of local government were limited, acting largely as branches of central government. Although 
the centre may have offered local authorities a limited degree of operational autonomy and 
some degree of independence in allocating economic resources in order to promote local 
development, the central government ultimately controlled macroeconomic development 
policy across the entire country, with the aim of achieving equal development across all 
regions. This pattern of economic development is typical of a centrally planned economy, 
with the central government in control of distribution of the resources necessary for economic 
development at the local level. During the Mao period, the Chinese economic development 
strategy was largely egalitarian in character, and financial investment during the Second, 
Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans (1958–65, 1966–70 and 1971–75) was concentrated on the 
interior and western regions (Naughton, 1987; Huang, 1996). However, a serious drawback of 
this governance structure was the extent to which the central government would allocate 
resources in the pursuit of national objectives to the detriment of providing resources to the 
local government level. This form of administrative system inevitably led to a lack of 
autonomy for local government and a failure to develop efficient administrative and 
operational capacity. 
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After the 1976 reforms, the centralised administrative system in China began to change, 
especially following the establishment of a market economy. Local authorities were gradually 
given greater rights and powers to evaluate the situation in the areas under their jurisdiction 
and to formulate their own development policies and plans. Today, local government no 
longer acts as a ‘pure’ implementer of central policy, but has instead become a party to the 
design, development and implementation of policy in China. The framework of the local 
government system is similar to that of the central state government; it has the same 
administration branches but on a smaller scale. For example, local government administers 
social security services through the local Civil Affairs Bureau, the Human Resources and 
Social Security Bureau, the Housing and Urban Rural Development Bureau and other relevant 
official departments at the local government level.  
 
Therefore, local government invariably carries out two functions having a dual role to play in 
the process of delivering social security. On one hand, the local authority acts as a level of 
government that is subordinate to central government, and is responsible for implementing 
central government's administrative tasks and regulations and assisting in implementing the 
centre’s social security policies. On the other hand, local government is a representative of 
local society and has responsibility for economic development, developing social welfare 
services and providing social security support. For example, in the provision of the Minimum 
Standard of Living Scheme (MSLS), local government needs to use part of its revenue to 
finance the MSLS, which provides financial support to recipients. Local government also has 
more power than before. They are now able to modify central policy or to add new local 
conditions to make it more efficient. In housing provision, local government is required to 
follow higher-level government orders to provide affordable housing, low rental housing and 
housing subsidies, but local government has the right to decide how this is provided. For 
example, local government has the power to decide where to build low-rent housing provision 
and how to allocate it to local applicants. As Chan, Ngok and Phillips (2008, p.67) emphasise, 
‘China is lacking a nationwide strategy for tackling social security policies, and the central 
government encourages local authorities to develop their own initiatives and use manifold 
resources to support and meet their resident’s needs.’  
 
Along with the changes in China's social welfare pattern and the expansion of market reforms, 
the relationship between central and local government has changed towards meeting 
development interests at the local level. For instance, when central government is in the 
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process of designing social policies, it will often consider the real needs of local government. 
Meanwhile, local government has exchanged its former passive acceptance of central policy 
directives for the practice of actively making requests based on local needs (Wang, 2012, p.8). 
Since city authorities work directly with the recipients of social security (and thus the targets 
of such social policies), they are in a better position to assess people’s needs. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that decentralisation may decrease the incentive of local government 
to adhere to nationally agreed social protections for citizens and that greatly increased 
independence, flexibility and power at the local level may actually lead local government to 
implement policies in such a way that they contravene central government’s objectives 
(Naughton, 1987; Huang, 1996). In China, the aspects of decentralisation inherent in the 
system of government mean that there are local variations in social security responses to the 
policies designed by the central government. Consequently there is a lack of national 
standards in the social security system. The national standards only provide a guideline, for 
example the national standard requires that the MSLS payment should meet the lowest local 
living expenses, but it does not state the exact amount that the local government needs to pay. 
However, as local government reports the level of the lowest local living expenses, there is a 
clear conflict of interest and local government might potentially have a detrimental influence 
on the overall MSLS process.  This has allowed local governments to tailor their responses to 
problems such as low support/payment rates in order to cut social security costs. Given that 
most of the local welfare budget is collected at local level (described in more detail in the next 
section), this is a crucial point.  
 
Many academics argue that the economic security provided in China is not enough to support 
the cost of living and healthcare and that the coverage support standard is low relative to the 
potential demand of many of China’s poor (Chan et al., 2008, p.73; Wong and Flynn, 2001, 
pp.67, 68; Saunders and Shang, 2001, p.283). Given the recent fast economic growth, the 
question of why social payment is still too low has to be asked. One reason might be because 
government spending of GDP on social welfare is quite low compared to other areas. In 2011-
2012, China’s GDP on government spending was about 13.5% (The Economist, 2014), but 
social security, healthcare and the employment budget shared about 15.7% of total 
government expenditure (Needham, 2013, p.5). Therefore, spending on social welfare was 
about 2% of total GDP.  Needham (2013, p.5) argues that China has been taking greater 
responsibility in social welfare and healthcare to reduce social insecurity. In one sense, it is 
true that over the past few years the governments in China has been more proactive in taking 
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responsibility for improving social security, and because of the large population, the coverage 
rate of social welfare will have a great impact on the greatest number of people. However, the 
GDP spending on social welfare compare to other factors is still quite small. In the OECD 
countries, GDP spending on social welfare rose from 19% in 2007 to around 22% in 2013 
(OECD data, 2013). Thus, there is still a long way for China to go to reach a similar service 
as in Europe with a system where universal health care is available to all residents, as well as 
long-term care for old people and sufficient support for unemployed workers.   
 
Nevertheless, many cities have promoted and gradually increased the coverage of social 
security policies, including MSLS, unemployment insurance, basic healthcare and pensions. 
Given the decentralised nature of social policy administration in China, the ability of local 
government to take responsibility for and implement social policies efficiently is a crucial 
issue for social security and long-term development. The next section provides more details 
on how local government might provide social services to protect citizens. The characteristics 
of economic and social security developments and policy structures in Tangshan city have 
been selected as a case study. As shown above, social payments come largely from local 
government, although the central government will also help by issuing a certain percentage on 
behalf of local government. Therefore, social security payments are influenced by local 
government revenue. The next section will give more detail on this issue.  
 
6.2	  Fiscal	  policies	  at	  the	  local-­‐government	  level	  
 
Social security is one of the key responsibilities of local government in China, and adequate 
financial support is key to the success of the social security system. The main fiscal 
responsibility for social security falls on local government, which manages and supports 
various forms of social security through its fiscal budget for capital expenditure. The area 
budget for social welfare is reflected in three factors, the local government support rate for 
social insurance, social assistance and other forms of fiscal support; the fiscal ratio of central 
finance and local finance expenditure; and, the social security fiscal ratio to GDP level. 
According to Zheng (2011, p.250), China’s social security fiscal budget in 2009 was about 
6.2% of national GDP, while the local government expenditure on social insurance was 14.4% 
of local GDP, with local government fiscal support accounting for more than 95% of social 
security support. The rest was supported by central government and other donations. Over the 
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past 30 years, the rate of fiscal support from central government progressed through three 
stages, first decreasing, then increasing and finally stabilising. From 1988 to 1995, the social 
security support ratio reduced from 29% to 11.63% of the total government fiscal budget 
(Zheng, 2011, p.256), this massive reduction was influenced the economic and political 
environment in China. Its economy was a system in transition; all resources were in a period 
of reallocation during the economic reforms after 1979 (Zhu and Tan 2005, p.9). In addition, 
foreign investment fell off sharply after the Beijing Massacre of June 1989. The whole 
economic and social system was in an unstable period. From 1996 to 2002, the ratio increased 
over time, and after 2004, the ratio stabilised at around 40% of total government fiscal 
expenditure (Zheng, 2011, p.256). This massive increase was also influenced by economic 
and political progress. After 1995, series economic reform policies were established and 
implemented, and the overall level of quality and ability of state enterprises was promoted 
and a better economic and political system was instituted (Zhu and Tang, 2005, p12).  
 
This trend towards large increases in the social security financial support ratio reflects the 
government’s increased focus on social security provision and development. In addition, 
social security became more monetized, whereas previously benefits were given fewer 
subsidies. For example, in housing, at that time, house prices were much cheaper than today. 
In employment, there were not many rural migrant workers working in urban areas, about two 
thirds of the population worked in agriculture areas, the government was able to provide jobs 
for urban workers, and social insurance pressure was much less than today. The population 
was about 1 billion in the 1980s and early 1990s, whereas today there are over 1.3 billion 
people in China. Also inflation has risen in China giving higher prices for food and 
commodities than before (BBC, 2011a). In 2011 the inflation rate was rising by about 5% and 
the rising cost of food and commodities have pushed up the cost of living. 
 
The majority of the social security fund comes from local government and local authorities 
are dealing with the costs with their own fiscal revenue. How do they raise so much money at 
the local level? According to Wang (2011, p.1), local government revenue comes from three 
main areas, local tax revenue (about 39% of total revenue), central government supply 
(around 31%) and local land sale or rent revenue (around 30%). At the local level, the 
majority of the social security fund comes from the local authority itself, which raises revenue 
through tax receipts, profits from government owned businesses and compulsory 
contributions by private companies and land sales.  
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China runs a tax revenue system that is divided into two major forms, state tax revenue, and 
local tax revenue. Local and central government share the total tax revenue in different 
proportions; for example, from income tax the state takes 60% and local governments take 
40%. All tax from local natural resources and local business tax revenue goes to local 
government (Liu, 2009, p.3). In addition, to raise non-tax revenue, local government can do 
things such as selling local land to raise money. Therefore, local government is able to 
provide a social security fund. As shown in Figure 6.3, local social security expenditure 
comes mainly from the local government fiscal budget, at an average of between 93% and 
94%, and central government contributes only around 5% to 6%. This is an important point; 
all almost social security costs come from the local government source. Income assistance, 
pensions, housing provision and other social security budget cover all social security 
provisions provided at the local government level. 
 
Figure 6.3 Government Social Security Expenditure Rate 
 
 
 
China is investing a lot of money in all types of economic securities. For example, in 2012, 
the state expenditure on pension was 1450.7 billion yuan, unemployment insurance was 18.1 
billion yuan and public health insurance was 762.4 billion yuan (Ministry of Finance of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2013). From 2009-2012, the state invested 900 billion yuan 
(about 140 billion US dollars) to build social houses to protect housing security (XinHuaNet, 
2009).  
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Local government responsibility for social security is merged with the market system. State 
owned companies and private companies are sharing part of the responsibility of the social 
insurance fund, and the government might also invest the social security fund in the market. 
In the pension system, for example, employers pay a pension to retired workers, of which 
local government is required to pay 20% and 10% is taken from government finances (Zheng, 
2011, p.263).  
 
Contributions from local companies have helped to reduce government costs. However, it 
also increases the number of part-time workers and informal workers employed by the 
companies in order to avoid social insurance costs. In 2010, the number of informal workers 
in China was around 50% according to official figures (Kuruvilla et al, 2011, p.20). In 1997 
there were about 53.92 million informal workers. By 2004, the number of informal workers 
had increased to 136.1 million and this figure continues to increase (Yao, 2007, as cited in Liu, 
Zhang and Li, 2008, p.17). This issue will be discussed more in Chapter 8.  
 
Given the lack of a national payment rate standard, the fact that local government is primarily 
responsible for providing social security and that the majority of social security expenditure 
comes from local government revenue, there is intense pressure on local governments to 
reduce the level of support payments and thus reduce their total social security costs. The lack 
of a national payment rate standard, the unclear demarcation of the boundaries of 
responsibility for social security provision and the failure to establish a systematic and 
standardised social security policy decision-making process all contribute to failings in the 
systems. Furthermore, the influence that the market has had on the social security system in 
recent decades, not all of it positive, means that there is a case to be made for the government 
to intervene more actively in setting standards for the social security system and its delivery 
of social protections.  
6.3	  The	  economic	  security	  issues	  in	  Tangshan	  
 
Located 100 miles from Beijing, Tangshan is one of the eleven city-level cities in Hebei 
Province, a heavily industrialised district that has experienced rapid economic growth over 
the past few years. It therefore provides a typical case through which to examine the welfare 
policy model in China. Local officials had an important part in shaping and developing the 
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local economy and managing local social welfare. The local authority also takes responsibility 
for obtaining and providing resources for social insurance. Due to the type of market 
investment and high economic growth rate in the city, Tangshan has provided many job 
opportunities to people from other regions, with a high rate of rural migrant workers moving 
to the city in search of work.  
 
The income security policies that will be examined in this case study are the Minimum 
Standard Living Scheme (MSLS), the Minimum Wage and healthcare insurance. In line with 
the strategy of central government, Tangshan has adopted income security policies that 
contain features of both universal and targeted policy models. For instance, the coverage of 
the social insurance schemes in Tangshan, whereby all urban formal workers are required to 
participate in schemes for unemployment insurance (UI), healthcare insurance, pension 
insurance, work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance, is characteristic of a 
universal income protection model. Of these, the UI scheme, which is one of the most 
important income security policies, will be examined in the following sections, which looks at 
how the local authority administers and implements UI policy to protect people. 
 
Before exploring the particulars of the administration of the UI scheme in Tangshan, a 
comparison of the coverage rates of other social security schemes compared to the rate for the 
UI scheme is useful. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, overall social insurance rates gradually 
increased from 2010 onwards. In addition, Tangshan’s Statistical Bureau (2013, p.3) reports 
that by 2012 1.537 million people had joined the pension insurance scheme, including 1.0929 
million formal workers in urban areas, 2.252 million people had joined the urban health care 
insurance scheme, including 1.4872 million urban formal workers and 0.7648 million urban 
residents were not employed in the formal sector. In contrast, only 0.7937 million were 
participating in the UI scheme. 
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Figure 6.4 Social Insurance Rate in Tangshan 
 
The number of UI participants is increasing over time. However, the number of people who 
draw UI benefits has declined from 2006 to 2012 (CCTV News, 2014, p.1) One reason is that 
in recent years, China’s economic and employment situation has improved; therefore, the 
unemployment rate has decreased. It should be noted that since many rural residents and 
informal workers are not eligible to join the social insurance system, most participants in 
social insurance schemes are urban formal workers. Many of them work in the state-owned 
sector or as civil servants. Therefore, their jobs are comparatively stable compared to those in 
the private sector. The level of social security is higher for civil servants and other employees 
working for the state and other formal state-owned enterprises compared to employees in the 
private sector. In private enterprises, workers’ social security has not been so well protected. 
Also, in practice, most rural residents and informal workers are not eligible to join the social 
insurance system. The level of social security development is therefore extremely unbalanced 
in China.   
 
As can be seen, the UI coverage rate is far below that of the healthcare insurance and pension 
schemes, and this figure has stayed almost the same for the past three years. As the UI scheme 
is one of the five compulsory social insurances that employers must pay, the participant’s 
contribution comprises part of their salary. The question then arises of why the UI scheme has 
a lower coverage rate than the other compulsory schemes. This is explained by the fact that 
UI is only for formal workers and informal workers are not included; whereas healthcare 
insurance and pension insurance are open to every permanent resident of the city. 
Furthermore, since the local authority is responsible for making social insurance payments to 
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participants, in order to reduce the cost of administering the system, it only takes permanent 
local residents and formal workers into account for social insurance purposes. This is a 
common standard across the country.  
 
UI sets out the level of overall planning in the regions to be followed by authorities in the 
provinces and autonomous regions. Those regions may establish adjustment funds for 
unemployment insurance and may also sensibly adjust the rate of unemployment insurance 
premium after approval by the state council. In Hebei Province, UI follows the 
Unemployment Insurance Rule introduced by the central government in 1999. In order to 
claim UI participants must have paid contributions for at least one year, be made unemployed 
rather than leaving their job voluntarily, have registered as unemployed and be looking for 
work (State Council of China, 2005b).  
 
UI implementation is followed by strategic decisions at the provincial government level, and 
the provincial government also manages the UI coverage standard. The city level government 
then implements the orders from the higher level of government, as follows:    
1. Those with contributions between 1 and 2 years, receive three months of UI payments 
2. Those with contributions between 2 and 3 years, receive six months UI payments 
3. Those with contributions between 3 and 4 years, receive nine months UI payments  
4. Those with contributions between 4 and 5 years, receive twelve months UI payments 
5. Those with contributions over 5 years, receive up to twenty-four months UI payments  
 
Under this directive, the specific implementation of UI in a given province is determined by 
strategic decision making at the provincial government level, and the provincial government 
also sets the UI coverage rate. The city level government then implements the instructions 
passed down by the provincial government. The UI payment standard considers the minimum 
local wage rate; the payment has to be below this, but above the local minimum living 
standard (Hebei Provincial Government, 2005).  
 
Before 2005, the UI payment standard was different in different places. The UI benefits in 
each city had a different payment rate. Even within the same city, there used to be a different 
payment rate between town-village areas and county districts. However, this has changed in 
recent years: in many places in China, a local standard payment rate has been set within the 
province or city, and local residents enjoy the same UI benefits across the province (Zheng, 
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2011, p351). In Hebei Province, the provincial government began setting a standard UI 
payment rate for all cities in 2011, and each city has to follow the UI rules set by the 
provincial government. Under the current UI payment scheme, the highest UI payment 
possible is 770 yuan per month, the lowest is 520 yuan per month, and the claiming period 
ranges between 3 and 24 months (Guo, 2012, p.2). Therefore, every participant can get at 
least 520 yuan per month. However, this payment rate is very low. In 2012, the minimum 
wage rate in Tangshan was 1100 yuan per month (State Council of China, 2012b) and the 
minimum living standard was about 450 yuan per month (Hebei News, 2013). The UI 
payment rate was about 60% to 80% of the minimum wage rate and was just over the 
Minimum Standard Living Allowance (MSLS) payment rate. Although the UI has achieved 
something in protecting unemployed workers, it is not enough to help unemployed workers to 
boost their skills to find a new job. Lin, Yang and Lin (2005, p.345) show that the UI benefits 
in a lot of places are only paid at the basic living standard. It is not enough to promote the re-
employment activity, if UI claimants cannot afford the expenses involved with getting a job 
such as travel costs.  
 
The UI payment is not decreasing over time. This might be because UI benefit is related to the 
minimum living standard and the minimum wage rate. It is not similar to European countries 
where the UI is related to the recipient’s previous wage rate. Instead, the UI has been set at a 
flat benefit rate by local authorities. Most provinces in China seem to be running UI benefits 
in a similar way. Unfortunately there are no regularly published documents from the 
government to explain why the structure of UI payment is related to MSLS. However, the 
main reason might be because local government capacity is limited and the local fund would 
not be able to cover the massive population by providing a high UI payment rate. Ms X, a 
deputy mayor from the Kaiping District of Tangshan City, agreed with the local 
administration capacity limitation. She said it is still under pressure to provide support for a 
large number of workers. Therefore, the UI scheme is designed mainly to protect the low-
income population and those who have temporarily lost their job, and the UI payment rate 
remains low. In addition, it might be difficult for local government to check and identify 
every unemployed worker’s previous income rate, the size of a province is as large as some 
countries, the labour market in each region might be very complex and diverse, and also the 
state lacks reliable personal credit account data, all of which are big challenges for local 
administrative capacities.  
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Furthermore, the low payment rate might be adequate to meet the living expenses of some 
low-income workers, but it is insufficient to meet the needs of workers with higher living 
costs. As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of economic security is not only to 
protect the poor, but also the security of higher income people. Given that each area has a set 
flat UI payment rate, higher income workers will still have considerable living risks because 
their living expenses are generally much higher than those of low-income workers and the flat 
local UI payment rate is insufficient to meets their needs. China’s UI scheme is a 
contribution-based system under which workers have to contribute part of their wages in 
order to obtain UI. In Hebei Province, workers have to contribute 2% of the provincial 
average wage rate to UI (Liu, 2009, p.13). Given the higher income needs of some 
unemployed workers, the introduction of an asymmetric protection system might better serve 
the needs of these unemployed people. In such a system, higher wage earners could contribute 
more to the UI scheme (that is, contribute at a higher rate than the current 2% of provincial 
average wage in Hebei) and the UI payment rate could be linked to the person’s previous 
wage in order to satisfy the needs of different income classes. Such a system would go some 
way towards guaranteeing the income security of higher income workers.  
 
In Hebei Province as a whole, there were 4.9875 million UI participants, with 835,000 
claimants in 2011. Out of all those who became unemployed, only about 16.7% claimed UI 
benefit (Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security of Hebei Province, 2012, p. 3). In 
Tangshan, about 0.8 million people joined the UI scheme in 2012, and about 13,000 people 
claimed UI assistance. However, according to the Tangshan Statistics Bureau  (2012, P.3), 
there were 4.4 million employed workers in Tangshan in 2011, and the unemployment rate 
was about 4.0% (Tang, 2011, p.9). According to these figures, the number of unemployed 
workers in Tangshan in 2011 should have been around 176,000, over 10 times the number of 
UI claimants. It appears, therefore, that despite increasing rates of participation in the UI 
scheme, UI in Tangshan is not fulfilling its prescribed role, as many unemployed workers 
have been unable to enjoy the benefits of UI.  
 
6.4	  Issues	  in	  basic	  health	  insurance	  in	  Tangshan	  
 
Basic health insurance is another important policy for income security. It is divided into two 
schemes, one for urban and one for rural residents. As discussed in Chapter 5, the scheme for 
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urban residents is known as basic urban health insurance and covers basic medical costs for 
those covered. In Tangshan, contribution costs were 350 yuan per year in 2006, with the 
government paying 200 yuan and the residents paying 150 yuan (Tangshan City Council, 
2007, p.2). Participants in the scheme were required to seek treatment at specific hospitals, 
with four types of hospitals covered by the health insurance: the types of hospitals range from 
low and general-level hospitals to specialist hospitals.  Participants receive benefits only for 
fees over 300 yuan at the first level of hospital, over 500 yuan at the second level of hospital, 
800 yuan at the third level of hospital, and where fees exceed 1,200 yuan for specific illnesses, 
with a maximum basic health insurance payment of 30,000 yuan (Tangshan City Council, 
2007, p.3).  
 
The central government would like to use this basic urban health insurance to provide citizens 
with a general level of medical protection. In practice, however, this system may not provide 
sufficient health protection to poor recipients. As health insurance benefits are not paid until 
treatment fees exceed 300 yuan, many of the poorest members of society may be dissuaded 
from seeking treatment for minor ailments and conditions where the treatment does not 
exceed 300 yuan, because this payment must come from their own pockets. It should be 
remembered that the 300 yuan limit equates to approximately one month of MSLS payment, 
that is, the entire monthly income of the poorest people. For poor people with persistent 
health problems, a sizeable proportion of their monthly income might be spent on medication. 
If poor people are dissuaded from seeking hospital treatment on account of cost, this raises 
the likelihood that the source of their ailment remains untreated and they may go on to 
develop a serious illness.  
 
For rural citizens, the basic health insurance scheme is called the New Rural Cooperative 
Healthcare Insurance (NRCHI). In 2011, 4.73 million rural residents had joined the NRCHI, 
and the coverage rate in Tangshan City was 98.36% (Tangshan Statistics Bureau, 2012, p.18). 
The NRCHI is financed by central government, local government and participants. There is 
no national standard contribution rate for the NRCHI, with rates being set at the provincial 
level. 
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Figure 6.5 New Rural Cooperative Healthcare Financing Standard Rate 
 
The provincial government sets the local NRCHI contribution rate, and this contribution rate 
is directly related to the support payment. Figure 6.5 above shows the differences in the 
NRCHI contribution rate compared with the national average and contrasts the Hebei 
Province rate, Tangshan city rate and Beijing rate. The rate in Hebei Province showed a 
similar trend to the national average rate in the period 2010–2012. In 2012, Hebei Province 
required that the contribution rate should not be less than 290 yuan and provided for 70 
thousand yuan per person in hospital support payments per year (State Council of China, 
2012a, p.1) Since Tangshan is a city-level government within Hebei Province, it implements 
the same provisions as those of the provincial government. Beijing, as a well-developed area, 
has a higher contribution and payment rate than the national average. The NRCHI 
contribution rate in Beijing was 640 yuan in 2012, and the hospital payment covered up to 75% 
of hospitalisation expenses for 15 specified diseases (Beijing Daily News, 2012, p.1).  Even 
those without an income still need to pay 50 yuan per year to the NRCHI, which must be paid 
out of their MSLS benefits. As the NRCHI cost is so low, the local authority assumes they 
have enough money to pay it, but they may not qualify for MSLS or the MSLS payment may 
be delayed (See Chapter 7 for more on MSLS payments). Although health insurance covers a 
large amount of the population in Tangshan (98.36%), there are still 1.64% who are not 
covered, such as those with no income and without MSLS support. Those people might be 
ignored. Unfortunately, there is no official published data on how non-income households 
contribute to the NRCHI. 
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Overall, the contribution rate and benefits rate tend to correspond to the economic 
development rate of the specific area, and an area with a higher economic development level 
will generally provide more support than a less-developed area. However, this is not always 
the case. As the provincial government is responsible for setting the minimum contribution 
and support rates throughout the entire province, the local government has to bear most of the 
costs of insurance fees, then it might decide to decrease the contribution and payment rates in 
its area and instead invest more money in regional economic development.  
 
6.5	  The	  issues	  of	  pension	  insurance	  in	  Tangshan	  
 
The pension system in Tangshan has changed in recent years. The previously separate urban 
and rural pensions have been merged into the new urban-rural pension insurance system. 
From 2010, rural participants in the pension insurance scheme have enjoyed the same pension 
benefits as urban residents (XinHuaNet, 2010). This development marks a significant step in 
the reform of the social security system in Tangshan.  
 
In recent years, many Chinese rural migrants have moved to urban areas in search of job 
opportunities. While there are large numbers of people from rural areas living in urban centres 
in China, existing social security policies have largely failed to protect them due to the fact 
that the majority of these policies have different guidelines on eligibility, contributions and 
payment depending on where they are officially resident. The most apparent difference in 
policy implementation is the separation that occurs between rural and urban residents owing 
to the household registration system that operates in China, called the Household Registration 
System. This is a system of household registration that officially identifies a person as a 
permanent resident of a particular area. This system has in effect separated people into rural 
or urban residents. Although in the past the system played a part in maintaining social 
stability by preventing mass migration to the cities, and contributed to the country’s rural 
development, as well as assisting the state in providing protection to citizens, it has resulted in 
a two-tier social security system in which rural residents are disadvantaged. In general, rural 
social insurance benefits are lower than in urban areas, and this has been the case since the 
social security system was founded in 1950. Furthermore, even for urban residents differences 
persist: social benefit rates are different in different cities, with developing cities providing 
lower levels of protection than developed cities. The continued use of the household 
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registration system has been called into question (Ringen and Ngok, 2013, p13), especially 
given that economic reforms in China have fundamentally altered the Chinese economic and 
social structure, and globalisation has integrated society in a way previously unseen in the 
country. These changes have led to the mass migration of people, especially from poor rural 
areas, to urban areas seeking job opportunities. For these migrants, the main drawback to 
living in a developed city is the household registration system. Rural migrants are unable to 
obtain the same benefits as local urban residents. In addition, given that many of these rural 
migrants come from the less developed western-interior provinces, where benefit levels are 
particularly low, the benefit levels that they are eligible to receive are simply insufficient to 
meet their needs in the coastal developed cities that host them. Clearly, it appears that these 
rural migrants are not treated equally with their urban counterparts, and they are among the 
people most at risk in China’s new market society.  
 
In Tangshan, the rate of increase in the number of citizens joining the pension insurance has 
been considerable (see Figure 6.4). This is particularly the case for rural residents: in 2010, 
1.22 million rural residents were participants in the pension insurance scheme; in 2011, this 
figure had reached 3.13 million, or around 96% of all rural residents (Tangshan Statistics 
Bureau, 2012, p.20). Although this new pension system in Tangshan has not entirely resolved 
the pension problems of rural migrants, it has reduced rural workers’ income and economic 
risks, because the new pension system dramatically improves the economic security of elderly 
rural people living in cities. By the end of 2012, the central government officially introduced 
the new pension system to all provinces, with the intent of building a universal basic pension 
system in China.  
 
Nevertheless, there are many people who cannot afford to pay the pension insurance 
contributions. According to the Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of 
Tangshan (2011, p.2) the pension contribution rates for employees range from 3,700 yuan to 
7,200 yuan per year, which equates to around 240 to 600 yuan per month, or about 20% of the 
average salary for workers in the area. Given that even the lowest pension contribution rate 
was greater than the MSLS payment for rural residents (191.67 yuan per month in 2012), the 
poorest residents of Tangshan are clearly unable to afford to pay the pension contributions, 
and the lowest-income families face a future without income protection. Poor residents might 
also be unable to afford the contribution fees, and extremely low-income families are still 
suffering from a lack of future income protection, as they do not get this pension if they 
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cannot afford the fee. The question, therefore, is how to solve the pension problems of low-
income people.  
 
For such people, there is another contribution model through which they can obtain the urban-
rural pension, the Urban-Rural Basic Pension Insurance, under which the benefit levels are 
significantly lower than those provided by the standard pension scheme. The contribution 
rates are divided into ten levels of payments of between 100 and 1000 yuan per year in 100 
yuan steps (100 yuan, 200 yuan, 300 yuan etc) (Lu Nan District Government, 2012, p.1). 
Individuals can choose their level of contribution rate, and the government provides them 
with 30 yuan of subsidies. If they contribute for more than 15 years, after the age of 65, those 
participants can obtain 1,200 yuan per year, that is, 100 yuan per month (ibid).  
 
However, the pension payment rate of 100 yuan per month is very low and is too little to 
satisfy basic living needs being below the cost of basic living expenses. As will be seen in the 
next section, in which basic income security is explored in greater detail, the pension payment 
rate for Tangshan will show that the 100 yuan per month offered by this pension scheme can 
only contribute towards a part of the cost of living in Tangshan. 
 
6.6	  The	  Minimum	  Standard	  Living	  Scheme	  in	  Tangshan	  
 
The Minimum Standard Living Scheme (MSLS) is one China’s most important income 
security policies because it covers both urban and rural residents. It is a means-tested benefit 
that aims to guarantee a minimum living standard by providing a subsistence payment that 
covers the cost of clothing, food, and minimum living expenses. Local government is 
primarily responsible for operating this subsistence allowance system, and the MSLS 
payment rate is set by the city-level government, which makes adjustments to the payment 
rate according to the economic development level of the area. It is administrated by 
authorities at the city level who report the local MSLS payment rate to the provincial 
government. The MSLS is collectively financed by funds from central, provincial and city-
level government. However, the central government provides subsidies only to areas with 
extreme poverty or to local provinces or cities with fiscal difficulties. In practice, the majority 
of the funding for the MSLS comes from the city government's fiscal budget, but the MSLS 
fund is managed separately from the rest of the budget and is strictly reserved for MSLS 
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support. In recent years, many academics have claimed that the MSLS payment rate is 
insufficient to meet people’s needs. The questions that must therefore be asked in addressing 
this issue are whether this is because city-level governments have enacted a very low MSLS 
payment rate, what the MSLS payment rate is in Tangshan and whether it is sufficient to meet 
people’s needs. To answer these questions, the MSLS payment rate, the average income and 
the average expenditure on consumption in Tangshan will be analysed.  
 
Table 6.1. The Minimum Standard Living Scheme (MSLS) Rate in Tangshan 2005-2012 
 
 
Number of Urban 
MSLS 
Participants 
Urban 
MSLS 
Payment 
Number of Rural 
MSLS 
Participants 
Rural 
MSLS 
Payment 
2005 
61 
thousand 
220 yuan/month 
2640 yuan/year 
63.6 
thousand 
800 
yuan/year 
2006 
63 
thousand 
220 yuan/month 
2640 yuan/year 
78 
thousand 
1000 
yuan/year 
2007 
59.5 
thousand 
225 yuan/month 
2700 yuan/year 
99 
thousand 
1000 
yuan/year 
2008 
58 
thousand 
270 yuan/month 
3240 yuan/year 
108 
thousand 
1200 
yuan/year 
2009 
54 
thousand 
285 yuan/month 
3420 yuan/year 
117 
thousand 
1300 
yuan/year 
2010 
49.2 
thousand 
310 yuan/month 
3720 yuan/year 
132.9 
thousand 
1540 
yuan/year 
2011 
49.5 
thousand 
363 yuan/month 
4356 yuan/year 
143.3 
thousand 
1900 
yuan/year 
2012 
43.9 
thousand 
410 yuan/month 
4920 yuan/year 
140.6 
thousand 
2300 
yuan/year 
 
 
Table 6.1 shows the MSLS rates in Tangshan from 2005 to 2012. In line with people's 
increased expectations of income security, the MSLS payment rate has increased over this 
period. The MSLS support payment is divided into two categories, one for urban areas and 
one for rural areas. As can be seen, the MSLS payment rate is higher in urban areas than in 
rural areas. In 2005, the urban MSLS payment was 220 yuan per month, around three times 
the rural MSLS payment rate (66.67 yuan per month). By 2012, the urban MSLS payment 
rate had reached 410 yuan per month, while the rural MSLS payment rate stood at 191.67 
yuan per month. Clearly, there is a considerable disparity in payment rates, with rural 
beneficiaries receiving only one third of the urban MSLS payment rate. Although Table 6.1 
shows that both the urban and rural MSLS payment rates display a positive trend, with 
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payment rates increasing year on year, this is only a positive trend on the surface; to ascertain 
whether the MSLS is sufficient to meet an individual’s minimum needs, the MSLS payment 
rate must be compared with two other measures, average income and average expenditure. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Tangshan Urban and Rural Average income 2003 -2011 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the average income from 2003 to 2011 in rural and urban areas in Tangshan. 
In 2005, the urban average income was 10,488 yuan and the MSLS payment was 2,640 yuan 
per year, meaning that the urban MSLS payment rate was about a quarter of the average 
income in the city. By 2012, while the urban average income had reached 24,358 and the 
MSLS payment had increased to 4,920 yuan per year, the disparity in the urban MSLS 
payment rate and the urban average income had increased, with the a latter standing at five 
times that of the former. As a result, although the urban MSLS payment rate is increasing 
every year, its real value is decreasing over time compared to the urban average income. In 
contrast, there has been an improvement in the disparity between the rural MSLS payment 
and the rural average income over the same period. In 2005, the rural MSLS payment rate was 
800 yuan per year, which was around 5.7 times less than the rural average income of 4,582 
yuan. By 2012, the rural average income had reached 10,698 yuan, while the rural MSLS 
payment had increased to 2,300 yuan per year, or around 4.6 times less than the rural average 
income. The MSLS payment in yuan in 2012 had more than doubled compared with 2005. 
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Source: Calculated data from Tangshan Statistics Bureau 
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In international poverty measurement standards, the poverty line or the minimum living 
support line is generally considered to correspond to 50% to 60% of a country or region’s 
middle-income or average income rate (Sun et al., 2011, p.239). In Tangshan, the MSLS 
payment rate is around 20% to 30% of the average income rate and is therefore far below the 
international standard.  
 
Figure 6.7 shows the average household expenditure in Tangshan between 2005 and 2012. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 The average household expenditure in Tangshan 
 
In 2005, the urban household average expenditure on living costs in Tangshan was 8,622 
yuan (see Figure 6.7), which was more than three times the MSLS payment rate. In 2012, the 
urban household average expenditure had reached 15,605 yuan, or about seven times the 
MSLS payment rate. Therefore, it must be concluded that the real value of the MSLS 
payment decreased significantly compared with the average expenditure rate. In rural areas, 
the average expenditure was 2,832 yuan in 2005, which was about 3.5 times more than the 
MSLS payment rate. By 2012, the MSLS payment rate was 2,300 yuan compared to the rural 
average expenditure of 8,316 yuan or a difference of around 3.6 times the MSLS rate. It can 
be seen, therefore, that the rural MSLS payment rate is increasing over time, but its real value 
in relation to average living costs is remaining more or less constant.  
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If the MSLS is to play an effective role in income security, then the key element is to 
guarantee a reasonable payment rate. In comparison to the 2005 international extreme poverty 
rate of US$1.25 (about 10 yuan) per day, the urban MSLS payment rate in 2005 was 7.33 
yuan per day (220 yuan per month), or approximately 25% below the extreme poverty rate. 
By 2012, the urban MSLS rate had grown to 410 yuan per month (13.67 yuan per day). This 
is just above the 2005 US$1.25 per day extreme poverty line, but if the World Bank’s more 
modern figure for measuring international poverty is used, a figure of between US$1.25 and 
US$2 per day (World Bank, 2012, p.69), then the MSLS payment rate still remains at an 
international poverty rate level. Furthermore, the rural MSLS payment rate is even lower than 
that in urban areas and is considerably lower than the US$1.25 poverty line (6.3 yuan per day). 
It must be concluded, therefore, that the city government has enacted an MSLS payment rate 
at a very low level, and as many academics claim, it is incapable of meeting people’s living 
needs as it currently stands. 
 
6.7	  The	  administration	  of	  housing	  security	  and	  the	  low-­‐rent	  housing	  project	  	  
 
Housing security is an important part of any social security system. China’s housing security 
system was gradually built up via a series of housing provision policies, including the 
establishment of a housing provision fund and the development of affordable housing, limited 
price housing and low-rent housing. Of these, the policies on affordable housing and low-rent 
housing are the most important, and low-rent housing is China’s core housing security policy 
(Cai and Wu, 2012, p. 36). In recent years, the influences of neoliberalism on China's 
economic system has had a considerable impact on the supply and demand for housing, and 
property prices have risen dramatically. According to Ren et al. (2012, pp. 786,787,793), the 
average rate of increase in house prices reached 14% per year from 2003 to 2007. This trend 
has come to be regarded as one of the key indicators of China’s changing economic base. 
Low-income people find it very difficult to purchase housing due to high prices, and the 
poorer sections of the population are increasingly being marginalised from central urban areas, 
where prices are highest. Alongside the marginalised urban poor, the increasing numbers of 
rural migrant workers seeking employment in urban areas have placed extra stress on the 
housing market, meaning that the housing problem has have become a pressing issue in need 
of solutions. 
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The administration of housing security policies is similar to the administration of the MSLS 
in that policies have to be considered and developed in line with both the requirements set out 
by the provincial government and the city’s housing capacity and economic development. In 
Hebei Province, housing provision has been treated seriously, and policies in support of 
housing security have been quickly developed. The provincial government requires each city 
to implement social housing policies on low-rent housing, affordable housing and limited 
price housing, rebuild areas of dilapidated housing and guarantee that housing security 
coverage rate is at least 20% of the total local homeless population during the period 2011 to 
2015. The state does not care how high the population is, it just wants at least 20% of the 
homeless covered by the local housing policy. In addition, all information concerning housing 
security projects needs to be digitally recorded, including the housing location map, the 
number of social houses and the planning figures (Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development of Hebei Province, 2011). Social housing development in Tangshan has been 
undertaken at a rapid and increasing rate, with low-rent housing and affordable housing 
prioritised in Tangshan’s housing security system. The low-rent housing is organized and 
built by local government, who then allocate them to citizens requiring them. As low-rent 
housing is the most efficient housing security support, it is important to examine how 
Tangshan city has designed and implemented its low-rent housing policy.  
 
In Tangshan, low-rent housing projects include Shi-Wu-Pei-Zu (SWPZ) and housing rent 
subsidies. SWPZ refers to a scheme in which the local government rents social houses to 
participants at a low standard rate. The SWPZ employs a waiting-list method: when an 
application is successful but there is no low-rent house available at that time, applicants 
automatically join a waiting list. During the waiting period, the government provides 
successful applicants with monetary subsidies to help cover their rent costs. The housing rent 
subsidies come from a scheme whereby the government provides cash support to applicants, 
who then use the support to rent a house in the private sector. As can be seen in Figure 6.8, 
low-rent housing provision relied on the use of housing rent subsidies prior to 2008. From 
2008, however, the provision of low-rent housing has expanded significantly in Tangshan 
with the large-scale implementation of affordable housing programmes and the number of 
people involved in the SWPZ scheme has increased considerably.  
  
 
162	  	  
 
Figure 6.8. Number of people with low-rent housing provision 
 
By the end of 2010, the housing security coverage rate of people needing housing support was 
18.3%. Five thousand five hundred and seventy-one participants have been allocated low-rent 
houses and 83,375 people have taken advantage of affordable housing (Bureau of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development of Tangshan City, 2012, p.9). The target recipients of low-rent 
housing provision are urban low-income households with housing difficulties. The next 
section looks more closely at housing security support standards in order to ensure that the 
needs of housing recipients are being met.  
 
As the Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Tangshan (2012) states, the size 
of each low-rent house size is limited to between 30 and 50 square metres, including a double 
bedroom of 8 to 10 square metres, a single bedroom of 6 to 8 square metres, a living room of 
8 to 15 square metres, a kitchen of 4 to 5 square metres and a bathroom of 3 to 4 square 
metres. The standard size per capita is 15 square metres. This housing is targeted particularly 
at extremely poor families. Does this size of accommodation meet the needs of recipients? To 
answer this, the size of the low-rent housing should be compared with the average housing 
space in Tangshan. Since 2006, the average housing space in Tangshan has increased slightly, 
and from 2008, the urban average housing space per capita has been steady at around 22–23 
square meters (see Figure 6.9).  
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Figure 6.9. Tangshan average housing space from 2006 to 2010 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6.9, although the standard size of the low-rent house is slightly 
smaller than the average housing space per capita found in other housing sectors in recent 
years, the low-rent housing space is similar to the average space in 2006 and 2007 and should 
therefore be able to satisfy tenants’ needs. The low-rent housing project is regarded as the 
main means of resolving housing difficulties in Tangshan. Rather than helping people to 
purchase their own property, it aims to guarantee a place for people to live via a system of 
rented properties and stresses pragmatism and the concept of compactness in housing design 
and the efficient use of space (Han and Li, 2009, pp.117-120). In other words, in its aim to 
satisfy the basic needs of people on low-income who cannot afford to buy a house, the low-
rent housing project belongs to the category of social security. This means that it must make 
practical use of space a priority, which is reflected in the project's stipulation on the size and 
distribution of useful functional areas and its avoidance of useless spaces. It seems, therefore, 
that the size of the low-rental housing currently being offered serves to meet the needs of its 
occupants. 
  
Some academics claim that low-rent houses are often situated in unsuitable or undesirable 
areas. According to China’s National Audit Office  (2010, p.4), many low-rent houses have 
been built with insufficient facilities, are remote from the main city area and are 
inconveniently sited for transport links. Peppercorn and Taffin (2013, p.79) also state that 
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low-rent housing is almost always built outside central urban areas. In order to examine this 
issue, it is necessary to look at whether the low-rent housing in Tangshan is conveniently 
located for its residents to be able go about their daily business. According to the Bureau of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Tangshan (2012, p. 21), the main low-rent area is 
located in the area designated Xu Xin Jie South-Jian She Lu East-Bu Min Jie North, which 
contains 144 low-rent houses. This area is near the city ring road and is located in one of the 
least developed areas in the south of Tangshan City. The distance to the city centre (Point A) 
is about 20 km (See Figure 6.10). It seems clear, that the location problem raised by 
academics has also occurred in Tangshan, and this has a seriously negative effect on the 
effectiveness of housing security policies as some people might reject the idea of living so far 
from the central city area (other consequences are discussed in Chapter 7).  
 
In practice, because the housing location is far from the city centre and inconvenient for 
transport, it appears that even extremely low-income participants have either refused to take 
their allocated low-income houses or have returned them. However, higher government 
cannot blame local government for the implementation strategy that has been adopted, 
because the lack of comprehensive national requirements means that current housing security 
policy has no fixed goals or standards and simply increasing the rate of housing provision has 
become an end in itself. As a result, the mere fact that Tangshan has established a system of 
low-rent housing and affordable houses means that the city’s housing security policies may be 
deemed 'Good' in housing security development reports, and the high number of low-rent 
houses built may be regarded in itself as 'mission accomplished'. 
 
Furthermore, although this method of creating housing security can play a major role in 
producing a system of guaranteed housing, its effectiveness is nevertheless limited due to the 
constraints of the household registration system, as only those officially registered as local 
urban residents are eligible to join the project. Rural residents and migrant workers currently 
stand outside this housing provision boundary. In practice, in the large cities, there are huge 
numbers of migrant workers whose income is generally lower and living conditions worse 
than local urban workers. They are often desperate to have a house to live in, and they should 
be able to enjoy the benefits of housing security. However, the housing security system has 
rejected them. In a fieldwork interview in 2012, Ms D a director of the Bureau of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development of Tangshan City states that Tangshan’s low-rent housing 
project does not include migrant workers, and the application conditions restrict local low-
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rent housing to low-income urban residents who earned less than 598 yuan per month in 2008 
and 1000 yuan per month in 2012. In addition, applicants must not already have permanent 
accommodation, or if they do, then their houses must be less than 15 square metres per capita 
per family. 
 
Figure 6.10. Map of Tangshan City showing low-rent housing area 
 
 
The affordable housing programme, which aims to increase the supply of purchasable low 
cost housing, is also designed for urban low-income citizens with housing difficulties. This 
affordable housing is limited to accommodation of no more than 70 square metres, with 
successful applicants being able to buy these houses at a low price but also being unable to 
resell them within five years (Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Tangshan, 
2012, p. 15). However, much of the affordable housing is allocated to workers at state-owned 
companies, largely because part of the affordable housing fund for a particular project comes 
directly from a state-owned company, and their low-income employees with housing 
difficulties take priority over other applicants.  
 
Source: Google Map 2013 
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While the number of homes available under the security housing system in Tangshan has 
increased significantly, most of them have been made available under the affordable housing 
programme. For example, in 2011, homes under the affordable housing programme accounted 
for over 93% of the total housing available under the housing security system, while low-rent 
housing accounted for only around 6% (Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of 
Hebei Province, 2012, p. 12). Therefore, many of the affordable houses have benefited local 
formal workers, with migrant workers and other poor local people left behind.  
6.8	  Conclusion	  
 
In recent years, the coverage rates for social security services such as UI, health insurance and 
pensions have increased dramatically and now cover 80% to 90% of the total Chinese 
population. Local government has played a key role in the implementation of social security 
policies. One consequence of the successful input of local government is that MSLS, the 
policy of last resort to address poverty and income insecurity, has been made available to 
many more people in urban areas, with figures showing that the number of MSLS recipients 
has jumped significantly in cities. In addition, housing provision in local cities has been 
strengthened. However, the freedom for local government to make decisions on the specific 
implementation of social security policies in the areas under their control has also created 
problems. Firstly, in most cases of social policy development and implementation, the policy 
goals of central government may be limited by local government’s fiscal budget, which places 
constraints upon the implementation of central policies. The divide that exists between 
centralised governmental policy and decentralised or localised service provision further 
weakens the implementing of social security policies. As a result of such limitations, local 
government often settles on low social security payment rates and more flexible service 
provision systems than central government would desire. In concrete terms, these policy 
implementation problems have contributed to the introduction of inadequate income support 
benefit rates and the housing security policy outcome where affordable and low-rent housing 
has been constructed in areas too far away from the city centre to make living there 
convenient for residents. In addition, it can be argued that while there has been a notable and 
welcome increase in the coverage of the main social security policies in recent years, the 
amount of living security protection that they provide has actually decreased.  
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A noteworthy development has been the introduction of the urban-rural pension scheme in 
Tangshan, which has taken the first steps towards breaking down the rural-urban divide in 
social security schemes, enabling local rural residents to obtain the same pension benefits as 
their urban counterparts. However, this does little for migrant workers, who due to the 
household registration system are not officially considered them as local residents and 
therefore do not have the same rights as people who are officially resident in the same area. 
Overall, it appears that the implementation of social security policies is still biased towards 
both urban residents and formal employees. As economic development in China continues, 
there are more and more rural migrant workers moving to large cities. However, they do not 
share the same social security entitlements as local urban workers, and under the current 
system, their basic rights to enjoy social security are not effectively protected. 
 
It should be stressed that the transition to a market economy has made rural migrants and 
unemployment the top labour issues in China. Clearly, local government needs to pay much 
more attention to social protections for rural migrant workers. Meanwhile, it is fair to say that 
the local government has done much work to resolve income and housing insecurity and to 
tackle poverty, which is shown in the extension of social insurance, increased MSLS payment 
rates and the development of housing provisions. Nevertheless, it appears that there is still a 
lot of work to be done in order to effectively tackle poverty, and income and housing 
insecurity. Precisely how far does China still have to go to develop its social security services 
to a satisfactory level? To answer this question, the next chapter explores the situation of 
social security recipients in greater detail. 	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Chapter	  7	  -­‐	  Recipients’	  Experiences	  of	  Social	  Security	  
Protections	  in	  Tangshan	  	  
7.0	  Introduction	  	  	  
To date, neither theoretical nor empirical analyses of household living conditions have paid 
sufficient attention to the actual economic security of social benefit recipients, and 
particularly not to that of rural migrant workers. Standing (2011a) argues that there is a new 
social class emerging worldwide, the precariat, which consists of people without employment 
stability. Countries such as China have a massive supply of low-cost labour, and this has 
created a labour market in which there are many informal workers. The majority of informal 
workers in China are rural migrants and since they cannot obtain social insurances in urban 
areas, they tend to move around within an urban area searching for a job that will provide 
some form of income. In many cases, the jobs that they find are not secure and their income is 
unstable. In line with Standing’s definition of the precariat, these rural informal workers 
might be termed the Chinese precariat, a new class subject to unstable labour practices. 
Because of the huge numbers of rural migrants in urban areas and their visibility within the 
urban population, local authorities cannot ignore their presence and the challenges they face. 
The challenge, then, is to devise efficient social security policies that pay attention not only to 
the officially registered urban poor but also to rural migrants. 
 
This research tests the limits of the Chinese social security system by looking at social 
security recipients’ level of satisfaction with the benefits that they receive and examining the 
quality of life for those with low incomes and lower-middle incomes, as well as poor migrant 
workers. This chapter demonstrates that recipients’ experience of the way in which they gain 
access to and receive benefits is very important and is often a more complex issue than the 
social policy itself. This chapter reviews some of the findings from a large sample (150) study 
of low-income, lower-middle income and poor migrant interviewees, focusing on living 
conditions, occupational status, and in particular earning level and housing situation. The 
study identifies how, when and where the recipients gained income and housing support after 
they applied to the local authority. The findings cast light on the ways and extent to which 
income and housing welfare provision protects economic security and the impact that the 
local social security system has on the lives of rural migrants.  
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A key question underlying the discussion in this chapter is the extent to which social security 
protections should be focused solely on alleviating poverty. Compared with most other 
countries, China has a huge population and a high level of poverty and inequality. One of 
China’s most important areas of social policy in terms of poverty reduction is social housing 
policy, which is designed to act as a safety net for people suffering from housing insecurity. 
However, in practice, Low-Rent-Housing (LRH) benefit might not provide a safety net 
equally for all citizens in need of social housing. Many of the people surveyed in the field 
research for this study had successfully applied for LRH benefit, but most of them stated that 
the conditions for receipt of housing benefit were very strict and that the social housing 
provided has serious shortcomings. For instance, common complaints were that the LRH 
accommodation was not connected to a gas supply when they moved in or that the social 
housing was built in inconvenient locations far from the city centre, workplaces and amenities. 
The LRH recipients’ statements mirror some of the findings of Fitzpatrick and Stephens 
(2008), who argue that the social housing system in the UK has resulted in social exclusion 
and social isolation from the rest of the city for those in social housing, and that the poorest 
neighbourhoods seem to bring additional disadvantages to poorer people that need to be 
countered by policy. In light of the discussion in previous chapters, the situation that 
Fitzpatrick and Stephens describe may also be occurring in China. For instance, in Tangshan 
city, social housing has been located around the city ring road, an area without sufficient 
public services available, and where people have difficulties in accessing transport to the city 
centre and other communities. This chapter will examine the responses of social housing 
recipients on these issues.   
 
The MSLS has been broadly implemented in all provinces of China. It is aimed at people on 
low incomes and is the most important benefit in providing basic minimum income protection. 
In order to estimate the effects of the MSLS benefit on both local urban and rural recipients 
two questions were explored via a questionnaire in Tangshan City. The questions asked 
whether the urban and rural recipients of MSLS support had received all the benefits that they 
had claimed, and what their experiences of the MSLS service delivery system had been. 
Section 6.1 explores MSLS benefit for local urban and rural recipients, housing security for 
local recipients is examined in Section 6.2, the issue of migrant workers’ economic security is 
looked at in Section 6.3 and the issue of middle-income workers’ economic security in 
Section 6.4, the disadvantages of high benefit support levels will be discussed in Section 6.5. 
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7.1	  Issues	  related	  to	  MSLS	  benefit	  for	  local	  urban	  and	  rural	  recipients	  	  	  
Wreinski (1987, as cited in Duffy, 1995, p.35) identifies insecurity as: 
 
…the absence of one or more factors that enable individuals and families 
to assume basic responsibilities and to enjoy fundamental rights…chronic 
poverty results when the lack of basic security simultaneously affects 
several aspects of people’s lives, when it is prolonged, and when it 
seriously compromises people’s chances of regaining their rights and of 
resuming their responsibilities in the foreseeable future. 
 
For Wreinski, then, lack of security is intimately connected with a lack of resources, 
especially when such shortages are long term and poverty is related to insecurity. The idea 
behind the MSLS is to top up income to a set level, which is normally the minimum living 
standard, to guard against economic insecurity. In principle, the MSLS benefit offers 
minimum income support for everyone, which should in theory guarantee a degree of income 
security for all citizens. However, the survey and interviews in Tangshan city reveal that 
many people were unable to claim MSLS for a variety of reasons. The applicant has to satisfy 
not only the MSLS conditions, but also the local government’s rules and conditions, and must 
even take into account the local authority assessment officer’s discretionary powers and 
rulings.  
 
In general, three categories of people are eligible for urban MSLS benefit. The first category 
comprises those without an income who are unable to work, such as disabled persons. The 
second category is employees or retired people whose family income falls below the 
prescribed local urban MSLS threshold. The third category is unemployed people whose 
income, either during or after their UI payment period, is below the local urban MSLS 
threshold. In rural areas, all rural residents whose income falls below the basic living standard 
for their area are eligible to apply for MSLS benefit. All successful applicants receive benefits 
to bring their income up to the specified local MSLS threshold, irrespective of the applicant’s 
previous income level. In principle, therefore, the MSLS has the potential to benefit all those 
in need and should provide basic income security. However, the research in Tangshan City 
shows that not all in extreme poverty receive MSLS payments, only those who are unable to 
work due to disability or serious illness, or the elderly poor who live alone. As can be seen in 
Figure 7.1, most MSLS recipients are in the age categories 41 to 50, 51 to 60 and over 60. 
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Given that the general retirement age in China in 2012 was 50 for females and 60 for males, 
the MSLS focuses on older people who are unable to work.  
 
It was also found that for people of working age, MSLS recipients were those who were 
unable to work due to either a physical disability or a serious illness, while unemployed 
people of working age (including both formal and informal workers) who are not available 
for work are not covered by this benefit. It appears that applicants of working age have been 
assumed to be earning a minimum wage income by local authority assessment officers. This 
practice actually goes against the remit of the policy. Therefore, although most of the single 
elderly and disabled local residents of Tangshan with either no income or an income that falls 
below a certain level have been guaranteed basic minimum income protection under the 
MSLS safety net, the MSLS is not a universal protection policy for everyone in China, and it 
appears that MSLS benefits are allocated selectively.   	  
	  
Figure 7.1. MSLS recipients by age (from questionnaire data) 
 
In principle, an effective income security policy would focus on whether or not people who 
claim income benefits are able to manage on their resources. In practice, the interviews reveal 
that MSLS recipients’ expenditure barely meets basic living expenses such as food, which 
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means that their spending is almost all on basic necessities. In Tangshan in 2012, the urban 
MSLS payment was 410 yuan (at 2014 rates around £40) per month and the rural MSLS 
payment was 210 yuan per month. To assess the ability of the MSLS payment to meet basic 
needs, it should be asked whether the MSLS payment is sufficient to provide a decent, healthy 
diet to benefit recipients. If only food is considered, then these payment rates are sufficient to 
afford MSLS recipients a reasonable intake of decent quality food given a basic healthy diet, 
and it might therefore serve to protect and secure the recipient’s basic food security.  	  
	  
Figure 7.2. Amount of MSLS benefit received each month in 2011-12 (from questionnaire 
data) 
 
MSLS payment rates vary between different recipients. This can be seen in Figure 7.2, which 
shows the differing levels of payment received in practice. Most urban residents received 
between 300 and 499 yuan per month, whereas rural residents received between 100 and 299 
yuan per month, with some people receiving less than 100 yuan per month. These varying 
levels of support are due to the fact that the MSLS system raises a given household income to 
a specific locally determined minimum level, usually the local minimum living standard. For 
example, if an urban recipient has an income of 100 yuan per month, then they could receive 
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310 yuan MSLS support every month in 2012 because the MSLS payment level for that year 
was 410 yuan/month in Tangshan.  
 
Comparing the MSLS programme with income protection policies in other developing 
countries, it should be noted that Brazil has a similar minimum income scheme, the Bolsa 
Familia programme, which is aimed at providing a guaranteed minimum income. Under this 
scheme, states provide direct cash transfers to reduce short-term poverty and make 
conditional cash transfers to the poor to fight long-term poverty. According to figures cited in 
Matarazzo Suplicy (2004), the Bolsa Familia programme provides all families with an income 
per capita below $50 BRL (about US$17.00) per month a complementary income of $50 BRL 
and an additional $15.00 BRL per child. Other related support such as the gas help 
programme provides $7.50 BRL per month for the family to buy cooking gas. In 2005, Paul 
Wolfowitz, the then president of the World Bank, praised the Bolsa Familia model as an 
effective social policy and stated that other countries were drawing lessons from it (World 
Bank, 2005).  
 
While on the surface the MSLS adopts a similar cash transfer approach to the Bolsa Familia 
programme, it does not provide the additional forms of cash support provided under the 
Brazilian scheme, and in practice, the MSLS does not even meet people’s basic needs. Most 
MSLS recipients in Tangshan are extremely poor, and although food consumption is a 
priority, they also have other essential costs, such as utility bills, clothing and basic medicine. 
Often, however, they are too poor to buy these necessary items. Since their existence depends 
entirely on a very basic level of financial support, MSLS recipients have to manage their 
income extremely carefully if they are to survive on it. Compounding this already difficult 
situation is the fact that the payment of the MSLS benefit, crucial for recipients, is not always 
made on time. Some of the reasons for these delays were examined in the previous chapter, 
for instance, delays might result from administration difficulties or fiscal problems or may be 
due entirely to the assessment officers’ discretion. The problems associated with this 
‘informal implementation’ of MSLS policy mean that payment can be delayed for a long time, 
with delays stretching up to periods as long as one year. Even those who are successful in 
their claim for MSLS benefit and who receive their payments on time still complain that the 
amount is insufficient to cover their family’s basic expenses. As Figure 7.3 shows, most urban 
residents stated that the MSLS payment was not enough to meet their total living costs. They 
maintained that while the MSLS benefit is sufficient to cover the cost of their food and 
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perhaps some other basic needs such as clothes, it is not enough to prevent economic 
insecurity. All of the urban MSLS recipient respondents said that they were particularly 
concerned about having health problems because they had no spare money to purchase 
medicine or pay hospital fees. Many of them also said that they could not buy electronic 
equipment because, on one hand, they could not afford the utility costs, and on the other, if 
the household was found to have electronic equipment, then it would be disqualified from 
MSLS support immediately by the local authority.  
 
The very different living standards in urban areas in China compared with living standards in 
rural areas compound the problems for MSLS recipients. Urban residents often cannot avoid 
paying utility bills or other necessary costs such as property management fees, parking fees 
and buying food. Rural residents normally have the use of at least a small patch of land on 
which they can grow vegetables and keep poultry, meaning that they can be largely self-
sufficient in food production. In addition, market prices are considerably lower than in urban 
areas due to the lower costs associated with the production and sale of basic goods. For 
instance, rural residents can buy necessary items from roadside stalls and markets. These 
lower rural costs are reflected in the lower minimum living standard rate set for rural residents. 
In 2012, the rural MSLS payment level was 2,300 yuan a year, or 190 yuan per month (see 
Chapter 6). Given the lower rural cost of living and the consequent lower MSLS rate, it must 
be asked whether rural MSLS recipients feel positive about their income support payments. In 
order to answer this question and to guarantee that the data collected from rural residents 
could be usefully compared and contrasted with that obtained from their urban counterparts, 
the questionnaire used for this study classified respondents as rural or urban by their resident 
area. According to the data presented in Figure 7.3, the answer to the above question is a 
resounding ‘no’. Most of the rural MSLS recipients questioned stated that the current MSLS 
policy is lacking. Many complained that the payment is inadequate to provide for their needs 
and that it is always paid late. During the interviews, many respondents revealed the most 
common reasons given by the local authority for late payments.  
 
The following quotations are typical of the reasons cited:  
“The local authority doesn’t have enough money to send it now, but will send it very soon”; 
“The payment is being processed; just wait for a few days”; or, no official answer was given 
by the local authority.  
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Although urban residents also experience some delays in MSLS payment, payment is 
generally more punctual than in rural areas. Nevertheless, it was found that a delay in MSLS 
payment for up to one month was an experience common to both rural and urban MSLS 
recipients. In extreme cases, the MSLS payment can be delayed for as long as one year. 
During the fieldwork, I encountered people who were crying about their situation and who 
stated that they had not received any cash support for around a year. Some even requested that 
I speak to the local authority on their behalf about their MSLS payments. This failure on the 
part of the authorities to guarantee timely payment of the MSLS benefit might in part explain 
why so many rural MSLS recipients described their satisfaction with the MSLS benefit level 
as ‘very bad’ on the questionnaire.  
 
In contrast to rural residents, the experiences of urban MSLS recipients, who generally do not 
suffer the same degree of delay in payment, tended to focus more on the amount of money 
they received in benefits and how it was insufficient to meet their living costs. One 
explanation for this difference in the experiences of rural and urban MSLS recipients might 
be the difference in attention given by the Chinese public to issues in urban and rural areas (in 
China, urban issues receive much higher public and media exposure than rural ones), and this 
might result in local authorities monitoring the status of urban MSLS recipients more closely 
and affording them ‘preferential’ treatment over rural residents. If this is the case, it suggests 
that a degree of informality exists in the way in which government is implementing social 
policies and that a lack of monitoring and the use of discretionary decision making and 
behaviour by officials limits the effectiveness and efficiency of the MSLS programme, 
placing people’s living security in danger. What is clear is that the majority of poorer citizens 
involved in this study have little trust in the ability of government income security provisions 
to deal with their current or future risks and uncertainties. 	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Figure 7.3. MSLS recipients’ assessment of level of benefit (from questionnaire data)  
  
A sizeable number of the respondents from rural areas rated the quality of MSLS services and 
payments as ‘very bad’, and a number of clear issues were raised concerning the MSLS 
system. One of the families interviewed for this study was the Z family, a rural family from 
the Kaiping District of Tangshan city and one of the poorest families in this district. Mr Z is 
over 70 years old and lives with his son. There are a total of four people in his family, living 
in an old house. He does not have a pension or a farm to support him and his only income is 
MSLS support. His son is a disabled person. The whole family rely on the income from his 
daughter-in-law and MSLS support. His daughter-in-law is an informal worker, so her income 
is unstable, fluctuating between 50 and 400 yuan per month, but sometimes her salary is not 
paid on time or remains unpaid due to lack of contract protection. Because the household 
income is unstable and also very low, they are living in poverty and claim MSLS benefit, 
which is the most important component of the family’s income. However, Mr Z’s daughter-
in-law reported that she never receives the MSLS payment on time. Sometimes it takes 
several months; at the time of the interview, the government owed the family six months of 
payments. This has put people in ‘danger’ from the economically insecure situation. She told 
me without the MSLS payment, the whole family had to reduce its general expenditure and 
could only afford to eat one or two meals per day consisting of very basic, cheap food. She 
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also told me that she had not eaten any meat for three months. Although the MSLS payment 
is very low, about 200 yuan per month for the whole family, it had given them the means to 
eat three meals per day.  
	  Picture	  7.1.	  Plain	  steamed	  dumplings	  made	  from	  flour	  and	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  with	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                       Yang, D. A MSLS family in Tangshan in 2012 [photographic] 	  	  Picture	  7.2:	  The	  kitchen	  of	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  recipient	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  Tangshan,	  2012	  	  
Yang, D. A MSLS family in Tangshan in 2012 [photographic] 
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Even with MSLS support, however, their income was sufficient only to provide for three 
meals a day of very basic food, and nothing else. Pictures 7.1 and 7.2 above show their living 
conditions and what they were eating when I arrived. I took these photographs to show the 
basic food and living conditions for such families in Tangshan, conditions that the Western 
observer might deem highly unsatisfactory. While the basic food displayed in the image 
above might look appetising, it is lacking in nutritional value.  
 
The method that the MSLS uses to support income security involves supplementing the 
family’s monthly income to the extent necessary to bring it up to the level necessary for basic 
survival. In practice, however, it is not even paid on time. This creates a very dangerous 
situation for MSLS recipients and might actually increase their insecurity because people are 
utterly reliant on this benefit to support their needs. Since MSLS payments are considered by 
recipients to be part of the household budget, if the government cannot even guarantee stable 
support, this could fundamentally undermine the ability of recipients to pay for even the most 
basic living expenses. On discussing the situation with interviewee Ms X, Deputy-District 
Mayor of Kaiping District in Tangshan, she stated that she was: 
 
“shocked and surprised by the MSLS implementation... This is very dangerous. It is putting 
poor households at risk. It is clearly unacceptable”. 
 
She went on to state that the government would like to provide high quality support to MSLS 
recipients to protect their living standards and that security policy should improve the 
situation of poor people, not place them in even greater danger. To achieve these ends, she 
suggested that the government should build an efficient social security administration system 
to guarantee that recipients received the full MSLS payment on time. 
 
The Debuty-District Mayor, Ms X’s comments strongly suggest that the local government has 
had high expectations of and confidence in the MSLS system to provide income security for 
the poor. In practice, however, it appears that the MSLS system is failing to meet these 
expectations, with many recipients being paid only in part or not paid on time. To highlight 
this, when I walked out of the District Government Building after the interview, at the main 
gate a group of people were kneeling to protest about their income and housing benefits cases. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to get close and take photos, as there were officers around 
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pushing people to move away and forbidding anyone to take photographs. Thus, it seems 
clear that the current system of administration used for the MSLS programme or perhaps even 
the whole income security system in Tangshan is inefficient. One assumption is that 
impoverished citizens are helpless, and living with constant income insecurity. The local 
administration has failed to provide sufficient services to recipients, such as those people at 
the main gate. Perhaps they feel that is the only way to talk to the local authority and push the 
local government to draw attention to their claims.  
 
It can be assumed that the process by which funds are transferred between levels of 
government is slow and that money for benefits are being appropriated for other purposes. As 
an efficient administration system directly influences the quality of social policy 
implementation, it appears that fundamental changes to the way in which the MSLS system is 
administrated in Tangshan are urgently required. It is suggested that rather than the adoption 
of a purely top-down approach to administrative reform, it might be better to consider a ‘joint 
venture’ approach in which recipients’ representatives are included in the local administration 
system. This approach might be viewed as a similar method to the joint ventures of 
commercial companies, whereby companies seek advantages by drawing on the expertise of 
individuals from inside and outside parent companies to develop new markets and gain access 
to raw materials (Killing, 1983, p.6), and could potentially provide an effective structure for 
the MSLS monitoring system. In such a system, local government representatives would 
obtain a better view of how the social policy had been implemented. Mendes (2008, p.948) 
describes such involvement as:  
 
…the form of government that is closest to people…is the most 
accessible…A bus ride away for anybody to come and talk directly to the 
representatives and to get something happening. So in terms of the 
community, they are coming to the level of government closest to them. 
 
In many developed countries, representatives come from many service areas such as health, 
food and social housing sectors. Despite its potential advantages, however, this joint model 
would be difficult to manage, and there could be both internal and external problems. To 
minimise potential problems, the MSLS recipients’ representatives need to be genuinely 
selected at random in order to guarantee accuracy and fairness. This suggestion mirrors the 
argument of Chaudhuri (1994), who asserts that for such a system to work effectively, a 
representative from a large population needs to be randomly selected. Ms X (Deputy-District 
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Mayor of KaiPing district) supported this idea of a representative system, stating that she 
believed “it would significantly increase the efficiency of the MSLS implementation” and that 
the local government should discuss this in a committee meeting.  
 
Also noteworthy is the high level of informality in local government administration in China, 
where there is a close relationship between the development of informality in the economic 
sphere and the development of more informal practices and discretion in the social policy 
arena. In the economic sphere, Barro and Gordon (1983, p.103) found that an actor is likely to 
display higher levels of discretionary behaviour when their discount rate (their freedom to do 
things) is high. In addition, an interviewee, Ms C (a director in the ILO Asian Office, 
Bankgok) commented on informality in China: 
 
“Local officials’ power in implementing social security policies is high, and given a high 
degree of informality, local officials are more likely to engage in discretionary 
implementation and administration of policies rather than acting according to set regulations.”  
 
Given the lack of clear nationally defined procedures, discretionary implementation of policy 
at the local level in China appears to have become the norm. In addition, social policy rules 
seem to be interpreted informally by local officials at their own discretion. (This is discussed 
in more depth in Chapter 8). For example, the lack of formal assessment tools means that it is 
not easy for an assessment officer to verify an MSLS applicant’s real income level in practice. 
In the interviews conducted for this study, I found that nearly all of the MSLS recipients 
either did not have a formal job or were unable to work. However, this did not mean that they 
did not have an income. Some people had an informal part-time job, but their monthly income 
was unstable. Therefore, verifying the income of such applicants is a difficult task for the 
MSLS assessment officers, especially given that there is no official method for assessing the 
incomes of informal-worker applicants. As a result, an applicant’s eligibility for MSLS 
support and the levels of payment that they receive are determined at sole discretion of the 
assessment officer. This clearly leaves the MSLS system open to potential abuse, and it seems 
that there are instances where people who should not have qualified for MSLS support have 
done so due to a good relationship with the authorising officer.  
 
An example of this was witnessed during the fieldwork when visiting the household (Mr Z) of 
a disabled urban resident who was receiving MSLS benefit payments. To be eligible for 
MSLS support, he should not have had any valuable equipment in his home, but he had an 
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electric tricycle that he used as a vehicle to transport paying members of the public. 
Unsurprisingly, it was unlicensed, which means that it was illegal, but in practice there are 
many of these transport workers on the road. He reported that when income was very good, he 
could earn over 1,000 yuan a month. He was then asked how he could also get MSLS support, 
to which he replied that his income was flexible and was a kind of ‘black-market income’ that 
was not taken into account in determining his eligibility for MSLS support. Furthermore, and 
more importantly, he had a good relationship with a local authority officer. As a result, the 
local authority offered him MSLS support of 410 yuan per month as a person who was unable 
to work and who had no other income. This case illustrates how in China local officials are 
granted the discretionary power to determine who is eligible for MSLS support and how 
much they receive. This discretionary and unfair treatment was negatively affecting the 
equilibrium rate, which can be lowered by institutions that allow discretionary behaviour and 
practices on the part of local officials to take root (Barro and Gordon, 1983, p102). Therefore, 
those local people’s income security or the local income policy implementation is influenced 
by the local officers’ activities. Under such informality, the local officer’s decisions are 
changeable, this has increased the level of risks or uncertainty of obtaining income support for 
those participants who cannot have good relationship with local officials, therefore, increasing 
the income insecurity level.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, local authority officers are free to use their own 
discretion to make decisions on MSLS applications. As part of the assessment process, they 
consider not only the applicants’ overall income, but also what possessions the applicants 
have in their home. If an applicant has any valuable equipment, such as air-conditioning, in 
their home, local authority officers may deem that possession of such items necessarily means 
that the applicant’s income is over the MSLS support rate. Of course, ownership of such 
possessions should not be treated as primary evidence of an applicant’s current income. For 
example, a person might be disqualified by equipment that they purchased when they had a 
higher income, and errors in judgement on the part of local authority assessment officers 
could result in a failure to correctly select the people who are in genuine need of this benefit. 
In such instances, it appears that there is a clear case of information asymmetry between the 
local official and the MSLS applicant. When a policy is administered in a way in which there 
is a high degree of information asymmetry between ‘dispensers’ and ‘receivers’ of policy, 
there is a high chance that ‘adverse selection’ in social security policy will occur. Spencer 
(2000, p.12) defined adverse selection as follows: 
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Since the pool price reflects average quality, the high-quality 
suppliers know that they are treated unfairly and may decide ex ante 
to withdraw from the market. Indeed, if they are high-cost producers, 
they may be forced to leave the market. This is the phenomenon of 
adverse selection. If adverse selection takes place, the average 
quality and hence the pool price falls, which may cause medium-
quality suppliers to leave and set up a cumulative downward spiral 
in quality and price.  
 
The case of potential MSLS applicants who were formerly middle-income workers is similar 
to the process that Spencer outlines above. If an applicant was once a middle-income worker, 
then their income and general spending would have been sufficient to purchase normal 
domestic electronic devices such as air-conditioning or a TV, which are not expensive in 
China. Once they lose their job or otherwise lose their long-term income, they should in 
theory qualify for MSLS support to maintain their standard of living. In practice, however, 
because they own some relatively inexpensive domestic electronic devices, even though they 
may be living in very poor conditions, they would not qualify for MSLS support. Like 
Spencer’s high-quality supplier, this person appears richer than a poor person, but when 
incomes are compared, they are in a similar position to other poor people. Nevertheless, this 
person might be treated unfairly and their application withdrawn from the MSLS waiting list. 
In such cases, a system of regular checks might be necessary to accurately gauge a person’s 
situation, and it might be assumed that such a system exists in China. How often, then, are the 
incomes of MSLS recipients checked? After they have applied, they are visited once by local 
authority officials to check whether they need MSLS support. After this, however, the 
situation is less clear. In the case of most Latin American countries, such checks are carried 
out around once a year. But when the Chinese government announced the MSLS support 
policy, no official guidelines were put in place to regulate how often the recipient’s income 
should be checked. Instead, this was left to the discretion of local authorities. Because there is 
no official regulation on this matter, the checking procedure has tended to be carried out in an 
informal and haphazard manner.  
 
As Ms D (Vice-Director of the Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of 
Tangshan) explained, “the local officials might use their own initiative and be willing to go to 
check every or some recipients”. Ms D clearly noted that there are no strict guidelines in 
Tangshan City to indicate how often officers should check the income status and living 
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conditions of applicants, nor is there a formal check list for visiting officers to use in 
determining an applicant’s eligibility for MSLS support.  
 
Another problem lies in the fact that potential MSLS applicants have to apply for this support 
themselves. When this procedure is compared with those for similar programmes in Latin 
America, there is a clear divergence in policy practices. In Mexico, for example, potential 
recipients of the income support programme are visited in selected neighbourhoods to inform 
them of the available support. In Brazil, local councils or the state typically set up shop at a 
local sports ground, school or church for a few days or a week to encourage households to 
apply for income support benefits. Given the lack of a national policy on implementation 
standards in China, the raising of public awareness about the availability of income support 
measures is left entirely to the local authority. Unlike Mexico and Brazil, the local authority 
in Tangshan does not identify areas in which there is potential need and does not send 
officials to these areas to encourage potentially eligible households to apply for MSLS 
support. When they visit the household of an applicant, local authority officers might ask if 
there are others in need within the applicant’s neighbourhood, but there is no consistent 
promotion of the MSLS programme in the way that occurs in Mexico and Brazil. Given the 
lack of effective promotion of the MSLS programme by local authority officials, there is the 
problem that some poor people might never know that they are able to claim this support. 
During the interviews, around 1 in 10 of the MSLS recipients surveyed stated that they had 
been initially unaware that they could apply for this income support and became aware of it 
only after they had been informed by friends, acquaintances or neighbours.  
 
Finally, a major problem with the current MSLS system is that it fails to provide anything 
above the basic level of benefit for recipients. Given that many MSLS recipients are disabled 
or in poor health, it is unsurprising that respondents in this research cited health costs as a 
major concern. Figure 7.4 shows that most MSLS recipients are suffering financially from 
having to meet healthcare costs, and about half of the MSLS recipients in the survey rated 
their predicament as in the extreme suffering range (between 9 and 10). Related to this, the 
data from the individual questionnaires indicated that living conditions and economic 
insecurity were major issues for most respondents. Since the stated goal of the MSLS 
programme is to ensure that people are able to survive by providing a minimal income to poor 
people, the fact that so many respondents complained that the level of protection is too low, 
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and that they fear for their financial security suggests that the MSLS programme is failing in 
its remit.  	  
Figure 7.4. MSLS recipients’ assessment of the amount of pressure they felt from worrying 
about medical costs (Scale 0 – 10, 0 = no pressure, 10 = extreme pressure) 
 
Given the above failings of the MSLS system, it might be useful here to consider some 
possible solutions to these problems. In the case of lower-middle and middle-income workers 
who are effectively excluded from the MSLS candidate system, lessons might be learned 
from the economic sphere. In the financial markets, companies can use screening devices to 
minimise the effect of adverse selection. Spencer (2000, p.12) states that clients who have 
poor credit records could be monitored and identified by the banks through informational 
system. Similarly, Chinese local governments could build a local information system to store 
people’s credit records, and the information could be used to make recommendations when 
the local government assessment officers are examining MSLS claims. This method would be 
of benefit not only to the MSLS system, but also in social housing provision. Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) indicate that in the financial system, a range of different contracts at different 
prices is offered to clients based on knowledge of their financial situation. A similar model 
could also be used in the MSLS system by offering a range of different protection levels. In 
this model, every poor applicant could get MSLS support with cover at the full standard 
MSLS benefit rate, while lower-middle income applicants could pay into the MSLS system 
via contributions that could be tracked through the personal credit account system mentioned 
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above. In economics, this form of multi-tier contract solution is known as a separating 
equilibrium (Spencer, 2000, p.13). The middle or low-middle income classes who want to 
have increased financial security could choose to make larger contributions in exchange for 
higher returns. 
 
An effective and efficient MSLS policy might simultaneously provide a sufficient level of 
income protection and serve as a basis for the provision of basic social services for all citizens. 
A basic comprehensive income protection could offer universal access to everyone, with 
those who make higher contributions to the fund receiving higher benefit rates. In such a 
system, the lowest level of benefit would be universal in that all citizens would be eligible to 
receive it, it would not be means-tested, and there would be no job search or similar 
requirements placed on the recipient. It would afford everyone the right to enjoy MSLS 
support when they are living through a period of income insecurity. Under such a system, 
however, the problem of measuring income accurately might still persist. Nevertheless, given 
the shortcomings of the current situation, where MSLS rules are ill-defined, where local 
authority assessment officers display discriminatory and discretionary behaviour that 
increases the probability of unfair treatment or inequality in allocating resources, and where 
access to MSLS benefits are strictly limited, a modified MSLS system that can guarantee 
coverage for all citizens is surely to be welcomed. 
 
Such a system might provide financial security not only for the poor, but for everyone else. 
While it is true that poor people are in weak position, an effective social security policy needs 
to provide protection for everyone. In its current guise, the MSLS programme represents a 
last line of protection for the most vulnerable people in Chinese society, a system within 
which everyone receives basic assistance to bring their income up to a locally set rate. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the middle class also needs income security. If they are not afforded 
such protection, then when they face income risk or uncertainty their living conditions might 
be even worse than those of the poor. This characteristic of the MSLS programme – that is, its 
failure to differentiate between prior earnings and expenditure of different groups of benefit 
recipients – is problematic in itself. Because the MSLS payment is at a very basic rate, it 
might be enough to enable the poor to survive, but this might not be enough for the middle 
class where their general spending might be higher. Clearly, it would be unfair to provide 
higher levels of benefits to richer people simply because they have lost everything, and the 
country should not blindly provide levels of support that enable more wealthy citizens to 
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retain their former incomes. Nevertheless, the fact that people’s circumstances can change 
means that income insecurity can affect even once affluent people, and the case can be made 
that consideration should be given to devising a policy that could cover middle-class losses of 
income. As suggested in Chapter 3, the asymmetric protection that the Chinese social security 
system currently affords citizens means that a two-tier contribution system could provide an 
insurance system that caters to the actual needs of a much larger proportion of the population: 
while non-contributory benefits would be available to all people as a safety net of last resort, 
there could be a parallel contributory system of benefits available to people with different 
income levels. 
7.2	  Housing	  security	  issues	  for	  recipients	  of	  housing	  benefit	  	  
The standard of housing is one of the major determinants of a person’s standard of living. 
Dwelly and Cowan (2006, p.17) state that the goals of housing policy should consider the 
following conditions: 
 
House price outcomes influence wage rates, interest rates, equity 
withdrawal and stability, migration and investment incentives…an 
inadequate home and neighbourhood can hold back the lives and 
opportunities of the poorest households…local housing systems that are 
sorted by ethnicity as well as income can prove a fertile ground for 
recruiting the disaffected to insecure causes…Housing matters to how well 
the nation is governed and how people, as individuals and as communities, 
are involved in that process. 
 
The Chinese government has recognised the importance of housing policies that promote 
social housing of a good standard and has particularly emphasised low-rental-housing (LRH) 
policy in order to relieve housing pressure and enhance housing security. How, then, does the 
LRH policy help individual housing security in practice?  
 
China’s housing market prices are increasing significantly and continue to rise every year, 
pricing many people out of the market. A housing policy focused on the construction of 
affordable housing for sale alone, however, is unlikely to satisfy and secure people’s housing 
needs. As a result, the LRH policy is increasingly seen as the optimal solution to China’s 
complex housing needs. The LRH policy has been operating in China for more than eight 
years, but to what extent has it met the needs of individuals? Many studies argue that the LRH 
qualification system is not clear, the administration of an LRH beneficiary’s entrance and exit 
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from the LRH system is not well managed, and the target coverage rate is low. Chak et al 
(2008, p.176) claim that “LRH projects in some cities did not have details on the eligibility of 
LRH applications and the application procedures and local government had little motivation 
to meet the housing needs of poor citizens”. To assess the effectiveness of the LRH system in 
practice, it is important to find out what the recipients of LRH feel about their housing 
because their views can provide convincing evidence of the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) 
of the LRH policy. Figure 7.5 shows that almost all of the lower-middle and low income LRH 
beneficiaries surveyed for this study felt that the location of their home was poor and sited far 
from the city centre, lacking in facilities and services such as shops, schools and hospitals, 
and lacking adequate transport links. Notably, most of the LRH beneficiaries rated their 
housing location extremely negatively, with some feeling that their home location was not at 
all acceptable. 	  
	  
Figure 7.5. Social housing tenants’ feeling about the location of their accommodation  
(Scale 0 – 10, 0 = extremely badly, 10 = extremely well)  
 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the LRH in Tangshan is located next to the city ring 
road, which is a long way from the city centre. The LRH houses in Tangshan are concentrated 
in this location, and the neighbourhood is predominantly composed of low-income 
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households. The research data in Figure 7.6 also shows that the majority of LRH households 
surveyed for this study were either in informal employment or were unemployed and all had 
low incomes. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the availability of work in this area is 
not good and the unemployment rate in this area is probably very high. Figure 7.6 also shows 
that the majority of social housing benefit recipients (over 50%) rated the area in which they 
lived as unsafe. The prevalence of temporary and unemployed workers among the LRH 
recipients surveyed suggests that there exists a relationship between employment type, 
general feelings of insecurity and occupancy of social housing.  	  
Figure 7.6. Percentage of households not feeling safe in their home area in Tangshan, 2012 	  
	  	  
LRH might bring with it the added disadvantages of social isolation or social exclusion. 
Given the concentration of LRH recipients in this particular area of Tangshan and its 
geographical isolation from the rest of the city, there is the potential for residents to 
experience social isolation. Such social isolation is an increasingly common phenomenon 
among poor urban residents worldwide. For example, Wilson (1987) uses evidence from 
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Chicago to show that low-income people tend to be concentrated in deprived areas alongside 
other poor people. Malpass (2005, p.174) argues that people living in social rented housing 
are to a large and increasing extent economically residualised, marginalised, poor and socially 
excluded, which can result in stunted economic development in such economically and 
socially isolated areas, which pushes down overall development rates and living standards. 
People’s perceptions of such areas also plays a part in creating further isolation, with those 
from outside the area refusing to live in or visit it because of the area’s poor reputation. As the 
deprived area suffers from a lack of resources, social isolation may be further compounded 
due to residents not travelling much to the other parts of the city. The social isolation of 
people housed in low-rental housing is also evident in the United Kingdom, where the 
integrated social housing system has contributed to increasing social isolation. According to 
Fitzpatrick and Stephens (2008, p.72) there is residualised social housing in Britain, which 
means a greater number of low-income households live in the same place while richer people 
have moved away and it appears that the patterns of segregation between poorer and better-off 
households has become a more serious problem over time in UK urban areas.  
 
These aspects of social isolation were found to exist for some of the people surveyed in the 
case study. They not only lacked the financial resources to travel outside their area of 
residence very frequently, but also had limited networks with people from outside the area. In 
addition, they lacked the social skills to communicate with people outside their own area and 
the confidence to travel to other areas. These findings are consistent with the arguments made 
by Fitzpatrick and Stephens (2008, p.73), who contend that the social networks that exist on 
poor estates are limited in their reach. They are cohesive places in that many people have 
local friends, but many people actually lack strong social networks outside the area. Many of 
the respondents in this study reported that they felt that the modern central areas of Tangshan 
seemed like another world to them and that they felt shame when visiting and did not have the 
confidence to go there. The labour market in the area studied is also isolated and a high 
proportion of the research respondents work locally.  
 
Clearly, the isolation of LRH neighbourhoods from the rest of the city affects social equality, 
and the resulting large groups of unemployed and informal workers can create many social 
problems. Previous research shows that many income and housing benefit recipients have 
serious medical conditions, are disabled or too old to be employed. Although the LRH 
programme is undoubtedly useful in that it provides places for poor people to live and can 
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help in protecting people’s living standards, in its current form it fails to recognise fully the 
serious disadvantages of social exclusion and the large number of recipients who are not able 
to work. It is agreed that an area with a large residualised poor population is unsuitable for 
most recipients, because the local services provided will then only target the poor, so may be 
much reduced in quality (Malpass, 2005, p.175). Therefore, areas with isolated poor 
households might then further decline over time, as there may be less support and services 
available to them. Such an isolated area might become a new type of city slum similar to 
slums in other developing countries such as New Delhi, India. The difference being that the 
poor people in China are not in the central city, but being ignored at the city margins. 
 
Ensuring that social housing areas become mixed neighbourhoods is an important issue for a 
healthy nation. To counter the social isolation that separate low-rental housing developments 
may create, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2000) suggests that social 
housing policy should focus more closely on market rent options. However, is such a 
suggestion relevant or applicable to the Chinese context in general and Tangshan in particular? 
In Europe, the IPPR’s suggestion might be a practical option, the general income level and 
income support rate are very high and people are generally able to rent accommodation in the 
market. In China, however, the population is huge, with many people live in abject poverty or 
suffering from homelessness. The welfare system in China simply cannot afford to offer 
similar income support levels to those of European countries. Therefore, many poor and 
homeless people are not able to rent houses through the market system. Despite the inability 
of many low-income people to access reasonable accommodation through the private housing 
market, the current availability of LRH houses is still insufficient to support poor and 
homeless people, and many people on a low-income are forced to live together in a single 
privately rented room. Indeed, this research found cases in which a leased single room 
accommodates eight people, with each person allocated a living space of only 1–2 square 
metres. Concerns about housing are not restricted to low-income workers and the unemployed. 
The booming housing market in China in recent years has led to concerns among the middle 
classes that if they do not get on the property ladder quickly, then property and rental prices 
will continue to rise so quickly that they will be priced out of the market (Pressly, 2011). All 
of these issues strongly suggest that the IPPR’s market renting solution to problems of social 
exclusion is not applicable in the Chinese context. Due to the high cost of housing and a huge 
impoverished population in China as well as the fact that rent and housing prices are too high 
even for those on average incomes, the government has pursued a policy of providing 
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subsidised low-rent housing to low-income people. Although the LRH programme is clearly a 
more appropriate solution to China’s housing problems than a focus on market rented housing, 
it nevertheless leaves the problem of social isolation unresolved. Given China’s current 
economic rate of growth, the government has the resources to invest in and re-build social 
housing areas. However, government at all levels should not forget that social housing policy 
needs to take a step-by-step approach that moves from meeting basic needs to improving the 
average quality of living conditions for those in social housing. While building LRH houses, 
the government also has to develop the economic, cultural and social environment at the same 
time so as to avoid social isolation. In practice, the government has introduced many social 
benefits to citizens, and in particular to local residents. However, there are few policies for 
migrant workers. The next section looks at the issue of economic security for migrant workers.  	  
7.3	  The	  economic	  security	  issues	  of	  migrant	  workers	  	  
In the wake of China’s economic development, more and more migrant workers have sought 
work in cities across China. The country’s population of migrant workers reached 262.61 
million in 2012 (see Figure 7.7), and between 2008 and 2012 the rate increased by about 3.9 
per cent every year. Migrant workers constitute a special group in the cities in China because 
they do not enjoy the same rights as local urban residents, and they are not sufficiently 
protected from employment or housing problems. In recent years, the central government has 
improved social policies following the promotion of ‘harmonious social development’ as a 
major welfare principle by President Hu Jintao. Since 2005, the social welfare system has 
been expanded significantly and migrant workers’ income and housing security has 
undoubtedly improved. According to An (2013, p.6), about 0.8 per cent of migrant workers 
did not get paid on time in 2011, by 2012, this figure had dropped to 0.5 per cent. However, 
although there has been a great reduction in payment insecurity for migrant workers, 0.5 per 
cent is still a large figure, as it corresponds to over one million migrant workers who did not 
get paid on time. In addition, it should be noted that only 43.9 per cent of migrant workers in 
China signed employment contracts in 2012 (ibid).  	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Figure 7.7: Migrant workers in China (2008-2012) 	  
	   	  	  
Interviews were conducted with migrant workers to analyse the effectiveness of policies that 
aim to guarantee economic migrants’ income and housing security. To assess the income 
security of migrant workers in Tangshan, the first question that must be asked is whether all 
migrant workers sign contracts in Tangshan city. It was clear from the interviews that the 
answer to this question is negative. Many of the young migrant workers interviewed did not 
know it was necessary to sign an employment contract in order to protect themselves.  
 
WY, 20, a migrant worker from Henan province, said he had had never signed a contract after 
coming to work in the city. He said: 
 
“I am not sure about a work contract. I only have a verbal agreement about my salary and 
working hours. I can tell you that it’s not only me; none of the workers in my team have 
signed contracts.” 
 
Many young migrants have no understanding of employment contracts, partly because of a 
lack of education and information about the relevant labour laws. As shown in Figure 7.8, 
most migrant workers have only a junior high school level of education (age 14 - 16) or below. 
China has compulsory education for nine years, and the majority of migrant workers complete 
this and then leave their hometown looking for work. The majority of migrant workers do not 
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have particular skills, and job mobility among migrant workers is very low. Another migrant 
worker from Henan province, AH, 21 years old, said that even if he had wanted to continue 
his education, he did not have sufficient funds to support further study, and his parents had 
asked him to find a job. He said:  
 
“I am not a good student. I think rather than spending money on education, I prefer going out 
to find a job and earning money.” 
 
Many migrant workers take up jobs that urban residents are unwilling to do, such as informal 
labouring work in the construction industry. For such work, they do not require any specific 
skills, just a willingness to perform manual labour. Many of them are reluctant to sign 
contracts with an employer, because if they did, their salaries would be reduced by around 30 
to 40 per cent to pay for the basic social insurances required under formal labour contract law. 
Furthermore, employers are unwilling to offer migrant workers formal jobs because non-
contracted labour reduces labour costs (for example, via lower basic rates of pay and no 
overtime rates) and avoids issues associated with organised contracted labour.  
 
In the interviews, Mr W, the owner of a private company, said that low-wage workers, 
without formal working contracts filled many of the labouring jobs at his company. He went 
on to state that because there is no formal contract between employer and worker, his 
company does not pay their social insurance fees. These workers receive a basic wage 
amounting to about 300 yuan per month, basic food and shared accommodation within the 
workplace. The accommodation provided houses up to six people in a single room. Mr W also 
stated that these labour conditions served to reduce his costs, and since many people, 
especially rural migrants, were willing to accept his offer of work under these conditions, he 
had no concerns about employing cheap, non-contracted labour. 	   	  
194	  	  
Figure 7.8 The highest level of education that migrants and non-migrants had completed in 
Tangshan in 2012 	  
	  	  
As discussed in the previous chapter, even though economic rural migrants live in the city in 
which they work, they do not enjoy the same rights as local residents. They cannot get social 
benefits from the local city council and have to return home to claim benefits. Therefore, 
many migrant workers prefer to give up their right to social insurance and obtain higher 
wages instead. A 27 year-old migrant worker, Mr Xi, from Anhui province said:  
 
“I do not have hukou (household registration) here. I and my children cannot access social 
welfare protection in this city such as the MSLS, medical care, pension, education and 
housing benefits.”  
 
Furthermore, the housing conditions of many migrant workers are very poor. Migrant workers 
have a limited choice of housing in urban areas. They usually live in shared temporary tents 
on construction sites (see Picture 7.3) or crowded dormitories with very little living space. In 
general, it is impossible for them to buy or even rent a house because the cost of renting a 
basic small apartment easily exceeds the average monthly salary that migrant workers receive. 
Since rural migrants’ living conditions are not suited to accommodating families, they usually 
leave their families behind and are therefore unable to enjoy the comforts of family life or 
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take proper care of their families. The only thing they can do is send money home to support 
their family. Wong et al (2007, p.33) found that around 50 per cent of workers sent 
approximately half of their income back home. 
 
Many migrant workers lack any form of housing protection, and their living conditions can be 
almost intolerable. Wang (2004, p.112) found that only 12 per cent were satisfied with 
housing facilities, 18 per cent with their house and home structure, and 31 per cent with the 
housing floor space available. It was impossible for them to rent public housing in local urban 
areas as the household registration system ruled them out of housing protection. 	  Picture	  7.3.	  A	  temporary	  shelter	  in	  Tangshan	  in	  2012
	  	  
Given the above, a detailed action plan to deal with the issues faced by rural migrant workers 
should be implemented without delay. Creating more work within a regulated labour market 
for migrant workers and helping them access the local social benefit protection systems 
should be seen as one of the most important challenges facing social and economic security 
policy makers. Thus far, some cities have introduced some reforms to the household 
registration system to protect migrants. For example, Yiwu city in Zhejing province 
announced “migrant workers with an education level of senior high school and an average 
Yang,	  D.	  2012.[photograph]	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housing of 10 square metres in particular locations can settle down” (Lan, 2013, p.26). 
However, these two conditions actually preclude most migrant workers from the resident 
reforms. As discussed earlier, the majority of rural migrants attain only low levels of 
education, and many live in shared accommodation with minimal living space. Another city, 
Guangzhou, has also launched a project to reform the current rural and urban household 
registration system. It is called the household registration point system and allows every 
resident to obtain local resident status. To qualify, the migrant must have an employment 
contract for more than a year, be making contributions to the local social insurance schemes, 
have a minimum education level of junior high school completion (age 14 to 16) and must not 
have a criminal record. Qualification is awarded on a points-based system – points are 
awarded in the categories age, education level, housing, insurance contributions and 
employment – and applicants must achieve a score of over 85 to qualify as a local resident. 
Although it might appear that applicants have to satisfy a lot of conditions, many migrants 
would be able to meet these conditions, and this reform actually potentially provides a better 
way forward than the reform introduced in Yiwu city. It could help to reduce, or at least limit, 
the size of the informal labour market in the city and provide a good labour environment that 
encourages migrants to find formal jobs in order to live there. Its demand that migrants make 
social insurance contributions is also an important feature of the reform. Although this might 
be a problem for many poor migrant workers, it will compel migrant workers to think 
seriously about obtaining social insurance protection. In addition, their contributions should 
help to reduce fiscal pressure on local government. This should serve as a good example to 
other cities that real protection can be provided to migrants without undue pressure on local 
government’s fiscal capacities. As a further measure, the local government could offer a 
system of discounts on the migrant’s social insurance contributions, which would encourage 
them to obtain certain social security protections. 
 
Unlike the reforms in Yiwu and Guangzhou outlined above, Tangshan has yet to make any 
substantive efforts to tackle migrant social security. Perhaps the absence of such efforts can 
be explained by Tangshan’s status as a traditional industrial city and its lower level of 
economic development compared with Guangzhou. According to Ms X, the Deputy-District 
Mayor of Kaiping district in Tangshan, the local government is still concentrating on GDP 
growth rather than increasing levels of social welfare. Although there are no official 
documents to show why Tangshan has not developed such social policies, Ms X’s statement 
suggest that the city’s focus on economic development might serve to explain the local 
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government’s lack of desire to spend money on improving social security. Despite the city’s 
relative underdevelopment of social security measures to assist migrant workers, many 
migrants are expecting to obtain equal rights with local residents. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the needs of migrant workers are not being entirely ignored by the local government. Mr Lv, 
Vice-Director of the Development and Reform Commission Bureau of Tangshan stated in the 
interview: 
 “a team from Tangshan government visited Guangzhou city to learn about this policy [the 
household registration point system]”.  
 
He also expected that Tangshan could import the household registration points system (or a 
system like it) to improve social security protection overall and help migrant workers in 
particular. Mr Lv’s positive assessment of the developments in Guangzhou suggests, therefore, 
that Guangzhou’s reform of the household registration system can provide valuable lessons 
for other cities.  
 
Many studies have argued that the household registration system hinders migrant workers 
from assimilating into the city environment and separates them from other city dwellers. 
While this is certainly the case, it should be remembered that many city councils maintain that 
they have insufficient fiscal capacity to provide comprehensive social security support to 
everyone within the city boundaries. A possible solution to the social protection issues faced 
by migrant workers might be for the state to implement a system that provided for equal 
rights to access local social protections while allowing local government to set local average 
income and housing conditions. This would enable local government to tailor contribution 
rates and benefit support rates to meet both the needs of people and the needs of government 
to balance budgets. For example, if local government fiscal capacity cannot meet the social 
protection costs of all residents, it could offer lower benefit support to migrants than to local 
residents to reduce local costs. Although the migrant workers would still be unfairly treated 
compared with local residents, the benefits that they would receive under such a system 
would be better than nothing. It should be borne in mind that migrant workers can still get 
support from their hometown. By adding both benefits together, migrant workers should 
therefore be afforded a good level of protection. 
 
In recent years, some local authorities have begun to build social villages specifically for 
economic migrants – for example, the Taopu Township in Shanghai – to accommodate and 
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relocate migrant workers (Wu, 2002a). This is a policy that the Shanghai government believes 
protects migrant workers. While on paper this appears to be a sensible policy, it could 
nevertheless lead to a similar problem as occurred with the LRH policy, that is, social 
isolation from living in such an area and a lack of good facilities provided by the local council. 
This might work in Shanghai because it is the most developed city in China, but the capacities 
of other cities do not compare with those of Shanghai. Therefore, this policy is unlikely to be 
suitable for universal application in China.  	  
7.4	  Does	  social	  support	  work	  well	  enough	  for	  recipients?	  
 
Is it the case that income support benefits such as unemployment benefit reduce the 
recipient’s enthusiasm for finding a job? This reflects the idea that employment may lose its 
attractiveness for some people if benefits, though low, were enough to live on. Qinghou Zong 
(Wu, 2013, p.1), the richest man in China in 2012, claims that the economic reforms in China 
dismantled the old egalitarian system by allowing some people to get rich first or permitting 
some areas to get rich first, and have thus aroused society’s enthusiasm for the creation of 
wealth. It is this enthusiasm for wealth creation that Zong believes is behind the rapid 
economic development in China. He also asserts that European countries are now 
implementing a policy of high tax and high welfare support and that this will inevitably lead 
to an ‘egalitarian mess’ in which no-one will wish to go to work and create wealth. According 
to Zong, European countries generally maintain high benefit rates in areas such as 
unemployment benefits. For example, he states that the unemployment rate in Spain is very 
high and that this can be explained by the fact that the Spanish government currently provides 
unemployment benefit of around 600 Euros per month. He then compares this to the average 
wage of working people, which he estimates at around 1000 Euros per month. After tax and 
other contributions, Zong argues that the real wage left amounts to only around 600 Euros, 
almost identical to the unemployment benefit rate, and that this explains why Spanish people 
are not willing to work (ibid). However, Zong’s claims are clearly founded on a faulty 
understanding of the situation in Spain. It is not the case that people are refusing to work, but 
rather the fact that in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (and a series of smaller national 
crises in the Spanish economic context), there are few jobs to be found in the Spanish labour 
market. According to the BBC (2013a, p.1), ‘the total number of unemployment workers in 
Spain at 4.7 million in August in 2013, and the unemployment rate [stood at] 26.3%’. In this 
situation, many Spanish citizens clearly need adequate support during a difficult economic 
period. In the meantime, the government also needs to provide more jobs to protect people’s 
income. China’s situation is fundamentally different in that the unemployment rate in China is 
much less than in Spain, and the Chinese government is unable to afford the high support 
rates common in Spain and other European countries. Given the lower fiscal capacity for 
social security provision in China, government (at both the national and local levels) needs to 
maximise social security fund efficiency. In a view reminiscent of those of Qinghou Zong, 
Ms D, Vice-Director of the Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Tangshan, 
stated that “high income and housing support rates increase the high unemployment rate and 
raise sluggards”. It is clear from her statement that she believes that high levels of social 
security provision are detrimental to people’s motivation to work. 
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If this is the case and high levels of benefit might lead to a reduction in the attractiveness of 
working in China, then the potential drawbacks of direct income support might be countered 
by employing means testing in the income security system. In Latin America, the growth of 
conditional cash transfer schemes has been a notable development in the social security 
schemes in the region. Means testing for benefits has also been adopted in many developed 
countries, including the United States and some countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that conditional payment is an incredibly intricate system 
of financial incentives and penalties for doing and not doing certain things (Studying, 2011, 
p.140). 
  
In China, the MSLS, as the primary income security support system, could take advantage of 
conditionality. This would necessitate altering the MSLS in its current form to include 
conditions upon the spending of certain cash transfers, such as permitting conditional cash 
transfers for food or childcare only to be used by recipients for these purposes. In China, 
corruption is another problem that reduces the effectiveness of the social security policy and 
the efficiency of its delivery. From my research, it seems clear that those responsible for the 
disbursement of funds cannot and do not make fair assessments of applicants. As discussed 
earlier, it is the case that applicants who have good relationships with the local authority 
assessment officers might receive more benefits than others. Although the system of cash 
transfers outlined above would not totally solve the problem of corruption, it would make it 
easier for the government to monitor the spending of social security funds and might therefore 
increase the efficiency of China’s income security system and negate the problem of people 
taking advantage of the system.  
 
In addition, it is necessary to introduce a national social support standard for income security. 
At the moment, there is no national standard for the MSLS programme, and the MSLS 
payment rate is therefore characterised by significant variation between provinces, cities and 
even between different areas of a city. Regardless of this regional variation, however, MSLS 
payment rates are consistently very low, as can be seen in the discussion of the case in 
Tangshan city. MSLS recipients are thoroughly dissatisfied with their MSLS payment levels 
and services. They complain that the current MSLS rates do not provide adequate living 
support and that the quality of MSLS service provision is often unacceptable, as illustrated by 
long-term delayed payments. In light of these concerns, it seems clear that a minimum 
national standard MSLS rate should be set. This would put an end to the absurdly low benefit 
rates that exist in some areas and provide a true ‘safety net’ for each citizen. Furthermore, a 
national standard should also be set to ensure service quality. Once an applicant has qualified 
for MSLS payments, the local office in charge of MSLS services must be responsible for 
making payments to recipients either immediately or within a fixed period of time. A 
commitment to the timely delivery of agreed payments has to be written into the national 
MSLS rules because otherwise the current poor state of MSLS services will persist, and this 
will greatly increase recipients’ level of economic insecurity.  
7.5	  Social	  security	  issues	  for	  middle-­‐income	  groups	  	  
Recognition of the differing needs of different socio-economic groups is perhaps the key 
concept in an economic security system. A good economic security policy should not only 
protect those on a low-income, but also other social classes. The social system covering the 
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middle class in a key factor that make the whole security system better off. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, Korpi and Palme (1998)’s paradox distribution is a kind of economic paradox; the 
poor get more, because the budget is bigger, but they do not get actually get a bigger 
percentage of the budget. However, there is also a political side to this paradox, which might 
not work in China, because China does not have either a democratic system or a tax system. It 
works in Scandinavia, because it has a well-developed tax system as well as an established 
democratic system, and they are quite closely related. In Scandinavian countries, people do 
not mind paying tax as they can see the benefit. Therefore, middle class inclusion leads to 
more spending on welfare. China’s tax system is not well developed. One major problem is 
the degree of informality and another is the lack of a democratic system. Therefore, private 
employers, like the interview participants from Rong Chuan Auto Industrial Park and 
YanShan Gas Company are not willing to pay tax or other contributions to public services. 
 
Those with an extremely low income or no income at all are already at the bottom of the pile, 
and the risks to which they are exposed might be seen in relation to their lack of the most 
basic essentials, such as food. They are so poor they have nothing further to lose. However, 
those with middle or lower-middle level incomes could actually face greater risks and 
uncertainty should they lose their jobs. Given the nature of modern developing economies, in 
which innovation can produce unpredictable side effects in the labour market, the risks facing 
such workers are very real. For example, the introduction of new technologies could bring job 
insecurity to the labour market. A massive new production line might only need a few formal 
skilled workers, with the rest hired only as informal or short-term workers on very low wages 
in order to save costs and increase market competitiveness. The pressure of job insecurity and 
other forms of uncertainty on the middle classes, who bear higher living costs than poorer 
sections of society, could place them in a precarious position. Taylor-Gooby (2000), for 
example, argues that for some social groups, such as middle and lower-middle income 
workers, there are much greater risks in both the short-term and long-term. European research 
studying the mature welfare states also note how ensuring that middle class is covered by 
benefit provision is important for other reasons, including the legitimacy of the system 
(Rothstein, 1998. p.154).  
 
It is difficult to evaluate employment and social developments for middle and lower-middle 
income workers because the provision and delivery of income and housing benefits in China 
has concentrated in the main on low-income citizens. On the one hand, the government has a 
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responsibility to maintain China’s rate of economic development and provide more stable 
jobs for citizens, thereby increasing people’s living standards. On the other hand, the 
government has a responsibility to provide an effective social security policy for when 
working class people face risks and uncertainties. 
 
From Figure 7.9 it can be seen that middle-income (over 3000 yuan per month) working class 
people in Tangshan are not confident about their income security, and many lower-middle 
income (1000 to 2999 yuan) workers feel worried about their income security. This is partly 
because their social insurance payment level is not sufficient to secure a good standard of 
living.  	  
	  
Figure 7.9. Participants’ rating of how secure they felt in their ability to deal with living costs 
and unexpected costs in their daily lives.  	  A	  working	  class	  formal	  worker,	  ZY,	  35	  years	  old,	  said:	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“My company pays five basic social insurances for me – Unemployment Insurance, Health 
Care Insurance, Pension, Occupational Injury Insurance and Maternity Insurance – but the 
fees for these actually come out of my salary. The real income I have left after the insurance 
fees is enough to satisfy only my family’s normal spending, such as food, clothes and my 
child’s education fees. I still feel that there is a great deal of pressure on my living standards, 
and I worry when I think about my family members being affected by illness or income 
uncertainties because I cannot pay the fees out of my current budget.”  
 
In cases such as that of ZY, it seems clear that middle and lower-middle income workers are 
also facing living uncertainty and risks. As discussed in the previous section, due to the low 
payment level and unequal treatment of applicants for social support, the government may fail 
to provide sufficient protection for every low income person, with nothing for the middle 
class. Therefore, middle class people might face more danger than poorer people, because 
policies such as the MSLS might not provide them with any support due to their electronic 
goods and other valuable household items.  
 
Following on from the discussion in the previous chapters, an asymmetric protection 
programme might be a solution to this problem. This uses different levels of protection to 
provide security for different classes. Fitzpatrick (2011, p.108) argues that “each class would 
prefer to see a distribution of social resources which is heavily in its favour…this represents a 
necessary retreat from each class’s ideal and a settlement with which each class can live.” 
Given the differing resources, needs and expectations of different social classes, it would 
seem sensible to consider developing a systematic social security system that would provide 
social security protection for all classes.  	  
7.6	  Conclusion	  	  
China has become a major player in an increasingly globalised world. Although it is the 
second largest economy, China still has a long way to go, especially as regards its lack of a 
developed social security system. By learning from Western social security systems and 
adapting to its responsibility to provide social security, the coverage rate of income and 
housing security programmes has significantly increased. Underpinning policy development 
in China is the belief that a harmonious society follows in the footsteps of social security 
policy, and this has informed the direction of China’s social-economic development. As its 
social security system has developed, China has tested and implemented detailed systematic 
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social security policies. The MSLS and LRH policies have played a major role in social 
security provision in China, and if they have proved ineffective in guaranteeing income and 
housing security, this would be a serious threat to the wellbeing and quality of life of the 
people receiving these benefits.  
 
The findings of field research in Tangshan suggest that there are some deep-rooted problems 
with the current MSLS and LRH policies, with recipients voicing their unhappiness with the 
level and quality of benefits that they have received. One of the most evident problems is the 
existence of a kind of informality in the way in which the policy is implemented at the local 
government level. Combined with the prevalence of labour-market informality, this places 
needy people at considerable risk of suffering income and housing insecurity. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
Another finding is that many recipients consider the income security protection level too low. 
Furthermore, in its practical implementation, the MSLS programme appears to have shifted 
from its original goals. As designed, the stated goal of the MSLS programme was to meet 
most of the minimal living needs of recipients. In practice, the MSLS programme is focused 
only on poor people who are physically unable to work and who have insufficient income 
support. Poor people of working age are ruled out entirely from its protective net. Local 
government has implemented and administered the MSLS programme in such a way that it 
addresses the most basic needs of MSLS recipients, but from the viewpoint of the recipients, 
the payment level is too low and does not satisfy their actual needs. In addition, it is not 
always paid on time, and recipients have to cut down on their food or other basic spending in 
order to make ends meet.  
 
There are also problems with the current social housing system, which appears to be creating 
a situation in which LRH beneficiaries are becoming socially isolated from other urban 
residents. The social networks that exist in poor areas are limited both in their 
communications and social reach. While the system may function effectively in meeting 
citizens’ needs in the short term, it is a subject for debate whether it is a mistake to assume 
that the LRH programme can be implemented successfully in China without problems. As it 
stands, the social isolation that the LRH programme appears to be creating is potentially 
hazardous to economic and social development. The findings of this research suggest that 
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housing policy aimed at creating mixed communities, rather than social housing estates, 
would be a better option if effective housing security is to be achieved for low-income people. 
 
The findings of this research on the income and housing situation for rural migrant workers 
suggest that China has some way to go to tackle the problems such workers face. The current 
social security system discriminates against migrant workers compared with official local 
urban residents and rural residents living in rural areas. It is clear that rural migrants do not 
enjoy the same rights as local residents. At the heart of many of the social security related 
issues faced by migrant workers is the household registration system and urgent reforms to 
this system are necessary. In addition, China needs to consider ways of providing more 
education and training opportunities for its labour force, and especially for rural migrant 
workers. Developments in this area are essentially about making people better equipped to 
make a more effective contribution to the labour market as well as improving their job 
mobility. Finally, China needs to consider the important concept of asymmetric protection 
and this is discussed further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter	  8	  -­‐	  Further	  Discussion	  
8.0	  Introduction	  	  
 
This chapter discusses in greater depth the series of barriers to policy improvement in the area 
of social development, looking specifically at the impact of informality on the income and 
housing security policies that have been implemented. In so doing, it aims to explain why 
China’s economic security system is developing in the way that it is. It shows that these 
barriers have also actively shaped the way in which social security policy has been created 
and implemented. 
 
In the current globalised neo-liberal context, the notions of decommodification and 
stratification are intimately connected to the question of informality and the concept of 
insecurity since they are affected by a wide variety of global processes, including reduction in 
state welfare provision, increasing competition and increasing labour market flexibility 
(Ahmed, 2004, p.114). Standing (2008,pp.3,10) asserts that the increased informality and 
insecurity arising from globalisation has forced many people into a new and vulnerable social 
class, the ‘precariat’, which is characterised by a broad range of insecurities. For example, 
members of the precariat tend to drift in and out of short-term jobs, have widely fluctuating 
incomes and can access few of the benefits traditionally afforded to citizens in developed 
welfare states.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, China’s social security system uses a model that draws on 
lessons from other developed countries and its own experiences of 30 years of economic 
development since 1978. It can be argued that the Chinese welfare state has characteristics 
that make it a sort of mixed model: alongside attempts to universalise and expand coverage, 
formal processes are being informalised. For example, by 2012 over 90% of the population 
had joined the basic health insurance scheme (ISSA, 2013, p.117). However, the informal 
way of implementing social policies by local authorities and also the large informal sector in 
the labour market has reduced the security level in China.  Despite China’s high rate of 
economic development over the past a few decades, the increasingly marketised social and 
economic policies implemented in China have started to lead to an increase in levels of 
economic insecurity, with the emergence of slums and new social hazards. As discussed in 
Chapter 7 rural migrant workers find it difficult to get social protection in urban areas, and 
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many poor people in China cannot get Minimum Standard Living Scheme (MSLS) support or 
housing benefits such as Low Rent Housing (LRH). 
 
Without basic security, people lose all sense of confidence in and control over their lives 
(Stock, 2002, p.60). Economic insecurity is not about being ‘rich’ or ‘poor’. Some people 
may feel insecure, even though they may not be poor, others may feel confident about their 
lives even though they have a low income. Rather, economic insecurity is about risk and 
uncertainty (ILO, 2004, p.4). Risk means that the probability of various outcomes is known 
and can be predicted, while uncertainty refers to the probability of events that are unknown or 
unknowable (Heimer, 1988, p.493). People are likely to be anxious and insecure when they 
are exposed to risks and uncertainties against which they have no protection. Therefore, the 
state needs a way to implement a strong social system to provide solid protection but not a 
marketised social system.  
 
As explored in Chapter 2, Esping-Andersen and other researchers look at decommodification 
and stratification in terms of what the state does to society (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Midgley, 
1997; Hunber and Stephes, 2001; Castles, 1993). Historically, European welfare state variants 
were consolidated in the period after World War II. In European countries during this period, 
fiscal capacity was expanding, the labour market was formalising, and the state was 
increasing regulatory controls. In his discussion of social security in relation to the key issues 
of de-commodification and stratification, Esping-Andersen places welfare states into three 
categories, the liberal regime, the conservatism regime and the social democratic regime. For 
instance, Esping-Andersen’s treatment of the Scandinavian welfare model focuses largely on 
the role of the state and the development of formal institutions, and he concludes that the 
Scandinavian countries provide social protection more through decommodification than 
through stratification. However, in Esping-Andersen’s examination of social welfare systems 
in Western countries, there is little discussion of the issue of informality, as European welfare 
systems were developed based on a formal economy system. As Esping-Andersen  
(1990, pp.27–30) notes, the fact that benefits are universalised means that citizens have an 
incentive to contribute towards the welfare state system. For example, the Scandinavian 
system has a history of a very close relationship between state and citizens. Its welfare model 
was developed based on a very formal taxation-based benefit system and its social policies 
target not only the poor, but also the middle classes. However, it is very different in China. 
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Previous chapters have shown that there is a high degree of informality in China. Ringen and 
Ngok (2013, pp.8,9) also argue that the emerging Chinese welfare state is developing an 
obviously high degree of fragmentation (informalisation) and that informalisation is part of 
the process through economic, political and social development. They argue that China is in a 
period of social transition in which old security provisions such as guaranteed access to work, 
a house or land has been stopped. A series of social insurance and assistance polices have 
been introduced and in recent decades the social system has been changing into a new form 
under ideological guidance, attempting to build a harmonious society providing more social 
security to all people. However, Ringen and Ngok (2013, pp.21,22) argue that the welfare 
state in China is developing in response to economic necessity, rather than the state being 
traditional welfare liberal, socialist or developmental, they classified it as a fragmented 
liberal-conservative. That explains why and how this pattern of fragmentation is occurring in 
the specific context of economic liberalisation.  In turn this is impacting on social policy 
formation and effectiveness. Therefore, when we consider China’s social security system, it is 
important to focus on China’s distinct characteristics. Clearly, China has a different history 
and set of institutions from those prevailing in Western Europe. Furthermore, its attempts to 
develop and expand the welfare state are taking place in the context of global neo-liberalism, 
a factor reflected in the prevailing marketisation policies within China and the loosening of 
the state regulation that existed prior to this period of welfare expansion. As a result, China 
has to some extent frustrated its own efforts to formalise a welfare state. 
 
In response to these problems, China’s social security provision in terms of income and 
housing policy is an attempt to create some of the universal social protection policies and 
institutions typical of the West, in order to improve people’s living security level. This is 
precisely the kind of difficulty faced when moving from targeting benefits in rich areas to 
trying to cover the poor across the country (such as providing higher benefits to the poor 
western region of China). Bradie and Bostie (2013, pp.8,20,29) assert that targeting of public 
benefits towards better off income groups (or areas in China’s case) is a more established 
pattern in developing non-democracies. In addition, they argue that this pattern makes it 
harder politically for governments in developing countries to begin to target benefits at poorer 
groups or indeed to make benefits more even between all groups in the case of universalism. 
Thus far, however, China has failed to reproduce the secure living environment enjoyed by 
Western countries. Significant barriers to developing a social security system exist in China, 
especially concerning the rising informal sector and this has created barriers universalisation. 
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This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 8.1 explores how China’s social welfare 
system differs from those of European countries. Section 8.2 discusses the household 
registration system in China. Section 8.3 examines how the migration of rural workers to the 
cities has increased the level of informality in China. Section 8.4 investigates how informality 
influences income security. Section 8.5 examines how informality influences housing security. 
Section 8.6 provides a summary of the conclusions of this chapter. 
 
8.1	  Social	  welfare	  system	  in	  China	  	  
 
The global and national contexts for the development of the Chinese welfare state differ 
considerably from the experience of Western countries in that China has instituted social 
welfare reforms in the context of international neo-liberalism, as well as the different 
inherited system of welfare delivery to that of European welfare states. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, since the 1980s, China has ceased pursuing policies that strive for full employment, 
complementary food support and universal housing provision. The Chinese government has 
gradually reduced its market intervention strategies and has in turn promoted market 
liberalisation and the opening up of internal markets to direct international investment. 
Although these economic reforms have led to extraordinary economic growth and 
improvements in living standards, the level of social security support appears to have declined 
considerably. For example, minimum income protection (such as the MSLS) has only been 
given to old and disabled people, and the MSLS payment is not sufficient for basic living 
expenditure.  
 
Another new phenomenon is rural migrant workers, who lack social protection and cannot 
obtain the same social benefits as urban residents. This group is so huge that it threatens to 
shake the stable development of the whole society. Rural migrant workers have experienced 
major problems in adapting to the emerging market economy. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7, migrant workers are unable to get social benefits in the cities where they go to find work. 
Along with lower payment rates and the unequal treatment of rural migrant workers, this adds 
higher insecurity to the living conditions and life situation of migrant workers. Within this 
new globalised economy, economic stability and security has taken a back seat, and there is 
evidence that a new globalised insecurity structure has emerged (Stiglitz, 2002; Scheve and 
Slaughter, 2004; ILO, 2004; Ahearn, 2012).  
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China began to adopt housing policy reforms in the early 1990s. Between the 1950s and the 
early 1990s, the government allocated funds to state-owned enterprises to build housing for 
their employees. This was regarded as one of the benefits of employment, as even low-salary 
employees could secure housing as a welfare benefit. This afforded all urban residents a 
degree of housing security. From the 1990s, however, the housing system changed from one 
based on government allocation to one founded on market allocation, and employees then had 
to purchase or rent houses in the housing market.     
 
This has meant that in recent years, the housing price has increased significantly and 
expensive housing has been a big important problem. A lot of people, particularly the young, 
cannot afford their own houses, and the current housing provision does not provide benefits 
for the massive number of rural migrants. In addition, China does not allow slums areas in 
urban city centres, which has generated large slum areas of poor housing and temporary 
shacks built by the homeless on the edges of the major cities. Furthermore, the conditions to 
apply for social housing, such as Low Rent Housing (LRH), are very strict and difficult. This 
is discussed further in Section 8.5. 
 
The reforms have exposed large numbers of Chinese people to income and housing insecurity 
in the absence of income and housing protection, have brought about increasing inequality, 
and have led to asymmetrical geographical development. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
economic development is far greater in the eastern coastal area than in the western 
agricultural hinterland, and wage rates in urban areas are generally much higher than in rural 
areas. The inequality gap and the large surplus of labour in rural areas have led to the 
emergence of a huge floating labour force. This population of migrant workers has become 
one of the main groups of people experiencing high-risk living conditions in China today. 
According to Zhu (2013, p.1), there were over 260 million rural migrant workers in 2012, but 
only 43.9% rural migrant workers have proper formal working contracts: employers paid 14.3% 
of rural migrant workers’ pension insurance, 16.9% health insurance and 8.4% unemployment 
insurance. Therefore, there are still huge numbers of informal rural migrant workers without a 
working contract or social insurances.  
 
The large-scale neo-liberal industrial structural changes and labour market restructuring that 
took place in China during the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in an unprecedented 
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problem of mass unemployment. According to Ghose (2005, p.7), during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, due to the patterns of change in the labour market, such as the appearance of 
huge numbers of private sector companies, informal jobs, and labour surplus, the employment 
rate in state owned companies declined by 42.5%, leaving about 59 million unemployed 
workers. Many state-owned enterprises lost their competitive advantages when they were 
unable to use and maximise their capacity and productivity effectively, and since any 
company that fails to make profits will eventually be driven out of the market, the inevitable 
decline of the former state-owned industries meant that the unemployment situation in China 
deteriorated considerably. As a result of these market reforms, huge numbers of workers were 
laid off or put on long-term administrative leave during this period, and in many cases 
workers were forced to accept extended periods of enforced leave and non-payment of wages 
(ILO, 2004, p.139; Standing, 2002, p.39). As neoliberalism became the dominant economic 
discourse in China, it pushed the market into principal position, and many economic activities 
were left to self-correct through market mechanisms, including the labour market. While the 
neoliberal logic has served to promote economic development in China, it has simultaneously 
threatened workers’ social security, especially that of informal workers. 
 
The ILO (2004, pp.139-140) predicts that structural changes to labour markets could lead to a 
dramatic decline in employment security, especially in developing countries in regions such 
as Latin America, Africa and Asia. Certainly, it is evident that a large and growing number of 
workers are employed in the informal sector in these regions. According to the ILO (2004, 
p.140), 47.7% of the population of Africa was in non-agricultural self-employment in the 
1990s, with the corresponding figures for Latin America and Asia standing at 41.8% and 
32.7%, respectively. Although there were increasing numbers of people in employment, many 
of these people must be regarded as being members of the precariat. For example, the ILO 
(2003b) reports that for every ten jobs created in Latin America in the 1990s, seven were 
informal. During the period of economic growth, China has witnessed a similar trend of 
labour-market informalisation to that of Latin American developing countries. During the 
Mao regime, almost all workers were employed in the formal sector. However, since the 
initial market reforms in the 1980s, which paved the way for further economic reform and 
development, labour market informalisation in China has gradually increased. The informal 
labour market that emerged a couple of decades ago has now spread across the entire country, 
followed by mass migration flows. By 2005, informal workers accounted for 46% of the total 
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urban workforce (Kuruvilla et al, 2011, p.20). This means that in every two urban employees 
in China, one is an informal worker.  
 
Ahearn (2012, p.5) found that since 2008 many unemployed workers in America have found 
it increasingly difficult to secure new employment, and many of those who did secure 
employment had to accept lower paying jobs. A similar situation exists in China. When 
workers leave companies, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, their social protection 
vanishes, because employers provide the majority of social benefits. Furthermore, the sheer 
number of unemployed people in China is so large and the situation so complex that 
government at all levels has found it difficult to deal with the problem (Yu et al, 2006). The 
inability of government to cope with the problem has exacerbated the already considerable 
impact of joblessness on the social security of the unemployed. The need to find work has 
meant that many unemployed people have taken the first job offered, which in turn has 
increased the size of informalisation in the labour market.  
 
The Chinese government’s decision to shift its economic focus towards urbanisation in 2002 
has compounded this problem. Although the shift in economic focus was in part an attempt to 
reduce the level of rural poverty, it has led to massive numbers of rural migrant workers going 
to cities to seek jobs and thus to a large increase in the size of the rural to urban migrant 
population (Connelly et al, 2001, p.286). The rising demand for low-skilled workers in the 
manufacturing, services and construction sectors has continued to expand rural migration to 
urban areas (Du et al, 2005, p.695). In the absence of effective employment protection 
regulation, people have to find their own ways to survive, and informal employment has 
increasingly become the only option for many unemployed workers. Since the 1990s, the 
growing unemployment rate and the mass migration from rural areas has meant that the 
numbers of people working either without a contract or with an unfair contract have increased 
significantly (Yu et al. 2006). Although this informal employment might appear to solve 
people’s income problem in the short term, it presents a major barrier to wider social 
improvement. As discussed in earlier chapters, informal workers do not pay taxes and their 
employers do not pay social insurance for them. As there is no formal contract, local 
authorities are hard pressed to identify people’s real income. This is another of the serious 
side-effects of the emerging market economy system which has increased the level of 
insecurity. Because informal workers’ income cannot be guaranteed, a common problem for 
informal workers is that their wages are not paid on time or they might not be paid at all after 
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working many hours. Therefore, informality is a real problem that reduces the economic 
security level in China. The next section will discuss more on how informality influences 
economic security in China.  
 
8.2	  The	  impact	  of	  informality	  on	  China’s	  economic	  security	  	  
 
The informality problem in China is more of a complex issue than its classic definition – a 
lack of an employment contract or a clearly defined working relationship between employer 
and employee – would suggest. In fact, the issue of informality goes far deeper and includes 
the way in which the state functions in the area of employment rights. A notable issue is that 
of discretion at local government level. When implementing social policies, government 
officers often have the freedom to decide for themselves what should be done. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, local authority officers have the power to select which applicants qualify for the 
MSLS and may delay payments. As informal workers’ income cannot be proved because 
there is no formal contract, the local authority might consider that MSLS applicants have a 
certain income from an informal job. Therefore, as income cannot be accurately proved, the 
local authority might use their discretion in determining salaries in investigation reports. As 
the MSLS eligibility condition is lower than the minimum wage, formal workers would not 
qualify unless the total household income is less than the MSLS. However, local officers can 
look through a formal contract and the tax system to identify an applicant’s income. Local 
officers also look at whether there are any electronic goods in the house, such as an air-
conditioner, in which case the family will be disqualified.  
 
This discretion is used differently in relation to workers on informal contracts. Ms L (Director 
of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Tangshan) states that local officers cannot identify informal 
workers’ income. Therefore, if the applications are of working age (age 16 to 65) and not 
suffering from a serious illness or disability, the local officers will assume those applications 
have at least a local minimum wage income, so these applications will be disqualified and of 
course electronic equipment will be also detected.  
 
Having discretionary powers means that personal relationships, favouritism or other interests 
may lead to local authority officers failing to comply with statutory provisions. Clearly, the 
current labour market in China is not functioning well, and government at all levels has not 
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addressed its failings. It seems equally clear, however, that labour market regulation will not 
be effective if it is carried out at decentralised government level, as local governments in 
China have little incentive to regulate informal markets, make the much needed investment in 
human capital or reduce poverty (Zenou, 2012, p.409). This is become the informal market 
increases GDP figures and also decreases employment pressure. Employers pay less for 
informal workers, so the cost reduction increases a company’s competitiveness in the market 
economy and increase GDP.  
 
Local government does not have an incentive to regulate the labour market, possibly because 
the use of informal employment increases economic growth in China. Huang (2009, pp.5-6) 
states that the informal sector has been a way of increasing production capacities and solving 
the problem of unemployed workers, but it has been ignored by policy makers in the welfare 
system. Since the 1990s, informal employment as a flexible labour strategy has developed 
rapidly (Cooke, 2008, p.4). Gallagher (2002, p.346) states that since 1978, opening to foreign 
investment and trade, and allowing a private sector has been a key element of China’s 
economic reforms. Gallagher (2002, p.339) further argues that thousands of local authorities 
have set up development zones due to foreign direct investment liberalisation, but the 
economic reforms have resulted in a weakened social system for the labour market. One of 
the important issues for China might be cheaper labour force and raw materials. A much-
regulated labour market would increase the cost of labour. For example, during the research 
interviews, one private employer (Director of YanShan Gas) states that he chose to offer a 
majority of informal jobs, so as not to pay social insurance for migrant workers, and also the 
wages he pays are much less than those of formal workers. In China, the informal sector has 
been recognised as a way of solving the unemployment problem. It also deals with the 
influences of economic reform where globalisation has strongly increased competition in the 
labour market (Lu, 2003, p.4). The informal sector has therefore been an unspoken agreement 
that has developed as a way of increasing employment rate and economic growth.  
 
Ms X, Deputy-District Mayor in Tangshan stated that delegating the regulation of labour 
markets to the local governmental level could lead to long-term labour market insecurity 
given that local government is focused on economic growth and producing good financial 
figures and GDP rate, rather than focusing on human capital value creation. As Boyer (2000, 
pp.123,133,142) indicates, such an approach is dangerous because making financial results 
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the central focus of policy tends to lead to greater instability and increases the likelihood of a 
catastrophic economic crisis. 
 
The Chinese labour-market context therefore differs considerably from the Scandinavian or 
German contexts examined in Esping-Andersen’s research, characterised as they are by much 
more formal institutions and an organised and formal labour market. In contrast, the 
development of the Chinese welfare system is taking place in a relatively deregulated 
environment in which there is a large percentage of the workforce working in the informal 
sector and a labour market in which there is a large proportion of workers without proper 
social protection. Barrientos and Hinojosa-Valencia (2009) discuss Esping-Andersen’s model 
of Latin America, for example, since the 1980s workers in formal employment and social 
protection have been largely underdeveloped, and informal or rural workers cannot participate 
in traditional social security schemes (2009, pp.2,6). This is very similar to China. However, 
since the 1990s, the design of a non-contribution social security system has provided a 
solution for all workers. Most of the non-contributory social protection is funded by taxes and 
government income that covers formal and informal, and urban and rural workers (Barrientos 
and Hinojosa-Valencia, 2009, pp.14,15,17).  
 
Although the social protection measures implemented in China thus far are not very effective 
and do not function as efficiently as they might, the Chinese government is making concerted 
efforts to establish and develop a viable social security system. While this thesis has shown 
that current Chinese social security policies are weak insofar as they afford limited levels of 
protection, there has clearly been some improvement over China’s thirty years of economic 
development. For example, at its inception, the basic pension system only covered employees 
of state and public owned companies. Since 1999, however, the basic pension insurance 
system has been unified for all employees in cities and towns throughout the country. 
Employees in all enterprises who have reached the statutory retirement age (60 years of age 
for male workers and 55 for female workers) and who have paid the necessary individual 
contributions over fifteen years can receive a monthly pension after retirement (XinHuaNet, 
2004). In 2009, the Chinese government expanded the coverage of the pension system to 
include rural residents in developed areas such as Beijing and Tianjin municipalities and it 
has subsequently increased coverage to include more rural areas (State Council of China, 
2009b). This is an improvement on the old pension system (1980s to early 2000), which 
mainly focused on urban residents, whilst rural residents were not eligible. 
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In 1999, the Chinese government introduced the ‘Unemployment Insurance Rule’ (UI). The 
UI regulation requires all urban employees to participate in UI. The UI payment scale is 
somewhere between the local minimum wage and the local minimum living standard. By 
2010, around 120 million people were participating in UI (State Council of China, 2010). 
However, this only covers the formal sector; the informal sector is not covered in China. On a 
more universal system in developing countries, Brazil has an unemployment system that 
covers the informal sector from a tax fund contribution based social security system 
(Barrientos and Hinojosa-Valencia, 2009, p.14). In China, although the new social system has 
been extended to cover more people, there is still a big informal sector problem in the labour 
market, and also among rural migrant workers. 
 
In 1998, the basic health insurance system was launched. Initially providing cover to urban 
formal employees, it was then expanded to all urban residents. In the past five years, the basic 
health insurance system has been extended to include all rural residents. At present, basic 
health insurance covers more than 1.2 billion people, around 90% of the Chinese population 
(State Council of China, 2010). The Chinese government has also actively promoted the 
urban housing security system. By the end of 2011, there were more than 10 million social 
houses under construction. The social houses that have been completed have solved the 
housing difficulties of tens of millions of people (Xin Hua She, 2011). Since economic reform 
in 1978, the social system has changed a lot, as the state has changed the allocation of housing 
provision into a market activity. From the discussion in Chapter 3 and 5, the housing price has 
massively increased in China, and many poor people are unable to afford houses. The new 
housing policies, such as LRH, have provided a lot of available social housing that has 
improved housing security. 
 
Similar to the experience of Western countries, China is endeavouring to gradually develop a 
welfare system that aims to provide universal social protection to all citizens and maximise 
capacity for individuals. However, in a widely discussed article from the Wall Street Journal, 
Professor Qin Hui states that ‘China is a “negative welfare state” because welfare support 
only benefits formal workers and officials; the state provides little or no welfare support for 
poor people’ (Yuan, 2013). Clearly, Qin contends that China’s current welfare state system 
does not provide good protection compared with Western welfare states. However, as an East 
Asian country, China’s social security protection level is related to its level of economic 
development. Since the establishment and development of the socialist market economic 
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system, China has carried out a series of social security system reforms as part of the planned 
economy and has gradually adapted to the market economy system. Following China’s rapid 
economic development in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the government has attached great 
importance to and is actively committed to providing and improving the social security 
system, especially as regards pensions and health insurance. The coverage has been extended 
from urban to rural sectors, with the fund for pension insurance and health insurance largely 
being provided by the government and taxes. This is similar to the discussion in Barrientos 
and Hinojosa-Valencia (2009) about income security policies in Latin America. Thus, China’s 
new social system has the potential for integrating informal workers in the future.  
 
Although China’s social expenditure is much lower than that in Western developed countries, 
it has increased significantly in recent years. Therefore, while Professor Qin’s claims might 
have fairly reflected the situation that existed in China during the 1990s, they do not 
accurately depict the current situation. In reality, the Chinese government is playing a key role 
in all economic, social and political arenas, and the country has a modern welfare system that 
provides social services and protection to citizens. While it might be an exaggeration to 
consider China a fully-fledged welfare state, there are nevertheless signs that it is developing 
towards being a reliable welfare state. China is trying to provide basic income and housing 
protection with a wide coverage rate that should help to reduce stratification. In fact, there are 
different stratifications in developing country non-democracies (Bostie and Brady, 2013, 
p.33). They argue that developing countries tend to be less extensive and universal, and more 
high income targeted than rich democracies. This is a similar issue to China, although, as 
discussed in earlier chapter 5 and 6, China is adopting both targeting and universalism, but in 
practice, income and housing support such as MSLS and LRH have been benefits for the 
elderly and extremely poor, and not everyone can obtain benefits. However, given China’s 
traditional separation along strong rural-urban, public-private, and formal-informal lines, 
China is creating new forms of stratification, especially regarding the proliferation of migrant 
and informal workers This new form of stratification is directly influenced by the constraints 
imposed by the household registration system.  
 
As stated earlier, more than 90% of the population is covered by health insurance. But the 
health insurance payment rate for urban and rural is very different. Rural residents have much 
lower benefits. Rural workers are the major labour group in China (Zhu, 2013, p.1). They 
number more than 260 million, but their social insurance (related to work) coverage rate is 
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less than 15%, and most rural migrants are informal workers that cannot get social benefits in 
urban areas. Therefore, the social protection trend is towards gradually covering more people 
but at the same time informalising the system, so that rural migrants and informal workers are 
still trailing behind. Informalisation is also reflected in the behaviour of the local authority 
who also have a strong influence due to their discretionary powers, as discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7. For example, those with a special relationship with local officers might get priority 
benefits. These patterns of stratification in China seem to contribute to explaining Ringen and 
Ngok (2013)’s characterisation of China, as ‘fragmented liberal-conservative’. Social services 
management has been poor and the implementation of social policies has been treated 
arbitrarily. This is particularly true for the migrant group and informal workers, where the 
economic and social system means they trail behind formal workers, without certain social 
rights. The next section will discuss more on the issues of migrants and informal work. 
8.3	  Household	  Registration	  System	  	  
 
In the pre-reform period of the 1980s, the household registration system completely restricted 
people’s mobility. Under this system, everyone had to register as a rural or urban resident and 
their status could not easily be changed without permission. Although the household 
registration system has been slowly reformed over the past 30 years, rural migrants still 
encounter difficulty in obtaining the registration necessary to move to urban areas. With 
China’s economic development, however, rural migrants are needed as a cheap labour force 
in the cities, and given the wage differential between urban and rural areas, large numbers of 
people registered as rural residents have migrated to urban centres, few of whom have official 
local registration. As discussed in Chapter 6, it is difficult for such workers to bring their 
families with them and obtain social insurances in the cities that they migrate to. Thus, 
although the social policies that have been implemented by the Chinese government are 
seemingly targeting the right people and appear sound in principle, the existing household 
registration system prevents these policies from reaching certain sub-groups of people and 
explains why there are several different forms of policies in different areas.  
 
It can be seen that the household registration system has had a negative impact on social 
security provision. Since rural migrants would have to return to their place of origin in order 
to collect social security benefits, the household registration system effectively eliminates the 
rights of rural migrant workers to such benefits and thus acts as a barrier to the provision of 
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universal social insurance coverage. Currently, social insurance cannot be transferred between 
cities, and even if workers do have social insurance, this cannot be transferred with them 
when they migrate from their area of permanent residence. Even if the rules governing the 
transfer of social insurance were relaxed, local governments simply do not have the 
administrative capacities to deal with the complexity of transferring the contributions and 
insurance benefits of large numbers of workers as they move to different places. Furthermore, 
since urban benefits such as LRH require urban registration, rural migrants are excluded from 
eligibility due to the household registration system (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development of China, 2007). The main victims of the household registration system, 
therefore, are rural migrants, who do not benefit from urban social security and thus do not 
enjoy the same kind of social protection as urban residents. This system enforces the trend 
towards informality, as discussed in the last section.  
 
The household registration system also contributes to increasing labour-market informality. 
Since workers coming from rural areas bear the label of ‘migrants’, it seems likely that some 
private businesses might treat them differently from local workers. Both private employers 
interviewed (YanShan Gas Company and Rong Chuan Auto Park) declared that they intended 
to provide informal jobs and pay less to rural migrant workers, as they thought rural workers 
were in a weak position in the city. Rural workers might be too frightened to oppose local 
employers. The private employers also said that the rural migrants normally kept quiet and 
accepted their employer’s requirements. In Shanghai, for example, most migrants who are 
classified as ‘temporary residents’ live in overcrowded dormitories and the remainder in 
private rented accommodation (Wu, 2002a). It should be noted that as most rural migrants are 
working in informal jobs, the label ‘temporary resident’ is largely synonymous with ‘informal 
worker’. As a result, the household registration system has left rural migrants separated from 
the urban population in both the social and labour market spaces. Therefore, this has increased 
the level of informality. As Solinger (1999, pp.800-810) indicates, informal workers as a 
secondary class largely work in dirty, dangerous and demanding jobs not performed by urban 
residents, thus increasing the social and labour market isolation of migrant workers. The 
problems faced by rural migrants in terms of income and housing security should receive 
much more attention than is the case at present. Despite this, social security policies such as 
the MSLS and LRH have not yet been expanded to allow the participation of rural migrants.  
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8.4	  Migrant	  workers	  and	  the	  Chinese	  labour	  market	  
 
At the heart of the income and social insecurity issue for migrant workers might be the fact 
that they are disproportionately employed in the informal sector. Bangasser (2000, p.47) notes 
that the ILO refers to two forms of employment in the informal sector. One is defined as 
‘informal own account enterprises’, and the other as ‘enterprises of informal employers’. 
Work in agriculture is excluded. Informal employment may take the form of work within 
informal enterprises, self-employed businesses and small family-owned businesses or 
informal jobs in formal sector enterprises (Hussmanns, 2004, p.5). Temporary workers are 
normally classified as part of the informal sector in developing countries. It is widely 
accepted that those in informal employment do not have labour contract protection and that 
informal workers tend either to have weak or no social security benefits. Meghir et al. (2012, 
p.2) make the case that informality necessarily implies that the amount of insurance offered to 
workers is lower than for formal, regular workers. 
 
In urban society in general, rural migrant workers are regarded socially as ‘second class 
citizens’. Due to the ‘household registration system’, rural migrant workers are discriminated 
against in the urban labour market, and employers more likely to offer them informal jobs 
such as temporary or part time work. Given that there is a large rural labour surplus and that it 
is moving into the urban labour market, the demand for low-skilled workers is weighted 
towards rural migrant workers. According to China News (2013, p.1), rural migrant workers 
wage rate is relatively lower and working environment is relatively poor, due to the bad 
treatment, on average, rural migrant workers have to change job every 4 years. Under the 
pressure of market competition, firms must reduce costs to compete effectively, and workers, 
especially the low skilled, have become victims of the drive for cost saving strategies. Over 
the past few years, firms have tended to reduce labour costs by employing informal workers 
as this enables them to pay lower wages and bypass many of their social responsibilities. In 
particular, small firms often prefer to offer rural migrant workers informal jobs in order to 
lower business costs by paying lower wages and avoiding having to take on responsibility for 
their employees. In recent years, both their low level of income security and the lack of social 
and labour rights protection for rural migrants have attracted criticism. Migrant workers 
frequently do not receive wages when due. According to research, around 10% of rural 
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migrant workers receive payment seven months late on average (State Council of China-
Research Office Project Team, 2006, p.1). Informal staff in a company might account for 90% 
of all employees, or informal workers might number ten times the number of formal workers 
(Sun, 2013, pp.2–4). For many companies, the informal worker has become the main form of 
employee, and they are in the weak position of receiving low wage rates and poor social 
benefits and facing lay-off cycles. 
 
The increasing labour-market informality in China is creating a very problematic labour 
environment, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for job seekers to secure a formal job 
and a high wage rate. Official surveys indicate that the nominal average wage level of rural 
migrants has barely changed in a decade (State Council of China-Research Office Project 
Team, 2006) Given that the income of rural migrants is very low and that the already 
significant income inequality gap between formal and informal workers continues to increase. 
China People News (2007, p.1) claims that in same company, same job, the payment 
difference between formal workers and informal workers could reach 10 times. The added 
problem of employers failing to pay or delaying payment of wages makes the situation even 
more difficult and dangerous for rural migrants. An example of unpaid wages to rural migrant 
was recently reported in the Chinese media. The news said 20 rural migrants who had not 
been paid were involved in an incident with the employer in which one man was injured 
(Chen, 2014, p.1). This kind of problem has been reported many times in the Chinese media. 
A lot of Chinese people are familiar with the insecurity of rural migrants. According to Xin 
Hua News (2014, p.1), from 2013 to January 2014, 23 million rural migrants have officially 
reported experience of delayed payments.  
  
In researching Western social welfare systems, it is important to consider unemployment rate 
as an important factor. The debates by Esping-Andersen and Regini (2000) on labour market 
and social security in European countries approach the issues by analysing the European 
unemployment problem and unemployment structure. In China, however, such an approach 
might be criticised as idealistic and impracticable. This is because migrant workers, who 
make up a large part of the labour force, actually have a low unemployment rate (Li, 2008, p. 
14). Most move to cities to increase their income and are generally willing to take any job, of 
which the majority are in the informal sector. Barnighausen et al (2007, p.2) claim that the 
informal sector workforce makes up more than half the total workforce in China. Tokman 
(2007, pp.2–3) argues that employment in the informal sector typically involves people 
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working in poor conditions on low incomes, and since most informal workers are from the 
poorer sections of the population, they take such work to obtain some form of income. In the 
informal sector, enterprises and employment relations are not regulated, and employees are 
not legally protected. Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of labour market 
informalities, both informal workers and informal enterprises need to be considered. While in 
European countries a low unemployment rate might equate to low job mobility – that is, the 
majority of people have stable employment – a low unemployment rate does not equate to 
low job mobility for Chinese migrant workers. According to Knight and Yueh (2004, p. 644), 
the rate of job mobility for rural migrant workers is much higher than for urban resident 
formal workers. One reason for this might be that the competition for jobs is very high and 
that these jobs are characterised by instability. As noted in previous chapters, a large 
proportion of migrant workers have not signed contracts with their employers and legal labour 
protection in China’s labour market is poorly enforced. The prevalence of small informal 
firms in China and the fact that even formal enterprises hire informal workers means that 
there is a ready availability of informal employment without formal contracts, social 
insurance and with low rates of pay. Without written contracts, rural migrant workers are in a 
weak position in their employment relationships.  
 
Labour-market informality in China also raises stratification issues that differ from the 
contexts that Esping-Andersen describes. In China, rather than state policy shaping society, 
labour market informality is actually affecting state policy, and the extent of informalisation 
in the Chinese labour market is directly related to the government’s activities and economic 
goals. Loayza (1996, pp.131–150) argues that in Latin America, governments that lack the 
capability to enforce enterprises’ compliance with labour regulations contribute to the 
emergence and rise of the informal sector. As a developing country, China’s economic and 
social development has many similarities with Latin America countries. After the 1980s, fast 
economic development resulted in similar problems to Brazil or Chile, such as informal 
workers and different social protection for urban and rural. The state or government, as an 
institution that administrates public services and monitors regulatory performance, plays a 
crucial role in the emergence and development of an informal economic system.  
 
This working relationship is very different from those in Western countries. In the UK, for 
example, if a company owner wishes to employ a cleaner, he/she is legally obliged to set up a 
contract for the cleaner and guarantee that their tax and national insurance payments are 
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deducted from their wages. In China, however, even though Chinese labour law clearly states 
that ‘the employment relationship has to be written in a formal contract’ (State Council of 
China, 2005c), many company owners deliberately look for informal workers to perform such 
low-skilled jobs, a situation that is borne out by the fact that more than 80% of rural migrants 
working in informal jobs do not sign labour contracts (Li, 2005, p.2).  
 
Zhang (2010, p.1) indicates that at the moment there is no law or rule to protect informal 
workers. This is true, even with the new social security law, it only states that the employer 
should provide a formal contract for workers, but it does not say how to provide protection for 
informal workers’ income security. Zhang (2010, p.1) also states that in 2010, there were over 
80 million informal workers, and in Jiaozuo City, the local court takes only about 30 cases of 
informal employment a year. According to the new social security law, the informal job 
sector is illegal, but so far, local authorities seem to have done nothing to private companies. 
A private employer interviewee from the YanShan Gas Company in Tangshan, stated that no 
institutions were actually investigating his company. Even if officers asked about informal 
workers, the company did not disclose that they had any Sometimes the company might give 
a gift or pay for dinner for local officers to avoid investigation. Then, if a problem was found, 
the company only needed to pay a small amount of money to solve the situation, because the 
company had built good relations with the local district officers, so the fine would not be 
large. This is also related to the discretion discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Local officers might 
consider turning a blind eye to the company’s behaviour or charging less if the company was 
caught. Li and Tang (2002, p.20) report that 26.1% of migrant informal workers had been 
warned and punished, and 73.9% of migrant informal workers were not questioned in 2002 in 
Beijing. Therefore, the situation in Chinese secondary cities is that informal jobs are against 
the new social security law, but in practice it is not seen as illegal, because the local authority 
does not strictly apply the law.  
 
In the interview, the Chief Justice of Lubei district court in Tangshan, Mr W said that at the 
moment, there might be millions of informal workers in Tangshan, there are some legal cases 
about labour contracts, but most of the cases are for state owned companies, there are few 
cases for informal workers’ contracts in private companies. He said almost no one prosecutes 
informal employers, so the court might not be able to do anything about it unless the case is 
very serious and has a big impact to the stability of society. In fact, there is a labour bureau 
where this institution could go to investigate those companies who have informal workers. 
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However, in practice, if nothing serious happened, no institutions would bother about 
informal job cases in Tangshan. In addition, most labour contract cases are about payments 
and need the employment contract as proof of the working relationship. For informal workers, 
proving the working relationships is difficult, so for informal worker’s unpaid salaries, the 
court may not help up. He also thinks that rural migrant workers might be frightened of going 
to court, because it take times, costs money and might also need certain knowledge. He 
believes that most rural migrants would not choose to go to court.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 7, the education level of migrant workers is generally low, so they 
might not know what they need to do to initiate court proceedings. They also run the risk of 
employers sacking them and hiring new people. As argued in previous chapters, migrant 
workers are looking to survive in urban areas; they need jobs to earn income to live. 
Therefore, they would rather not take time off and risk going to court. Because of these 
difficulties and the lack of legal protection, to either escape or do nothing but continue to 
work might be their only choice, as was found from the interviews with local workers and 
private employers. Therefore, although informality in the labour market might still be a grey 
area, for the informal workers it is a case of tolerating the situation, because this area of the 
labour market is not considered strictly, and so is neither structurally legal or illegal within 
the court system.  
 
In one sense, this arrangement is easy to understand from the migrant’s perspective. When 
they arrive in a strange city without money or friends, they are desperate to find a source of 
income, and since they are generally unable to find work with formal companies, the ready 
availability of informal jobs enables them to survive in the city. However, given their weak 
earning power and their lack of social protections such as unemployment insurance, such 
workers in China are incredibly vulnerable. Legal action is rarely taken against employers 
who offer non-contract jobs due to the large labour market surplus in China and the 
willingness of desperate migrant workers to accept such employment conditions rate (Mr W, 
Chief Justice in Lubei District Court of Tangshan). This situation finds echoes in the 
argument of Souza and Tokman (1976, p. 356) that there is a strong correlation between a 
‘surplus’ labour force and the employment of workers in informal enterprises. Culturally, 
because this kind of informal work is very common, unless employers commit very serious 
offences or engage in fraudulent behaviour, it is unlikely that complaints will be made to the 
government. What is clear is that given the government’s eagerness to increase the rate of 
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economic development in China and firms’ desire to reduce their costs through labour market 
informalisation, as discussed above, very few of the companies employing informal labour in 
violation of Chinese labour law have been investigated and punished. Although many workers 
are aware of the crucial importance of contracts to their wellbeing, many employers simply 
refuse to sign labour contracts with rural migrant workers. This lack of labour contract 
protection means that rural migrant workers can be dismissed at any time and have no 
protection when their rights are violated.  
 
In response to this endemic labour-market informality, the Chinese government introduced a 
new labour law in July 2013 which states that enterprises can only hire temporary or part-time 
staff for a period of up to six months, after which they should be offered full-time contracts, 
and that the proportion of part-time staff on a company’s book has to be kept within defined 
limits (Sun, 2013, p.1). The new social security law marks China’s attempt to learn from 
Western countries’ experiences and efforts to reform labour markets. However, this new 
social law still has some weak points concerning the treatment of informal workers, and 
despite its introduction, informal workers still face the pressure of job insecurity. For example, 
the six-month period afforded to employers for the use of temporary or part-time informal 
work remains a considerable period of time, during which part-time workers still receive 
lower pay rates and fewer social benefits. During the research interviews, a construction 
worker Mr Z said his wage was negotiated with his employer. They agreed on 12 hours work 
a day including food and accommodation. His wage is 90 yuan a day (US$12), paid weekly, 
with work offered on a daily bases. He has no formal contract. Xin Hua News (2014, p.1) 
reports that from 2013 to 2014, there were 240,000 labour payment cases managed by local 
work related authorities, but only 53 cases came to court. Therefore, local government is still 
in the key position of managing and regulating the labour market, but not the legal system.  
 
This also seems to indicate that the new social security law has failed to provide effective 
protection for workers, because not many reported cases ended up in legal action. Due to the 
decentralised nature of government, discussed in chapter 6, the state does not provide many 
details on the implementation of the new social security law, but instead leaves it to local 
authorities. It is very hard to find academic documents or other data to show whether the new 
social security law is good or not, but from the analysis of the interview data, the new law 
does not seem to have improved economic insecurity in Tangshan very much.  
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In an effort to reduce costs, there is a high probability that the company alone will determine 
whether part-time workers retain their jobs at the end of the six-month period. In addition, Ms 
L, Deputy Department Director at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of 
the People’s Republic of China, stated in our interview that: 
  
“This new labour law does not specify the actual ratio of part-time workers that may be 
employed in a company; rather, the specific proportion of the workforce that can be employed 
on a temporary or part-time basis will be determined by the Labour Administrative 
Department of the State Council” 
 
Although under the new legislation the government is apparently able to regulate the 
proportion of part-time workers in the workplace, the new labour law has not set the ratio 
within each industry. Therefore, given that China is more difficult to administer than 
developed Western countries and has huge differences in internal economic development, it is 
probable that after the implementation of the new labour policy the problem of informal 
workers making up a large percentage of a company’s workforce might still exist.  
8.5	  How	  informality	  influences	  income	  security	  policies	  	  
	  
ILO (2010, p.73) recommends that income protection provision should provide protection for 
all possible contingencies. This can be delivered either via earnings-related social insurance 
schemes or via basic flat rate protection. The first form of income protection might be a 
targeted type of protection, and the latter might be a universal type of protection. As discussed 
in earlier chapters, the MSLS is the most important policy and is designed to protect all 
citizens. For those whose income is under a certain level, the government guarantees to 
provide cash support to assist in meeting living expenses.3 As such, it appears to be a means-
tested scheme. In practice, however, the majority of beneficiaries are poor, old people and 
disabled people, as people of working age with the ability to work are assumed to be earning 
an income that meets the minimum wage level. 
 
It has been stated that the MSLS is regarded as a security net to protect people’s minimum 
living standard, but should it simply be viewed as a top up scheme? The current idea behind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It should be borne in mind that as there is no national minimum wage rate in China, local provincial 
government sets both the minimum wage and MSLS rates. While the minimum wage rate differs according to 
each province, in general it is much greater than the corresponding MSLS rate. For example, the MSLS rate in 
Sichuan province was around 380 yuan per month in 2011 (China News, 2013), whereas the minimum wage was 
around 800 yuan per month (BBC, 2011b).  
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the MSLS is that whenever a person’s income falls below a certain level, the government will 
top it up to a set amount. However, this quantitative approach to income support lacks an 
appreciation of other factors that contribute to deficiencies in income. In practice, many of the 
income earners in poor households are informal workers whose wage rates tend to be much 
lower than the formal minimum wage rate. In general, the income of low-paid informal 
workers has to meet the needs of the entire family, often including elderly parents, a spouse 
and children. Such low incomes might only be sufficient for very basic food (as shown in the 
picture in Chapter 6) or poor quality food lacking nutritional value.  
 
Although the MSLS was designed to be a universal type of protection, due to the lack of 
information and extensive labour-market informality, it has become a targeted benefit. In 
practice, the MSLS is mainly targeted towards helping elderly and disabled people. It can be 
assumed that the inspection process that is used to assess eligibility is, at least in part, to 
blame for the government’s failure to examine, identify and monitor people’s income rate. 
Since elderly people are beyond working age and disabled people might be unable to work at 
all, the income of these two groups is relatively easy for local authorities to measure. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, local authority officers visit the applicant’s home to check whether 
they have an income and can examine the applicant’s home to determine their real living 
conditions and establish their eligibility for receipt of MSLS support. Eligibility is determined 
by a rudimentary appraisal of the applicant’s standard of living: for example, if they own an 
air-conditioner, it is assumed that they have sufficient income to use it, and the applicant 
would not be eligible for MSLS support. While on one hand this mechanism might filter out 
all those who do not meet the MSLS eligibility conditions and thus ensure that all MSLS 
recipients are truly in need, on the other hand, many people in urgent need of MSLS benefits 
are excluded, especially those who have recently lost their income. Thus, although the MSLS 
is a useful policy in securing people’s income level, providing them with some money to meet 
basic living costs and verifying that beneficiaries (for both the MSLS and the LRH) are poor 
people, there are still many members of society who are not eligible to receive MSLS support. 
 
In addition, according to the ILO (2012), health costs are the most significant threat to income 
security in developing countries, with many poor people unable to bear the cost if a family 
member has a serious illness. In such cases, most of the family income will go towards 
meeting medical costs, and therefore the family might not have any money to live on. With 
these issues in mind, the state should begin to reconsider the purpose of the MSLS and should 
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reappraise its current role as a monetary top-up scheme so as to provide a wider range of 
support. Although the Chinese government does provide other relevant supports for MSLS 
recipients, such as lower education costs and housing costs, these measures alone cannot 
provide comprehensive social security and perhaps the government needs to consider 
employing a targeted support model within the existing MSLS universal framework in order 
to satisfy people’s specific needs. For example, for MSLS recipients who are supporting a 
seriously ill family member, the government might provide both MSLS cash support and help 
with medical costs. In sum, to satisfy different people’s needs, the government should seek to 
combine both universal and targeted measures within the MSLS framework. 
 
The problems of a large informal labour sector and its threat to worker’s social security are 
not unique to China. European countries also experienced considerable labour-market 
informality during their processes of industrialisation and globalisation, but over time Europe 
developed ways of reducing the economic insecurity impact of development. For example, the 
UK has a much more developed formal labour market than China, and all UK citizens over 16 
years of age are issued with a National Insurance Number through which people in work 
make payments towards tax and benefits. This number is used in the administration of the 
UK’s social security system and because it is unique to every adult, it could be described as a 
personal account number. Almost every adult resident in the UK has a National Insurance 
number, which helps the government track an individual’s tax and national insurance 
contributions. To improve the efficiency of the MSLS, China could draw lessons from the 
UK’s National Insurance system and design, develop and implement a personal account 
system so as to provide an effective measure of each citizen’s income, and thus pave the way 
for universal protection under the MSLS.  In the interview, Ms B from the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs of China stated: 
 
“In many Western countries the labour market is much better than in China. The governments 
are able to monitor or easily track people’s real income, either through the tax system or other 
systems. But in China, this is very difficult, especially for small private companies and 
informal workers, as they might provide fake income statements or no income statements at 
all.”  
 
The introduction of a system modelled on the UK’s National Insurance system would regulate 
the market more efficiently and enable the government to ascertain an individual’s ability to 
work and their income. This would improve the effectiveness of not only the MSLS, but all of 
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China’s social security policies. In practice, this might be relatively easy to set up given that 
China already has a ‘household registration system’ in place, with every Chinese citizen aged 
16 years or over having an ID card that contains their resident location, personal details and 
unique ID number. This ID card could function in a very similar way to the UK’s National 
Insurance number, and policy makers could consider adding an extra feature to the ID card so 
that it ties in with the tax and social insurance contribution system. This would help the 
government track an individual’s contributions record and working status, and this kind of 
system could be a key element in helping the MSLS achieve universal coverage. Since many 
urban poor and rural migrant workers are working in the informal labour market, it is often 
difficult for local government to identify those eligible for the MSLS and LRH programmes 
and to allocate resources fairly. This is seriously hampering the growth of the coverage rate 
for both programmes. Establishing a personal account system could therefore provide an 
efficient means of administrating both the MSLS and LRH. Ms B from the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs of China supported this recommendation, stating: 
 
“It would be much easier for the government to implement income security policies if there 
was a personal credit account system, and I am sure there would be many more poor people 
covered by the MSLS.” 
 
If such a system were implemented, current unsophisticated practices for assessing MSLS 
eligibility, such as the ‘air-conditioner measurement’ outlined above and more widely 
described in Chapter 5, could give way to a fairer, more effective and efficient means of 
measuring a family’s income.  
 
A formal MSLS monitoring system should be considered an important part of any future 
income security system that China might adopt. Such a monitoring system has the dual 
function of identifying those in need of support and guaranteeing effective resource allocation: 
it identifies not only those in need of support, but also those no longer in need of MSLS 
payments. For instance, for MSLS recipients who secure employment and thus increase their 
income beyond that permitted under the MSLS support system, there is the need to ensure 
that they are no longer deemed eligible for MSLS support. However, the current 
administrative capabilities of the government make it difficult to investigate MSLS recipients 
very frequently. As part of an overhaul of the monitoring system, the state might consider 
introducing different monitoring frequencies for different types of recipients. For example, for 
those MSLS recipients who have serious illnesses or disabilities or whose basic income does 
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not change over time, an eligibility assessment might be conducted annually. For those whose 
incomes might change a little, assessments might be carried out every six months. For those 
in receipt of MSLS support who have the ability to work and whose income is unstable, local 
officials might check their eligibility status monthly. In combination with improving 
administrative capacity, such changes to the frequency of inspection should help in allocating 
resources more efficiently to meet more people’s needs. However, the administrative costs of 
sending an inspector to monitor MSLS recipients monthly might prove to be excessive, and if 
those monitored are paid for their work directly in cash rather than via the taxable system, any 
monitoring of their income might prove useless. In light of these limitations, a more 
permanent basic income might be an alternative.  
 
8.6	  How	  informality	  impacts	  on	  housing	  security	  	  	  
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, measures to promote income security should not be viewed 
merely in terms of providing cash support to the most disadvantaged, but as a means of 
promoting income security for all citizens. Similarly, access to housing should not be 
regarded simply an as issue of securing a roof over people’s heads, but as a wider issue that 
concerns security of life and wellbeing. Given the link between income and access to 
satisfactory housing, the effect of labour-market informality on access to housing should be 
considered.  
 
Housing protection has been a major focus of this thesis. Since the early 2000s, the Chinese 
government has introduced a series of social reforms in housing and income security. For 
example, the low-rental housing policy for poor homeless households improved the MSLS 
payment level and expanded the health insurance coverage rate to reach nearly the entire 
Chinese population. In recent years, the price of housing has risen dramatically, especially in 
the major cities. According to the BBC (2013b), prices for new homes have risen in 69 of 
China’s 70 major cities, and more and more people are unable to afford housing, especially 
poorer people, the elderly and young people. In the past five years, in cities such as Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, the price of housing has risen by a monthly average of 1.4% 
(XinHua News, 2013). According to the ILO (2004, p.82), 29.3% of Chinese households had 
insufficient income to afford basic housing in 2002, which equates to around 390 million 
people suffering from housing problems. Comparatively, India has a similar population to 
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China and similarly limited resources. Nevertheless, although the living conditions that they 
experience are unsatisfactory, poor homeless citizens and rural migrants can at least find 
places to live in slum areas in urban centres such as New Delhi.  
 
In contrast, poor homeless people in China are unable to find such places in urban areas 
because the government does not allow the growth of slums, and any attempt to build shanty 
towns in municipal areas is quickly prevented by the government. For example, during field 
research in Beijing for this study in 2012, there was no sign of slum housing in central areas 
of the city (unlike in New Delhi). This does not mean, however, that there are no poor 
homeless people in Beijing, and it is clear that not everyone has access to housing and income 
benefit. A shocking example of housing and income insecurity was recently reported in the 
Chinese media. In December 2013, news reports revealed the story of a homeless man who 
had been identified by Beijing authorities as living in a utility well for a decade. The man, Mr 
W, was quoted as saying that he came from a rural area and as he could not afford the rent in 
Beijing, he moved into the well (Zhang and Li, 2013). Although this man received support 
from the local government after the media exposed his case, there are many people like him 
suffering from housing pressures in China. However, many of those suffering most from 
housing insecurity are in effect ‘invisible’ to city authorities. For instance, the lack of slum 
housing in central Beijing is due to the city authority’s order outlawing slum development. 
Nevertheless, entire colonies of slum housing can be found at the city’s margins, but these 
areas are regarded not as part of the city, but as ‘city villages’. Since many poor homeless 
people, especially rural migrants, are unable to find places to live in urban Beijing, they are 
compelled to seek some form of housing outside the area restricting slum development.  
 
The social policies that have been introduced in China to deal with housing security have 
been designed for poor homeless people. The LRH scheme aims to provide accommodation 
to poor homeless urban families at significantly discounted rents. This housing welfare 
system replaced the pre-1990s free-allocation housing system, which was prohibitively 
expensive, since it allowed an apartment to be allocated permanently to a person or a family. 
To reduce the costs of its social housing policy, the government designed the new LRH 
system from the outset as a housing welfare policy to provide a short-term residence for an 
individual or family. The recipients of LRH cannot buy the house they are allocated, and the 
LRH security policy involves a non-permanent system of occupation whereby once LRH 
recipients have the ability to secure housing via the open market, they have to vacate the low-
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rent housing, which is then given to the next people in the housing queue. In one sense, the 
system is similar to a long-term stay hotel apartment.  
 
In an effort to guarantee that the system is not open to abuse, the LRH policy sets out 
conditions that make it difficult for people to obtain LRH assistance. Currently, according to 
Feng (2007, p.1), the LRH project requires applicants to meet five major conditions 
concurrently.  
  
1. The family’s income must match the local LRH policy’s minimum income conditions. 
2. The family’s per capita living floor space has to meet the local low-rent housing 
policy’s floor space standard. 
3. At least one member of the applicant’s family must be registered as being a non-rural 
area resident. 
4. The applicant must be responsible for the statutory maintenance, support or custody of 
other family members. 
5. The family has to meet all other local government eligibility requirements for LRH. 
 
While these requirements are meant to guarantee that the government allocates LRH only to 
those who are in real need, the conditions are so stringent that many people do not meet them. 
Furthermore, since the five requirements focus on personal details such as income and living 
space, this tends to lead to a similar problem to that encountered with the MSLS in that the 
government has difficulty in determining people’s real income and housing situation. In 
practice, an LRH applicant’s income level is largely determined by their eligibility for MSLS, 
and since the local government normally requires that they provide a valid MSLS certificate, 
the majority of LRH beneficiaries are also MSLS recipients. However, because the LRH 
facilities are much sought after, the local government must assess the applicants even more 
stringently than for the MSLS. One interviewee, Ms X, the Deputy-District Mayor in 
Tangshan, states that:  
 
“Recipients first have to meet the MSLS requirements, the applicants have to continue to 
receive MSLS benefits for more than 6 months and then they might have the chance to 
receive LRH support.”  
 
The additional local government requirements (no. 5 in the list above) might be varied, but 
these have certainly increased difficulties in getting LRH benefits. Because condition 5 has 
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given a lot of rights to local authorities, and also the identification of income is very much 
reliant on MSLS. As discussed, the local authority does not formally implement the MSLS 
policy for every citizen. Therefore, LRH has also not been formally implemented, as the local 
authority still has the ability to use much of their discretion in the process of implementing 
LRH.  
  
It should be remembered that the social security policy aims of the MSLS and the LRH are 
actually quite different. However, if the receipt of support under the MSLS is used as an 
essential condition for LRH eligibility, then the LRH will ultimately benefit only those who 
currently benefit from the MSLS. Unfortunately, it appears that the LRH scheme may actually 
have been operating in this way. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the majority of people in 
protected housing (see blue bars) are in their 40s and 50s, suggesting that the LRH scheme is 
mainly targeted towards a particular group, with the rest of the population unable to access 
housing protection. Therefore, relying on the MSLS to identify applicants’ income is likely to 
concentrate LRH in the hands of those in receipt of MSLS support, and the stringent 
eligibility conditions that have been set for the LRH scheme might in fact be the wrong way 
forward. While local government should regard the MSLS as an important element in 
determining eligibility for LRH, they should not conflate the two policies.  
 
The LRH scheme is also limited by the household registration system. The third condition for 
LRH eligibility states that there must be at least one person in the applicant’s family who is an 
urban resident. The main reason for the imposition of this condition is probably China’s large 
population: it is likely that there are too many people in need of such housing support, and the 
government simply cannot afford to meet all their needs. Certainly, the urbanisation process 
in China has increased housing problems significantly in urban areas, and limited housing 
resources and high prices have become a feature of Chinese urban life. As Chapter 7 shows, 
there has been massive migration of rural workers to urban areas in recent years, placing 
further strain on limited resources. In its current form, the LRH system fundamentally ignores 
the needs of these migrant workers. To solve urban housing problems in contemporary China, 
the LRH system will need to consider the needs not only of urban residents, but also of rural 
migrants who are living in urban areas. 
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Figure 8.1. Number of people obtaining housing support by age group 
 
In addition, the terms of condition five are not clearly defined. In effect, the power to make 
decisions on the specific terms of LRH policy has been passed to lower levels of government 
as local government has the right to add other conditions to the criteria for LRH eligibility. 
This has increased the difficulty of participating in the LRH scheme. When the problems 
raised by this condition are coupled with the limitations imposed by China’s household 
registration system, the LRH system as it currently stands is in fact a targeted type of social 
welfare provision. Although millions of low-rent houses have been built, the LRH scheme 
currently targets people among the registered urban population who are extremely poor, 
elderly or disabled and who are without a home. It can therefore be seen as a means of 
addressing the housing problems of a particular group of people already resident in urban 
areas. This is a little similar to the way MSLS is implemented. As discussed in Section 8.5, 
only certain target groups can obtain such benefits.  
 
Despite the specific targeting of elderly and disabled people under the LRH scheme, nearly all 
of the low rental houses are located in isolated areas on the edges of the city. For the 
recipients of LRH, this is a thoroughly inconvenient arrangement, especially given that the 
lack of accessible public transport services means that it is difficult for such residents to travel 
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to other city areas. In turn, the geographical isolation of the LRH areas from other city areas 
leads to social isolation for the residents. Moreover, the policy of placing relatively poor 
families together in particular areas that are generally located far from public services and 
workplaces might mean that the LRH areas ultimately become perceived as slum or ghetto 
areas. At present, this policy is effective for the very poor but not for others on a low income. 
In addition, rural migrants are not eligible, as LRH is only available for local residents, so that 
migrant workers have to go back to their hometown to apply. If the LRH scheme is to solve 
housing problems, then extra care must be taken by the policy makers and planners to ensure 
that such problems do not manifest themselves.  
 
Public housing policies for those on low incomes in Western countries are much more 
effective than current Chinese policy, in that nearly all low-income people are eligible for low 
rental housing subsidies. However, given China’s population and the high rate of labour-
market informality, the current LRH system could not hope to provide such housing security 
for all of the low-income population. Nevertheless, although it is clear that the LRH system 
has produced some benefits for a particular group of urban residents, it could surely make a 
greater contribution to housing security for more of the population. Fortunately, changes are 
slowly being made in order to address this issue. The government has started to consider 
bringing members of what might be termed a ‘sandwich class’ (the middle-low income group) 
into the scope of the project. The revised goal of the LRH system is to solve the housing 
problems of the poorest homeless people first and then gradually extend its coverage to more 
groups of people. For example, for much of the last decade in Zhejiang province, the LRH 
system only benefitted those people with an income equivalent to the MSLS income rate. 
Fortunately, since 2006, the housing security (LRH) coverage rate has been extended to cover 
people who earn more than 120% of the MSLS standard rate (Feng, 2007, p.1). 
 
Comparing the Chinese LRH system with low rent housing policies in other countries, the 
policy employed in the USA offers greater flexibility for tenants than in China. Low rent 
tenants can choose to live in privately rented houses and are free to select their location from 
the available housing market. Indeed, such low rent tenants in America tend to be 
concentrated in central areas, while more affluent residents tend to be located in the suburbs 
(Zenou, 2012, p.398). The greater flexibility afforded under the US model means that the 
special needs of elderly and disabled people are more likely to be met and that LRH recipients 
are less likely to suffer social isolation. Public housing provision in France is similar to that in 
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the USA. It provides housing subsidies to the low-income homeless population, but over 65% 
of French households were eligible for public housing services in 2005 (Laferrere and Le 
Blanc, 2006, p.162). However, public housing policies in Western countries are not without 
faults. In Europe, the number of deprived areas has increased over time, social isolation 
remains an issue, and there has been the emergence of largely segregated areas in which 
mainly immigrant populations reside separately from the wider population (Bisin et al, 2011). 
Zenou (2012) also states that poor families in Europe and the USA are often placed in areas 
that are sited far away from their workplaces and services. These areas eventually become 
depressed, suffering from poor quality public services, high unemployment rates and high 
levels of crime. Therefore, in developing future public housing policy, China needs to draw 
on the lessons, both positive and negative, that have emerged from the Western experience.  
8.7	  Conclusion	  	  
 
This chapter discusses the current state of labour-market informality in China. A number of 
issues and problems related to an increased level of informality are explored on the basis of 
the income and housing security system in China, and some of the challenges faced by the 
Chinese government have been examined. The discussion of informality in this chapter 
approaches the subject from two directions. The first direction follows the traditional 
definition of informality in which the concern is the lack of contracts and social protection for 
the labour force; the second looks at informality from the perspective of how the state works, 
an approach that differs from Esping-Andersen’s treatment of the subject. The chapter 
discusses how the Chinese social welfare state is developing within a neo-liberalist context 
and how informality as a whole tends to be greater in China than in its European counterparts. 
It occurs in all areas, including the job market, the payment of wages and the way in which 
social security policies are implemented. Informality also affects state policy, rather than state 
policy alone shaping society. In addition, the chapter points out how the increasing degree of 
informality has been propelled both by the migration of rural workers to the cities and by 
local authorities’ use of discretionary powers. Finally, this chapter sets out the argument that 
China’s welfare state is developing in such a way that it is creating new forms of stratification 
rather than reducing them.  
 
From the analysis of income and housing security policies conducted thus far, it can be seen 
that both policies have some things in common. First, both the MSLS and the LRH 
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programmes were formulated by central government, which retains overall control of both 
schemes. However, decentralisation has given the local provincial level and lower levels of 
government the power to adapt the social security policies to suit local circumstances. The 
central government still retains authority, but provides a necessary space for local government 
innovation and development in terms of the social security system (XinHuaNet, 2013). 
Therefore, China has a unique policy environment in that all levels of government are both 
policy makers and policy implementers. In view of the fact that China’s economic 
development differs considerably from region to region, it might be assumed that this 
decentralised system could provide an efficient means of allocating resources to meet specific 
local requirements. In practice, however, as local governments generally try to save money in 
order to improve their GDP figures, many social security support standards have been set too 
low to satisfy people’s needs. Therefore, to enable the efficient allocation of resources in local 
areas, the central government might consider setting minimum national standards for social 
security policies so as to prevent local governments from setting lower support standards than 
are needed at both the local and national levels.  
 
China’s current labour regulation system does not provide for efficient oversight of the 
informal labour market, and the government therefore needs to upgrade the current regulation 
system so it can provide more oversight of the informal labour market in a legally enforceable 
way. Such a system would reduce the informal job market by forcing firms to abide by legal 
regulations. It would be a universal type of system insofar as it would apply to the entire 
population and protect each citizen’s basic rights. Clearly, social policy reform is needed to 
bring the massive number of informal workers in China under the social protection umbrella. 
As it currently stands, almost none of the social security protection offered in China covers 
informal workers. As discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, although the MSLS is the major 
policy for income security, it fails to provide local minimum income support for rural 
migrants because of the existence of the household registration system. As rural migrants 
comprise the main labour force in China, and since the majority of informal workers are rural 
migrants, any effort to provide social security for informal workers has to consider the 
situation of rural migrants. China is a large developing country with a huge population, and 
the government needs to decide the social security policies that will be implemented to 
address the issues faced by informal workers. This requires direct government intervention; 
the markets will not and cannot provide social security for informal workers, especially given 
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that the effects of informalisation have been largely negative for informal workers, who have 
had to endure greater insecurity, lower wages and less legal protection. 
 
The informal labour market that has become a common feature of modern China’s economic 
system is regarded as an important component of economic growth, allowing firms to conduct 
business with low overheads due to low wage rates and low tax contributions. A range of 
studies (Yamada, 1996; Henley and Carneiro, 2009; Yuki, 2007; Ulyssea, 2010) have found 
that informal workers are generally treated as being outside the country’s tax, regulatory and 
social security contribution systems. One concern about the informal sector in the labour 
market is that informality has led to a business and political preference for illegal employment 
relationships, with workers increasingly experiencing income, employment and social 
insecurity. In short, the more that informality occurs, the more likely workers are to 
experience insecurity.  
  
238	  	  
Chapter 9 - Thesis Conclusion  
9.0	  Introduction	  	  
 
This chapter summarises the findings and evaluations from the previous chapters, including 
the literature reviews in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and the analysis presented in Chapters 5 to 8. 
The findings and discussions focus on the research question presented in Chapter 1 and the 
sub-questions around it. This thesis examined the characteristics of recent social security 
system reforms in China by exploring the developments in both the social and economic 
systems from a historical perspective. It has argued that social security should not merely aim 
to prevent and alleviate poverty, but should take into account a wider perspective that accepts 
that all citizens, not only those who are poor, need a certain degree of security. In practice, 
however, not every citizen is able to enjoy his or her social rights: rural migrants cannot apply 
for local urban income or housing support, and middle-class people might be deemed 
ineligible for MSLS support simply because there is an air-conditioner or another relatively 
inexpensive consumer item in their house.  
  
The analysis of the Chinese social security system, administrative capacity, social security 
levels and the Tangshan case study reveals that inequality in social security provision between 
rural and urban areas is directly related to the prevailing household registration system. In 
addition, the high degree of informality in the design and delivery of social security 
(discussed in Chapters 6–8) at the local government level in China has affected both the 
system’s social function and its performance. Under such a system, social security policies 
cannot efficiently provide services that guarantee people a secure standard of living. Thus, the 
existing security system fails to deliver an effective social welfare system, has a negative 
influence on policy implementation and service delivery, and falls significantly short of 
achieving the goal of social reform. 
 
As in many developing countries and emerging economies, China is evaluating how to reform 
its social security system so that it can provide health protection, basic income security and 
housing provision for its citizens without greatly disturbing its rate of economic growth. 
However, this focus on economic growth as the central goal of government means that since 
the 1980s the state has consistently failed to appreciate fully the social risks that have 
emerged as a result of rapid economic development. In China, policies that once guaranteed 
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employment, food support, means-tested housing allocation and health support have been 
consigned to history, with income and housing provisions becoming increasingly marketised. 
The result has been economic insecurity due to increasing social and economic hazards, risks 
and uncertainties.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 9.1 reviews the research contribution; Section 
9.2 summarises discussions around answering the main research question on how neo-
liberalism has influenced the Chinese welfare system as well as examining some of the sub-
questions; Section 9.3 provides some indication of what kind of model is developing in China; 
Section 9.4 looks at some of the policy implications of the main arguments in the thesis and 
provides suggestions for further study; Section 9.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
9.1	  	  Main	  findings	  and	  research	  contributions	  	  
 
In expanding upon the main findings outlined in the introduction above, the overall findings 
of this study can be summarised as follows: 
1. Inequality in social security provision between rural and urban areas is directly related to the 
prevailing household registration system  
2. The influence of China’s integration into the globalised market has shifted Chinese society 
from state-maintained economic security to labour-market and employment insecurity. 
3. Informality both in the labour market and in social welfare implementation and provision is 
prevalent in China. 
4. Social welfare provision levels are set at rates that fail to guarantee income security. 
5. The decentralised nature of welfare administration and provision in China has had a 
significant impact on the quality of welfare provision.  
6. Deregulation of the economy has had a knock-on effect on the administration of welfare 
provision, both at the national and the local level. 
7. The economic growth that led to mass rural-urban migration has raised particular economic 
security and welfare problems for migrant workers. 
 
The main research contributions of the thesis are as follows. Firstly, the empirical research for 
this study employed extensive fieldwork to collect primary data for analysis, firmly grounding 
the study in the reality of the situation on the ground in contemporary China and thus 
providing the basis for its contributions to current research on welfare and economic security 
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issues in China. The influence of China’s integration into the globalised market has shifted 
Chinese society from state-maintained economic security to labour-market and employment 
insecurity. By using Tangshan city as a case study, the aim was to present a picture that is 
much more representative of the actual social security policy situation in China. In contrast to 
this study, much of the current research on China is based on studies of developed areas such 
as major cities like Beijing or Shanghai, to which the state has paid greater attention in terms 
of developmental practices. For example, the ILO measured economic security in China but 
mainly used data from the state level, with most of this data being collected from official 
sources in Beijing, such as the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, and the Ford Foundation (ILO, 2004, p.392). However, the 
policy practices found in secondary cities in China are much more representative of the 
national picture, as the majority of cities in China are unlike the highly developed 
metropolises of Beijing and Shanghai, whose economic development is much faster than is 
the case in other places. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapters 6–8, local government 
contributes a great deal to the social fund both financially and in terms of administration and 
is empowered to amend social policies as regards payment rates or which groups are targeted. 
As cities like Beijing and Shanghai can provide better support than secondary cities due to 
their greater administrative capacities and stronger financial position, the economic and social 
policies adopted in these highly developed major cities are not representative of the wider 
picture in China. The authorities in these major cities are also in a unique position in having 
higher autonomy and greater control over the areas under their jurisdiction. As more Chinese 
people live in secondary-level cities than in the metropolises of Beijing and Shanghai, the 
focus of this thesis on policy implementation at the local level in a secondary city marks a 
shift away from the examination of welfare development in the most developed areas of 
China and towards investigation of arguably the more typical situation for low and lower-
middle income earners in China. This study’s investigation of the actual living conditions and 
experiences of 150 low income, lower-middle income and rural migrants (50 participants in 
each group) in Tangshan has served to shed light on how these local Chinese residents feel 
about their living security. 
 
This study therefore makes an important contribution to the study of welfare policy 
development and implementation in China. By employing both primary data in the form of 
interviews and a questionnaire and secondary data taken from official documents, the study’s 
investigation of actual events on the ground in a secondary-level city extends the depth of 
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knowledge about the contemporary welfare state in China and reveals the views of both those 
implementing policy and those on the receiving end of policy implementation. Furthermore, 
by using multi-level and triangulation methodology, the study expands its panorama to look at 
the economic security issues on three different levels: the national level, the government level 
and the recipient level.  
 
Secondly, the study has contributed to the wider academic discourse in the areas of social 
welfare and economic security. While many studies have drawn upon the welfare state 
typology set out in Esping-Andersen (1990), his analysis is based on formal economic and 
social systems that do not exist in the Chinese context. Given this, it is unreasonable to apply 
Western welfare theories wholly and directly to China. Esping-Andersen’s theories of 
decommodification and stratification are very important issues for social development and 
that social rights carry with them economic and social statuses is a crucial point here. 
However, the high degree of informality that exists in China is very likely to undermine the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy solutions tailored to Western countries. Informality 
itself has institutional characteristics and these also shape and interact with state policy. This 
research shows the need to acknowledge and examine the important effect of informal 
economies on the shaping of welfare systems; this goes beyond China, as informality or at 
least legalised precariousness has become more mainstream. 
 
The research has also introduced and expanded upon a new dimension for the classification of 
welfare states: ‘order or fragmentation’ (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). Ringen and Ngok found 
that China is learning towards a conservative model, but China cannot be readily classified as 
a traditional welfare state, a socialist state or a developmental state. They assert that China is 
providing security but only at a minimal level, and the social management and 
implementation by the state is arbitrary and poor in quality. In addition, migrant and informal 
workers are being denied the rights defined in the current social security system. Drawing on 
the findings of Ringen and Ngok, this thesis has further explored the conditions facing 
previously under-researched social groups.  
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9.2	  How	  far	  does	  neo-­‐liberal	  ideology	  influence	  the	  Chinese	  welfare	  system?	  
 
Critics of the neo-liberal model contend that it has led to increased insecurity for many people 
(Standing, 2004, 2008, 2011, Chang, 2007, 2010; ILO, 2004). A deregulated, free market 
system has effects on the welfare system and the labour market. This thesis has sought to 
examine how neo-liberalism affects social policy design, implementation and the labour 
market in China in more detail.  
  
The Chinese welfare system has also has been influenced by neo-liberalisation. Welfare 
provision by the state has reduced dramatically due to the increasing adoption of a form of 
neo-liberal ideology that has pervaded both the economic sphere and the state’s thinking on 
the social welfare system. Prior to economic reform in 1978, the state universally guaranteed 
employment, housing provision and food coupons to the urban labour force. Rural residents 
were allocated land from the state, based on collective ownership of land, which the farmers 
could use to grow food for themselves. In addition, poor rural residents were also covered for 
basic needs, such as food and clothes, by the state. Without considering the political and 
economic issues, this welfare system provided a high level of economic security, and the 
welfare system was highly regulated by the state. After the introduction of economic reforms, 
however, the Chinese economy embarked on the road towards a market economy. In parallel, 
the high level of state integrated economic security was slowly dissolved, and the provision of 
economic security through universal guaranteed access to employment and housing provision 
was discontinued. Guaranteed jobs were replaced with a market contract system. From the 
research findings, it appears that the impact of deregulation on the welfare system and labour 
market has been significant. In Chapter 8, this was discussed in depth in terms of the degree 
of informality prevalent in the both the labour market and the welfare system.  
 
Informality can be seen as an important factor in the neo-liberalisation process in China and 
the effect that this has had on economic security. After the introduction of economic reforms, 
the large gap in income inequality between both China’s inland and coastal areas and rural 
and urban areas drove workers from the west of China to move to the east-coast area and 
workers from rural villages to urban centres. This has resulted in a large labour surplus in the 
urban labour market. As discussed in Chapter 3, the combination of the high level of surplus 
labour and the deregulated labour market has generated great employment insecurity. In the 
absence of concerns about potential labour shortages, employers now feel free to pay lower 
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wage rates and provide less social insurance (or none whatsoever) to employees. Due to 
migrant workers needing to find work as soon as possible in order to enable them to continue 
living in their new urban areas, they are often willing to take any job offered. This has further 
increased the degree of labour-market informality, and the government faces considerable 
difficulties in monitoring statistics about informal jobs, especially as regards income rates. 
The government also faces difficulty in implementing policies within the existing legislation 
and also there is an absence of sufficient legislation in China. Moreover, informal employees 
do not contribute to social insurance schemes. As a result, the current design of targeted social 
policies does not respond well to the realities faced by workers in the informal sector. In 
addition, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, informality exists not only in the labour market, 
but also in the way government institutions provide services. From this study’s findings in 
Tangshan City, the local authority turns a blind eye to the informal sector. It allows the 
existence of informal workers within the local labour market in order to solve employment 
problems and increase the local economic growth rate. 
 
The findings show that it is also often the case that recipients of social support do not get 
what they deserve or are entitled to receive; for example, the local government might not pay 
MSLS recipients the payment for which they are eligible or payments may not be made on 
time. This situation on the ground in China today has been largely ignored by the literature on 
China’s implementation of social security policies. Contemporary Chinese economic reforms 
have failed to address the imbalances in formal/informal employment in the labour market. 
Due to the high degree of informality that has prevailed during China’s economic 
development, the monitoring system for social security policy implementation and delivery is 
neither efficient nor effective in secondary cities like Tangshan. The findings of the study 
suggest that local government has failed to take enough responsibility for implementing social 
policies in a way that guarantees that the needs of those whom the policies are intended to 
support are met. It appears, therefore, that neo-liberalism has had a great deal of influence on 
economic security in China. Its impact has been not only on the economic and social system 
and the labour market, but also on the way in which government institutions have evolved in 
combination with policies, as evidenced by the shift towards a more informal system of 
implementation. 
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9.3	  What	  kind	  of	  model	  is	  developing	  in	  China?	  
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) asserts that the issues of decommodification and stratification are 
central to the development of an effective welfare system. If China is to achieve a level of 
social development consistent with its position as an economic powerhouse, a renewed focus 
on comparable development in both the economic and social arenas could help to bring 
security to the Chinese masses. Certainly, it seems clear that bias towards one side of the 
economic-social development equation is unlikely to provide an optimal solution to the 
development issues that China faces in the 21st century. As things stand, the informal sector 
is firmly established in China and current social security programmes fail to provide the 
necessary protections to those employed in this sector. As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, there 
is a huge population of rural migrants who fall into the informal sector and who are not 
covered by current social policies. As a result, Chinese social policy is creating new forms of 
stratification, with rural migrants perhaps most affected due to their lack of protection under 
the current social security system. The household registration system, the design of targeted 
policies that afford no coverage to rural migrant workers and the high inequality between the 
levels of benefits paid to urban and rural residents all contribute to the difficulties faced by 
informal workers. As a direct result of these policies, almost none of the social security 
protections offered in China covers informal workers. Of particular note, and as discussed in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, although the MSLS is China’s main policy for income security, it 
fails to provide local minimum income support for rural migrants because of the existence of 
the household registration system. As rural migrants comprise the main labour force in China, 
and since the majority of informal workers are rural migrants, any effort to provide social 
security for informal workers has to consider the situation of rural migrants.  
 
As stated in Chapter 8, while the informal sector has been regarded by economic policy 
makers as a way to improve performance in the market economy, the impact of informal 
employment on social development has been ignored by social policy makers. In other words, 
the growth of the informal sector has led to the rise of significant economic security issues, 
issues that have not yet been considered by social policy makers. Part of the reason for the 
failure to consider these issues are the lack of administrative capacity and the government 
turning a blind eye to these activities. Ms B (a civil servant from the Ministry of Civil Affairs) 
stated in her interview that the government encourages informal sector employment as part of 
its economic growth programme, and has done so for a long time, perhaps since the initial 
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economic reforms in 1978. It appears, therefore, that, for a long time, the state has not taken 
the economic insecurity and social issues related to informal work seriously. In recent years, 
however, the problems associated with the informal sector have drawn increasing attention 
from the media and academics. As a huge country, China clearly needs time to respond to this 
major problem, but the lack of administrative capacity and the fact that the tax system is not 
well developed means that it is currently very difficult for the Chinese state to access 
information on an individual’s circumstances. Therefore, it is difficult to see how informal 
workers could be afforded security coverage immediately. However, it appears that China 
might be starting to address this situation. The announcement of the new social security law 
could be a sign that the state is starting to bring the labour market under the regulative 
umbrella of the legislative system. Nevertheless, it will still take considerable time to improve 
and regulate the labour market.  
 
There have also been some positive changes to rural resident benefits, such as health care 
insurance being universalised to cover almost all the population. In addition, in Tangshan, 
rural residents now have similar pension insurance benefits to urban residents in the city. 
These examples denote some of the improvements made to the economic security system. 
However, the social payment rate remains at a minimal level, one that cannot fully guarantee 
people’s income security. Thus, while China’s social welfare protection policies might seem 
to be moving towards a model combining decommodification and stratification, the reality 
might not be so straightforward. Certainly, the Chinese government at all levels needs to take 
on more responsibility for the protection of rural migrant workers, particularly in regulating 
the informal labour market. 
 
The huge numbers of rural economic migrants to the cities are also a problem as they place 
increasing pressure on the limited funding available for social security payments. As China’s 
social security policy situation currently stands, if the Chinese population were to remain in 
its place of birth, then the government’s social security policies could possibly succeed. 
However, the fact that people, and especially poor rural workers, tend to relocate in search of 
economic opportunities means that millions of Chinese people have migrated to areas with 
greater employment opportunities, which has raised barriers to the success of the current 
social policies. As discussed in Chapter 6, this problem is not new, but it has finally begun to 
draw the attention of the state. For example, the state is starting to consider making changes 
to the household registration system. In Tangshan, for instance, a new pension policy that 
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merges the pension benefits of local rural residents and local urban residents is being piloted. 
This pilot programme might be a sign of the start of change. However, for the country as a 
whole and in other areas of social policy, the household registration system remains a 
significant barrier to addressing economic insecurity.  
 
As regards the social security situation in emerging markets, this thesis has proposed a new 
solution – the asymmetric protectionism principle – that could improve the social protections 
for citizens in developing nations. Under such a proposal, central state government would put 
in place a guaranteed minimum level of universal protection (which would provide the same 
amount of basic support in all geographical areas) and would compel local authorities to set 
their own conditions so as to meet the national standard. It is believed that this approach could 
provide a strategy to support the development of welfare protections in developing countries 
in the face of the inequalities of market competition. In general, asymmetric protection would 
combine universal and targeted social protections: everyone would be eligible to receive some 
form of protection, but benefit levels would differ depending on the recipient’s income level 
and the cost of living of the area. In China, economic growth has clearly benefited certain 
groups over others, and targeted policies to reduce poverty levels should be designed and 
implemented. Alongside more heavily targeted programmes of support, a social security 
system that applies equally to all citizens in the same situation should be developed so that 
everyone has the right to obtain support if required. This more universal type of social 
security system would provide protection for every citizen, and indeed some steps have 
already been taken in this direction both in China and in other countries. Chapters 5 and 8 
looked at the model used in Brazil, where the tax fund contribution to the unemployment 
insurance system covers every citizen from formal to informal employment sectors and rural 
to urban areas. However, it still does not cover non-contributors and so is not strictly fully 
universal. Nevertheless, it has wide coverage because the design of the scheme allows quite 
precarious categories of workers to contribute.  
 
In response to the challenges arising from the introduction of neo-liberal economic reforms in 
China, new forms of income and housing support have been introduced to provide protections. 
For instance, the Minimum Standard of Living Scheme (MSLS) has the potential to secure 
every citizen’s living security, and low-rent housing (LRH) could provide housing security to 
those without a place to live. However, Cook et al. (2003, p. 71) argue that while these 
policies are welcome, the social policy reforms that China has undertaken indicate that its 
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welfare regime is geared towards short-term relief rather than the reduction of long-term 
poverty.  
 
Cook et al.’s argument might initially appear persuasive. However, an examination of the 
extent to which long-term elements are integrated into Chinese social policies, the way in 
which long-term elements combine with short-term elements and the manner in which 
different social policies work in combination reveals a clearer picture of the nature of China’s 
social welfare system. This picture reveals that the situation is more complex in China. Firstly, 
the long-standing household registration system that has been applied in China has led to the 
separation of Chinese residents into two distinct groups in many policy areas, as evidenced by 
their unequal access to social benefits, payment levels and eligibility for social support. 
Secondly, the high degree of informality in China (both in the labour market and in policy 
implementation) has affected all policy areas. In particular, the implementation of social 
policies in an unsystematic manner has resulted in threats to recipients’ economic security. 
Nevertheless, as regards the policies explored in this thesis, it can be seen that while the LRH 
might be a short-term solution to address housing insecurity, the MSLS does provide a long-
term basic solution to people’s social security. It appears, therefore, that while Cook et al.’s 
argument holds in part, it neglects China’s attempts to build a combination of short-term and 
long-term protection and is thus not entirely accurate. 
 
This thesis has shown that although China’s current social policies are capable in theory of 
providing a basic level of social security, there are real barriers to their success. The most 
significant barriers are the household registration system, the high degree of informalisation 
in the labour market, the unduly strict conditions on eligibility for housing and income 
support, and the informal implementation of policy and discretionary behaviour on the part of 
officials. These barriers have a considerable effect on people’s access to social welfare. The 
current form of welfare model being used in China therefore does not fit neatly into existing 
welfare state categorisations and thus warrants a name of its own. Its particular characteristics 
mean that it might be termed a ‘decentralised socialist-market liberal-conservative welfare 
model’ of social development, where social welfare support is emerging with economic 
activities. It contains a high level of decentralisation and a high degree of informality. This 
descriptive term is based on a modified use of Esping-Andersen’s conceptualisation of three 
types of welfare state regime – liberal, conservative and social democratic – and Ringen and 
Ngok’s (2013) assertion that China is a fragmented liberal-conservative hybrid model. This 
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new term to describe the welfare model in China is grounded in the findings from my 
empirical research and my analysis of Chinese social policy design and implementation as it 
occurs in practice, with local government having certain powers to modify social policies and 
implementing policies in an informal way. 
 
9.4	  Suggestions	  and	  policy	  recommendations	  
 
In recent years, Chinese government policies have shifted dramatically from being aimed 
solely at economic development to encouraging and being more supportive of social security, 
and there is little doubt that the actual situation as regards living security has slowly improved. 
Nevertheless, it will still take considerable time for the government to change the current 
situation fundamentally and provide a secure environment for citizens with regard to the 
labour market, income and housing.  
 
Ultimately, social policy reflects the ideology of the government in power. For example, it is 
highly likely that a government that vigorously supports a free-market housing policy will 
limit its level of support to the social housing sector. Where significant social problems exist, 
however, the government needs to intervene more actively in the market and provide greater 
support to those facing housing, income or labour-market insecurity. Throughout China’s 
period of economic growth, however, there has been reluctance on the part of the Chinese 
state to intervene in market mechanisms. While the state’s political power in China has 
remained strong, its intervention in labour market regulation has reduced significantly 
compared with the case thirty years ago. New strategies are needed in order to deal with 
current hazards, risks and uncertainties, such as those due to informality, social housing 
shortages, low-income support rates and the problems facing rural migrants.  
 
Throughout this thesis, two separate but interrelated issues affecting the development and 
provision of social welfare in China have been discussed: firstly, social payment rates are set 
at a minimal level that is insufficient to support secure living standards; secondly, there is a 
high degree of labour-market informality, and the wages of informal workers are themselves 
insecure, often being delayed or going unpaid. Suggestions and policy recommendations to 
address these issues are set out below.  
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From the analysis of income and housing security policies conducted in this thesis, it can be 
seen that both policies have some things in common. First, both the MSLS and the LRH 
programme were formulated by central government, which retains overall control of both 
schemes. However, decentralisation has given the provincial level and lower levels of 
government the power to adapt these social security policies to suit local circumstances. The 
central government still retains overall authority, but there is space for local government 
innovation and development of the social security system (Xin Hua Net, 2013). Therefore, 
China has a unique policy environment in that all levels of government are both policy 
makers and policy implementers. In view of the fact that China’s economic development 
differs considerably from region to region, it might be assumed that this decentralised system 
could provide an efficient means of allocating resources to meet specific local requirements. 
As this research has shown, however, local social security standards have been set too low to 
actually meet people’s needs. The low support rates are primarily due to China’s lack of 
national minimum benefit standards and the fact that much of the power to implement policy 
and set standards is delegated to lower levels of government. This decentralisation of control 
over the implementation of social security policy has ultimately meant that local government 
has an incentive to reduce social costs in order to increase economic and business investment. 
This gives a boost to local and regional GDP figures. As a politically centralised country, 
local government is required to follow the central government’s lead, and the prioritisation of 
positive GDP figures by local and regional government is in tune with the government’s 
primary national policy of economic development and economic growth (Li, 2010, p.6). In 
line with central government goals, local government in Tangshan has therefore put 
considerable effort into economic growth rather than social support. Due to having the power 
to set the local social payment rate, the duration of the benefit payments and the method of 
implementation, local officials have considerable flexibility in implementing social policies. 
However, this has resulted in some people facing dangerous levels of income insecurity. For 
instance, as seen in Chapter 7, many recipients complained that their MSLS benefits had been 
delayed for a long period (half a year or one year) or the services obtained from local officials 
were of very poor quality. 
 
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, local government has implemented the MSLS to target only 
extremely poor citizens, such as disabled and elderly people who cannot work. The findings 
show, however, that even then local officials are not always making the MSLS payment on 
time. In the answers to the questionnaires, over 90% of participants receiving MSLS and LRH 
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benefits stated that they had experienced delayed payment or bad service from local 
government. None of the participants had received an official answer as to why the payment 
was delayed. Indeed, it proved very difficult during the research to obtain any official 
evidence (for example, official reports) on why payments were being delayed. Upon 
reflection, however, a possible three-part explanation emerges. Firstly, as noted above, local 
officials are putting more effort into economic growth. Secondly, there is insufficient money 
to provide MSLS and LRH benefits. Thirdly, both the informal implementation of the MSLS 
and the lack of administrative capacity to update information quickly and monitor individual 
income or MSLS status are contributing to this problem. This lack of administrative capacity 
means that some people receive double MSLS payments or continue to enjoy MSLS benefits 
even though their income is above the minimum support level. Thus, people who do not 
necessarily qualify for the MSLS are given MSLS money from the local government fund, 
while other recipients who need the money cannot get a payment or are delayed for months. 
 
It seems clear, then, that deregulation within the system of social security implementation has 
gone too far and is in practice reducing the effectiveness of social welfare provisions. To 
address this issue, the central government should assume greater responsibility for ensuring 
that benefit rates more accurately reflect the real needs of citizens. To do so and to ensure the 
efficient allocation of resources at the local level, the central government should consider 
establishing a national level of support and should formulate much more detailed rules on 
policy implementation to replace the current vague guidelines. Local levels of government 
should not be absolved from responsibility to improve the situation for benefit recipients, and 
all levels of local government should be encouraged to assume greater responsibility for 
ensuring that the needs of citizens are met. In particular, the findings from the fieldwork in 
Tangshan suggest that local government needs to take immediate steps to ensure that the basic 
living allowances for extremely poor citizens under the MSLS programme and other forms of 
support are paid in full and on time.  
 
China’s transition to a market economy has made the issues of informal labour, rural-urban 
migration and unemployment the top labour problems facing the country. The enormous 
numbers of informal workers in China have come to represent a significant total of the 
population in cities, and the government needs to decide the policies that will be implemented 
to address the issues faced by informal workers given that the effects of informalisation have 
been largely negative for informal workers, who have had to endure greater insecurity, lower 
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wages and less legal protection. This requires direct government intervention; the markets 
will not and cannot provide employment protection and social security for informal workers. 
To a certain extent, informality is by definition insecure, and the Chinese government, rather 
than ignoring labour-market informality, needs to move towards formalising the labour 
market,(as ‘regulating the informal market’ seems a contradiction in terms). In areas where 
the informal labour market persists, the government should ensure that there is more effective 
and legally enforceable regulation of this labour market. Such a system would aim to reduce 
the informal job market by forcing firms to abide by the legal regulations and would provide 
universal protection in that it would establish basic employment rights for all citizens. The 
problems of informal workers do not end with employment protection, however, and it is 
clear that wider social policy reform is needed to bring the massive number of informal 
workers in China under the social protection umbrella.  
 
Considering the special case of rural migrant workers, it is clear that the household 
registration system is a significant barrier to the ability of rural migrants to access China’s 
social security system and to receive equal treatment to their urban counterparts. The very fact 
that their official residence is recorded as being in a rural area means that they are eligible for 
lower benefit support rates than urban workers in a similar position and are largely ineligible 
for urban social housing support. Furthermore, the fact that they are entitled to draw benefits 
only from their place of origin precludes many migrant workers from accessing the social 
welfare system entirely. When these factors are coupled with their status as informal workers 
who are excluded from social insurance contributions, the situation for rural migrant workers 
is extremely hazardous in terms of living security. Moreover, it should be noted that the very 
term ‘rural migrant worker’ is in some ways misleading as those who fall under this term are 
not a homogeneous group and are marked by a degree of complexity: while some of them 
undoubtedly constitute a floating, transient population, others may remain in the same city 
over a considerable time or even permanently. It seems clear, therefore, that the household 
registration system in its current form acts as a barrier to the provision of income and housing 
support to rural migrants and discriminates against them. This is not to say, however, that the 
household registration system should be dispensed with completely. The Chinese government 
could learn lessons from the UK experience of National Insurance and employ the databases 
that the household registration system uses as a basis for a system that creates a ‘personal 
account’. This could record each person’s insurance contributions, assesses their need and 
determine their eligibility for support. In such a way, the household registration system might 
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serve as the basis for a regulated formal social security system and could be a key element in 
helping income and housing social policies achieve universal coverage. In the interviews, Ms 
B, from Ministry Civil Affair Office in Beijing and Ms Z from the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security in Beijing, both strongly agreed that the household registration 
system is a major barrier to economic security development, and they suggest and expect the 
state should set up a ‘personal account’ which could provide sufficient information to help 
implement social policies such as MSLS.  
 
One concern about granting income and housing security to rural migrants is that it might 
attract more migrants to the cities. Indeed, the resources and administrative capacities of city 
planners are already under strain due to increasing rural-urban migration. Therefore, there will 
inevitably be a trade-off between rural migrant workers and local workers as regards income 
and housing support. The local government should therefore consider encouraging greater 
integration by incorporating the areas currently deemed city rural areas into the city planning 
areas. Since the government has already chosen such places as the sites for social housing, 
city planners should focus on improving public services in order to draw these areas and the 
city closer together. Such integration would increase the city’s capacity for housing support, 
which would reduce the shortage of available accommodation in the city. 
 
Finally, the issue of whether the Chinese welfare state should seek to adopt a universal or 
targeted coverage system is a more problematic question. Esping-Andersen (1999, pp.73–80) 
argues that a welfare regime should be considered not only in terms of the government’s 
welfare provision, but also as a complex whole involving the systematic functions of the state, 
the market and the household. This more complex view of welfare provision should be taken 
into account when analysing the form that a welfare regime takes. A well-organised welfare 
system should satisfy everyone’s needs and protect all citizens, and a specific welfare regime 
can be of a mixed type that aims to meet the specific requirements of a particular country. A 
crucial argument in favour of a universal welfare policy is that, by aiming to provide 
economic and social security for the entire population, it does not place the security rights of 
privileged groups above those of less privileged groups; equally, it guarantees people’s right 
to access welfare provisions when necessary, even if they belong to the more privileged group. 
There is a complex mechanism by which this occurs, and it is a political legitimation 
mechanism as much as anything else. Korpi and Palme (1998) argue that an inclusive model 
that also gives substantial benefits to the middle class actually helps the poor on the whole 
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(even if the middle class receives more money than this group) because as it legitimises more 
public spending on welfare services in general, the effect is to also raise the level of public 
support for the poor. Korpi and Palme term this effect the ‘distribution paradox’. This 
legitimation mechanism may not be evident in China given the lack of a western-style 
democratic system, but it is important to consider that the universalism espoused by many 
scholars in fact includes this aspect (i.e. including the middle class paradoxically helps the 
poor). Perhaps as China gradually starts to include different social classes within the same 
social security system, a sense of a common identification will then develop, even though 
China is not a Western democracy. If this occurs, people in one social strata will likely be 
more willing for other groups to receive public assistance because they can envision 
themselves one day being in that situation. The example of a pension system is pertinent here: 
young people do not mind paying into the pension system if they know that when they are old 
they will also receive benefits from the pension system.  
I believe that such an approach will lead to a mixed welfare system that combines the 
advantages of both universal and targeted welfare systems, with the aim of providing 
effective policies that ensure a sufficient level of support that provides security for all. Clearly, 
assessing the potential benefits of the proposed approach is beyond the scope of this study, 
and further research is therefore necessary. Regardless of the approach that the Chinese 
government ultimately adopts, it is clear that those living in hopeless or dangerous situations 
not only require a compassionate response from society in general, but also the establishment 
of an efficient welfare state founded on effective social security policies that provide 
protection for every citizen.  
9.5	  Conclusion	  	  
 
As the world’s largest emerging economy, the Chinese experience has significant 
implications for the study of welfare states in other countries, especially those countries that 
have undergone a transformational change in economic regime (i.e. communism to capitalism) 
and those that have strong centralised states. Such countries face particular challenges, and to 
understand the complex nature of these challenges more fully, it is necessary to explore the 
experiences of countries facing similar problems. 
 
It is clear that the very nature of social welfare policy, which is complex and dynamic, 
precludes the researcher from conducting a superficial analysis and proposing simplistic 
policy recommendations. This complexity has meant that I have not been able to analyse 
254	  	  
every Chinese social policy or every aspect of the policies examined. What I have covered, 
however, reveals that a distinct complexity lies at the heart of the Chinese welfare state and its 
social welfare policy. The complexity comes from China’s huge population, overcrowded 
labour market and complex political and economic systems. This means that although the 
existing welfare literature is useful insofar as it explains some aspects of the worldwide social 
welfare experience, it cannot explain everything that is happening in the current globalised 
welfare policy environment. Clearly, China is a unique case, not only owing to its large 
population, but also due to its distinct economic system, political system and history of 
development. Since China’s initial economic reforms, the country has put much more effort 
into supporting its GDP growth, and while economic development has increased significantly, 
the development of China’s social welfare system has lagged behind.  
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Appendix	  A	  	  
 Interview	  Consent	  form	  This	  form	  is	  for	  you	  to	  state	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  agree	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  study	  and	  understandp	  what	  it	  entails.	  Please	  read	  and	  answer	  every	  question.	  If	  there	  is	  anything	  you	  do	  not	  understand	  or	  if	  you	  want	  more	  information,	  please	  ask	  the	  researchers.	  
这个表格是关于您是否同意参加这个学术调查，请回答所有问题，如果有哪里不明白请问研究调查者 
研究学者名字 Researcher(s):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dongqing	  Yang	   	  
联系电话 Contact	  details:	   	   008615901039771	   	  
	  
Research	  Project:	   	   	  
您是否明白论文的内容信息	  Have	  you	  read	  and	  understood	  the	  information	  leaflet	  about	  the	  study?	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您是否有机会提问关于这个论文的问题	  Have	  you	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  questions	  about	  the	  study?	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您是否明白你提供的信息会被妥善秘密的保管	  Do	  you	  understand	  that	  the	  information	  you	  provide	  will	  be	  held	  in	  	   	  confidence	  by	  the	  research	  team?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您可以选择匿名，你愿意匿名作答么 You	  may	  request	  that	  any	  information	  you	  provide	  be	  anonymised.	  Would	  you	  like	  to	  request	  anonymity?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您是否明白您在论文发表前任何时候都可以选择放弃和撤销您提供的信息	  Do	  you	  understand	  that	  you	  may	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study	  at	  any	  time	  and	  for	  any	  reason,	  and	  have	  your	  data	  withdrawn	  up	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  research	  is	  published?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您是否明白如果有任何疑在任何时间都可以联系此研究学者	  Do	  you	  understand	  that	  you	  may	  contact	  the	  researchers	  at	  any	  time	  if	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  or	  concerns?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您是否明白您提供的信息可能被用在将来的学术研究中	  Do	  you	  understand	  that	  the	  information	  you	  provide	  may	  be	  used	  in	  future	  research?	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您愿意参加这个学术调查或访问么？	  Do	  you	  agree	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  study?	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
如果愿意，您同意你的信息将被录音么？	  If	  yes,	  do	  you	  agree	  to	  your	  interview	  being	  recorded	  	  
Note:	  you	  may	  take	  part	  in	  the	  study	  without	  agreeing	  to	  this	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
在论文中，您的个人观点可能会被采纳，您是否同意	  Are	  you	  happy	  for	  quotes	  provided	  on-­‐the-­‐record	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  you	  as	  an	  individual?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	  
您是否明白这个调查会被公开发表 Do	  you	  understand	  that	  the	  research	  will	  be	  used	  in	  presentations	  and	  publications?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  是	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
否	  Yes	  r	   No	  r	  	   	   	   	   	  
您的名字 Your	  name	  (in	  BLOCK	  letters):	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您的签名 Your	  signature:	  ________________________________________________________________	  	  
研究学者名字和签名 Interviewer’s	  name	  and	  signature:	  _________________________________________________	  	  
日期 Date:	  _________________________________________________________________________	  	  This	  form	  will	  be	  held	  by	  the	  research	  team	  and	  a	  copy	  given	  to	  you	  or	  sent	  to	  you	  by	  post.	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Appendix	  B	  
PROJECT	  INFORMATION	  SHEET	  	  
	  
Economic	  security	  in	  China	  
	  
Information	  Sheet	  for	  Participants	  The	  research	  I	  am	  carrying	  out	  is	  for	  a	  dissertation	  that	  I	  have	  to	  complete	  as	  part	  of	  my	  Phd	  degree	  in	  Politics	  Economics	  and	  Philosophy	  at	  the	  University	  of	  York.	  My	  dissertation	  supervisor	  is	  Louise	  Haagh	  	  	  
Brief	  outline	  of	  project	  	  In	  China,	  the	  neo-­‐liberalization	  has	  generated	  rapid	  economic	  insecurity	  in	  last	  three	  decades.	  The	  changing	  nature	  of	  economic	  system	  from	  state	  caring	  institution	  to	  market	  economic	  led	  to	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  informal	  workers,	  unsupported	  poor	  people,	  unemployed	  workers	  and	  migrants	  suffering	  from	  poverty	  and	  economic	  insecurity.	  The	  problems	  in	  living	  and	  working	  conditions	  of	  insecurity	  have	  increased	  significantly	  in	  recent	  years.	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  examine	  and	  measure	  economic	  security	  in	  terms	  of	  income	  security	  and	  housing	  security	  in	  China.	  This	  thesis	  asks	  how	  far	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  neo-­‐liberalization	  has	  generated	  rapid	  economic	  insecurity	  in	  China	  in	  recent	  years,	  why	  the	  state	  has	  adopted	  the	  economic	  security	  policies	  it	  has,	  and	  how	  far	  these	  are	  adequate.	  
What	  will	  I	  be	  asked	  to	  do?	  The	  interviewee	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  undertake	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  interview	  of	  approximately	  30	  to	  one	  hour	  with	  the	  researcher.	  The	  interviewee	  will	  be	  asked	  that	  their	  voice	  will	  be	  recorded	  by	  flash	  driver/recorder.	  And	  also	  a	  broad	  indication	  will	  be	  given	  of	  what	  the	  focus/purpose	  of	  the	  interview	  will	  be.	  
	  
Do	  I	  have	  to	  take	  part?	  
If	  you	  decide	  not	  to	  take	  part,	  that’s	  OK.	  	  If	  you	  do	  decide	  to	  take	  part	  and	  later	  change	  your	  mind,	  you	  can	  withdraw	  at	  any	  time.	  	  You	  do	  not	  have	  to	  give	  a	  reason.	  	  Should	  you	  withdraw,	  any	  information	  that	  you	  have	  provided	  will	  be	  destroyed.	  	  
	  
What	  will	  happen	  to	  the	  information?	  	  Interviews	  will	  be	  recorded	  and	  transcribed	  by	  the	  researcher.	  	  All	  participants	  have	  the	  option	  to	  indicate,	  either	  on	  the	  consent	  form	  or	  in	  verbal	  or	  written	  communications	  with	  the	  PI,	  whether	  they	  wish	  the	  data	  they	  provide	  to	  be	  anonymized.	  Quotes	  from	  the	  data	  will	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  specific	  individuals	  unless	  express	  permission	  has	  been	  given	  via	  a	  participant’s	  informed	  consent	  form.	  If	  you	  feel	  uncomfortable	  answering	  any	  specific	  questions,	  please	  abstain	  from	  answering	  and	  inform	  the	  researcher.	  	  	  Data	  will	  be	  stored	  securely	  on	  the	  University	  of	  York’s	  central	  data	  storage	  system	  and	  will	  be	  available	  only	  to	  the	  PI	  and	  RA	  (where	  appropriate).	  The	  storage	  and	  use	  of	  this	  data	  is	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  UK’s	  Data	  Protection	  Act	  of	  1998.	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The	  thesis	  will	  be	  seen	  only	  by	  my	  academic	  supervisor	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Politics	  and	  its	  external	  examiner.	  The	  thesis	  will/will	  not	  include	  interview	  transcripts.	  	  
Is	  there	  any	  ‘risks’	  of	  the	  research	  to	  the	  participant?	  No,	  there	  are	  not	  any	  identified	  risks	  to	  the	  participant.	  If	  any	  participant	  feels	  uncomfortable,	  they	  can	  choose	  anonymity	  or	  withdraw	  their	  words.	  	  In	  academic	  level,	  the	  research	  questions	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  security	  academic	  theories	  and	  the	  academic	  participants’	  view	  or	  experiences.	  There	  is	  no	  risk	  to	  them.	  	  	  In	  government	  level,	  the	  research	  questions	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  current	  social	  security	  policies.	  The	  participants	  in	  this	  area	  are	  the	  government’s	  representatives,	  so	  their	  views	  would	  be	  the	  government’s	  views.	  So	  there	  are	  no	  potential	  risks	  to	  them,	  because	  they	  are	  from	  the	  governments	  and	  represent	  the	  governments.	  	  	  In	  recipient	  level,	  the	  research	  questions	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  participants’	  own	  experiences	  and	  situations.	  In	  this	  level,	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  come	  from	  the	  lower	  income	  level	  of	  the	  whole	  society,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  any	  complain	  from	  them,	  the	  government	  might	  help	  them	  from	  this.	  So	  there	  are	  not	  any	  risks	  but	  benefits	  to	  them.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  research	  interview	  is	  only	  for	  my	  academic	  Phd	  paper,	  and	  research	  questions	  are	  focused	  on	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  security	  policies	  and	  participant’s	  experiences,	  there	  is	  no	  conflict	  with	  government	  and	  law.	  The	  participants	  would	  be	  safe	  in	  my	  research	  interview.	  	  	  	  
Is	  there	  any	  	  ‘benefits’	  of	  the	  research	  to	  the	  participant?	  The	  potential	  benefits	  to	  the	  participants	  are	  that	  the	  local	  government	  or	  sate	  economic	  security	  policy	  makers	  might	  be	  taking	  more	  care	  on	  participants’	  living	  security	  and	  well	  being.	  	  	  
How	  the	  findings	  will	  be	  disseminated?	  The	  research	  data	  will	  be	  only	  refer	  to	  my	  Phd	  papers,	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  use	  this	  on	  other	  article	  papers.	  	  The	  researcher’s	  supervisor	  can	  be	  contacted	  at	  the	  address	  below:	  Name:	  Louise	  Haagh	  	  Address:	  Department	  of	  Politics,	  University	  of	  York,	  York	  YO10	  5DD,	  UK	  Tel:	  01904323549	  	  The	  researcher	  can	  be	  contacted	  at	  the	  address	  below:	  	  Name:	  Dongqing	  Yang	  (Andy)	  	  Address:	  School	  of	  PEP	  University	  of	  York,	  Heslington,	  York,	  YO10	  5DD,	  UK Email:	  dy505@york.ac.uk	  Tel:	  00447891781552(UK)	  /	  008615901039771(CHINA)	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Appendix	  C	  
	  
	  
Questionnaire	  1.	  性别：	  	  	  	  	  	  男	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  女	  	  	  	  	  Gender	  :	  	  Male	  	  	  	  Female	  	  2.	  年龄: 18－25     26－30     31－40     41－50     51－60     60以上 
     Age: 18－25     26－30     31－40     41－50     51－60     Over 60 
 
3. 一家几口人？How many people in your household? 
    1) 1 
    2) 2-3 
    3) 4-5 
    4) Over 5 
 
4. 户籍：             城市           农村 
    Residence:       Urban         Rural 
 
5. 是否外来人口：      是      不是 
    Migrant:                   Yes       No 
    如果是， 请问你是从哪里来得? 什么原因你来到这里 
    If yes, where are you come from? What reasons make you here? 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  6.	  你在这里生活了多久？	  	  	  	  	  How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  living	  here?	  	  	  	  1)	  1年	  	  (1	  Year)	  	  	  	  2)	  2-­‐5	  年	  	  (2-­‐5	  Years)	  	  	  	  3)	  6-­‐9	  年	  	  (6-­‐9	  Years)	  	  	  	  4)	  10	  年或者 10年以上	  	  (	  10	  years	  or	  more)	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  7.	  你有没有孩子跟你一起住？	  	  	  	  	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  children	  currently	  living	  at	  home	  with	  you?	  	  	  	  	  1)	  是	  yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  有几个孩子：	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  孩子年龄：	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Number	  of	  children	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Age	  of	  children:	  	  	  	  	  2)	  没有	  	  no	  	  8.	  你完成的最高学历是什么？	  	  	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  education	  that	  you	  have	  completed?	  1) 小学或者初中 Junior	  middle	  school	  or	  lower	  2) 高中或者中专 High	  school	  or	  equivalent	  	  3) 大学本科 Undergraduate	  university	  4) 研究生以上学历 Postgraduate	  university	  
受过大学多少年的教育 Number	  of	  years	  in	  education_____________________	  	  9.	  工作情况 Employment	  status	  1) 政府 Government	  2) 国有企业 State	  owned	  company	  3) 私有企业 Private	  company	  4) 外国企业 Foreign	  company	  5) 合资企业 Joint	  venture	  6) 个体 Self-­‐employed	  7) 无业 Unemployed	  	  
其他 Other_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  10.	  你的月收入是多少？	  How	  much	  money	  do	  you	  make	  per	  month	  on	  your	  current	  job?	  1) 499元或者以下 499	  Yuan	  or	  Less	  2) 500-­‐999	  元 500-­‐999	  Yuan	  	  3) 1000-­‐1499	  元 1000-­‐1499	  Yuan	  4) 1500-­‐2999	  元 1500-­‐2999	  Yuan	  5) 3000元或者 3000以上 3000	  Yuan	  or	  More	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  11.	  你相信你能支付你的生活费用么？Can	  you	  believe	  you	  are	  able	  to	  handle	  your	  own	  finances	  and	  to	  pay	  bills?	  	  1)	  非常确信 Very	  well	  2)	  确信Well	  3)	  差不多 Fair	  4)	  不确信 Poor	  5)	  非常不确信 Very	  poor	  
为什么你认为你会是这个状况Why	  do	  you	  think	  you	  are	  in	  this	  position:	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  12.	  你申请过社会保障补助么？Have	  you	  ever	  applied	  for	  your	  social	  security	  benefits?	  1)	  是的，申请过	  Yes	  2)	  不是，没申请过 No	  
如果申请过，请说明为什么申请，申请的是什么方面的补助？Please	  specifies	  the	  reason	  for	  applying	  and	  which	  security	  benefits	  you	  have	  applied: 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
262	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
13. 你的申请被拒绝或者曾经被拒绝过么？The time you applied for the social security 
benefits, was your application denied by the authority? 
1) 是的，拒绝过 Yes 
2) 没拒绝过 No 
如果决绝请说明为什么，如果没拒绝，请说明多久拿到了补助Mention the reason of 
denial: __________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	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_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  14.	  是否申请过最低保障补助 Have	  you	  obtained	  any	  support	  from	  MSLS	  ?	  	  1) 是的，以前申请过 Yes	  (in	  the	  past)	  2) 是的，正在申请 Yes	  (at	  the	  present)	  3) 没有申请过 No	  	  
请说明原因 
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	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15.	  你从低保每个月得到多少补助 How	  much	  did	  you	  received	  from	  MSLS	  per	  month?	  	  1) 100元，或者以下	  2) 100-­‐299元	  100-­‐299yuan	  3) 300-­‐499元 300-­‐499yuan	  4) 500-­‐699	  元 500-­‐699yuan	  5) 700-­‐999元	  700-­‐999yuan	  6) 1000元或者 1000元以上 1000yuan	  or	  more	  
你得到的补助是多久的 For	  how	  long	  did	  you	  receive	  the	  benefit:	  	  
开始日期：____________                       截止日期_____________________	  	  From____________                               Until_____________________	  	  16.	  你如何评价低保政策的补助在？How	  do	  you	  rate	  the	  MSLS	  benefits	  level,	  is	  that	  higher	  enough?	  	  1) 非常好 Outstanding	  2) 很好 Effective	  3) 好 Good	  4) 不怎么好 Not	  enough	  5) 差	  bad	  6) 非常差	  very	  bad	  	  17.	  你在担心支付不起家人或者自己的基本医疗费用么？(0代表一点也不担心，10代
表非常担心)	  Are	  you	  suffering	  pressure	  on	  medical	  fees?	  (	  0:	  No	  pressure	  at	  all.	  10:	  Much	  pressure.)	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  
 
为什么你会这么认为，请距离说明？How	  are	  you	  feeling	  such	  pressure,	  make	  some	  examples?_____________________	  
 
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	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_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  18.	  1你认为你现在的生活条件好么?（0代表很差，10代表很好）How	  are	  you	  feeling	  about	  your	  current	  living	  conditions?	  (0:	  Very	  Bad	  -­‐-­‐	  10:	  Very	  Good)	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  为什么你会选择这个位置？Why	  do	  you	  think	  you	  are	  in	  this	  position	  ?	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	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______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  18.2	  	  请排列以下哪项你认为对你的生活最有影响？Please	  rank	  the	  most	  important	  problem	  to	  your	  living	  condition	  	  1)	  周围环境拥挤，地方狭小 Crowded	  	  2)	  离工作的地点远 Remote	  from	  work	  	  	  3)	  离基础服务设施远（例如医院，超市和学校等）Remote	  from	  services	  	  	  4)	  租金贵 Rent	  is	  high	  	  	  5)	  房屋合同没有保障 Contract	  is	  insecure	  
请按先后顺序排列（你认为最重要的排第一个）Rank it in order: 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
为什么你会有这样的排列	  Why	  are	  you	  ranking	  this	  way?	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	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_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  
 
_______________________________________________________________	  	  	  19.	  你参加过任何社会保险么？例如失业保险，养老保险或者医疗保险 Have	  you	  anticipated	  any	  social	  insurance?	  (e.g.	  Pension,	  UI	  and	  Health	  Insurance)	  	  1) 是的，公司帮我出钱参加 Yes,	  company	  purchasing	  	  2) 是的，自己出钱参加 Yes,	  purchasing	  from	  social	  insurance	  bureau	  by	  yourself	  3) 是的，免费从政府获得	  Yes,	  free	  obtained	  from	  governments	  4) 没有任何社会保险 No	  
请列举出你参加的保险种类，并写出参加了多长时间 Please	  list	  which	  social	  insurance	  you	  have	  anticipated?	  What	  is	  the	  duration?	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	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  20.	  你认为参加社会保险的费用高么？What	  do	  you	  think	  the	  social	  insurances	  fees?	  (	  0:	  Absolutely	  acceptable	  10:	  Absolutely	  unacceptable)	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  21.	  你认为你的工作有保障么？会随时丢掉工作么？	  Do	  you	  think	  you	  might	  lose	  your	  job	  by	  any	  time?	  1) 是的，有保障 Yes	  	  2) 不，没有保障 No	  	  3) 不确定 Not	  sure	  
为什么你会这样认为？Why	  are	  you	  choosing	  this	  option?	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  22.	  如果你失去工作了，你能继续维持正常的生活么？或者生活的很好么？Are	  you	  still	  living	  well	  once	  you	  lost	  your	  job?	  	  1) 是的，我能继续生活的很好 Yes,	  I	  am	  still	  living	  well	  2) 是的，但是只是短期的 Yes,	  but	  just	  for	  a	  short	  term	  3) 不，不能生活的很好 No,	  I	  am	  not	  living	  well	  4) 不，我不能继续正常生活 No,	  I	  could	  not	  live	  	  	  
269	  	  
23.	  你认为失业保险能够支付你的生活开支么？Do	  you	  think	  the	  UI	  payment	  will	  cover	  your	  living	  costs?	  1) 是的，能支付 Yes,	  it	  will	  2) 是的，但是将将够用 Yes,	  but	  just	  enough	  3) 不，不能支付所有费用 No,	  it	  will	  not	  cover	  all	  of	  the	  costs	  4) 不，根本不够用 No,	  not	  at	  all	  	  24.	  假如你失去了收入，以下你会希望得到哪种类型的补？If	  you	  lost	  your	  income,	  which	  support	  category	  that	  you	  prefer	  to	  receive?	  	  1) 有条件的现金补助，（例如学补，房补或医补助）Conditional	  Cash	  (E.g	  Education	  cash	  transfer,	  Housing	  cash	  transfer	  or	  Medicines	  cash	  transfer)	  	  2) 无条件的现金补助 Unconditional	  cash	  3) 基本的生活补助，例如食物和水电费等 Basic	  living	  support,	  such	  as	  food	  or	  free	  utility	  bills.	  4) 物质补助，例如房子等 Material	  subsidise	  	  (Such	  as	  housing)	  	  25.	  你选择房子的最重要条件是什么？请按先后重要性顺序排列What	  is	  the	  most	  important	  condition	  for	  you	  to	  choose	  a	  house?	  Please	  rank	  the	  most	  important	  element.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1) 地理位置 Location	  2) 房屋价格 House	  price	  3) 周围环境 Environment	  4) 左邻右舍	  Neighborhoods	  	  5) 其他因素 Other________	  	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  26.	  你从政府得到过房屋补助或者帮助么？Do	  you	  receive	  any	  housing	  support	  from	  government?	  1) 是的，有得到过 Yes	  2) 不是，没有得到过 Not	  	  3) 不清楚 Not	  sure	  
如果得到过，请举例说明什么补助。	  Please	  list	  what	  kind	  of	  support	  that	  you	  have	  received.	  	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	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_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  27.	  你只否住在政府提供的保障房里？Are	  you	  living	  in	  an	  affordable	  house	  which	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  government?	  1) 是的 Yes	  2) 不是 No	  
如果是，请问住了多久？签订的时间是多久（从哪年到哪年）	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  28.	  你认为你住的地方够大么？Do	  you	  think	  the	  housing	  space	  is	  big	  enough	  for	  you?	  	  1) 是的，非常大 Yes,	  very	  big	  2) 是的，将将够住 Yes,	  just	  enough	  3) 不是，不太够用 No,	  not	  enough	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4) 不是，很小，完全不够用 No,	  very	  small	  	  	  	  29.	  你认为你现在居住的地理位置如何？（0代表很差，10代表很好）How	  are	  you	  feeling	  about	  your	  current	  home	  location?	  )(0:	  Very	  bad.	  10:	  Extreme	  well)	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  30.	  你在申请房屋补助的时候等了多久拿到的补助。How	  long	  have	  you	  waited	  to	  receive	  the	  housing	  benefits.	  1)	  一个月以内 Less	  than	  1	  month	  2)	  二到三个月 2	  to	  3	  months	  	  3)	  三到六个月 3	  to	  6	  months	  4)	  六到十二个月 6	  to	  12	  months	  5)	  十二到十八个月 12	  to	  18	  months	  6)	  十八到 24个月 18	  to	  24	  months	  7)	  两年到三年 2	  to	  3	  years	  8)	  三年以上 over	  3	  years	  	  	  31.	  你认为哪种社会保障政策是人们最需要的，或者你最需要的？According	  to	  you,	  what	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  security	  benefits	  for	  people?	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  32.	  对于目前的保障政策，您能给出一些建议吗？您认为哪种保障政策需要调整，改如
何调整？Would	  you	  like	  to	  suggest	  any	  change	  to	  make	  the	  social	  security	  benefits	  more	  accessible?	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	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______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	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______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	  	  
_______________________________________________________________	  	  
______________________________________________________________	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Appendix	  D	  
 
List of interview participants and questionnaires  
 
Title Institution Location Date  Time 
Civil servant  Ministry of 
Civil Affairs 
Office 
Beijing 18th  May 
2012 
 
3:00pm-5pm 
 
Deputy head 
of department  
Ministry of 
Human 
Resources 
and Social 
Security 
Beijing 24th August 
2012 
2:00pm-
5:00pm 
Civil servant Ministry of 
Housing and 
Urban-Rural 
Development 
Beijing 10th August 
2012 
2:30pm-
4:30pm 
A project 
leader 
International 
Labour 
Office  
 
Bangkok  6th July 
2012 
9:00am-
11:40pm 
Lecturer Renmin 
University of 
Beijing 
Beijing  16th June 
2012 
3:00pm-
5:00pm 
Vice deputy 
Mayor 
Kaiping 
District 
Government  
 
Tangshan  22nd May 
2012 
10:00am-
12:30pm 
2:30pm-
4:20pm 
Director of 
Executive 
Office 
Tangshan 
Bureau of 
Civil Affairs 
Office 
 
Tangshan 4th  May 
2012 
3:30pm-
5:30pm 
Director Tangshan 
bureau of 
housing and 
urban-rural 
development 
office 
 
Tangshan 28th  April 
2012 
2:30pm-
5:00pm 
Vice-Director Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
Bureau of 
Tangshan 
 
Tangshan 10th  May 
2012 
2:30pm-
4:00pm 
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Court Judge Lubei District 
local court 
 
Tangshan 14th  May 
2012 
5:00pm-
7:00pm 
Questionnaires  
And Employer 
interview 
Rong Chuan 
Auto 
Industrial 
Park 
Tangshan 1st,3rd , 
25th to 27th  
May 2012 
 
 
2:00pm to 
5:00pm 
 
Questionnaires  
And Employer 
interview 
YanShan Gas 
Company 
Tangshan 29th ,30th   
April 
 
2nd , 4th , 5th   
Sperptember 
2012 
11:00am 
to 3:00pm 
Questionnaires 
  
MSLS 
recipients list 
 
(2 to 4 people 
a day) 
Kaiping 
District, 
Tanghsan 
City 
23rd	  ,	  26th	  ,	  29th	  ,30th	  ,	  	  May	  and	  20th	  to	  27th	  	  July,	  2012	  	  
From	  10:00	  am	  to	  4:00pm	  
Questionnaires  Housing 
provision 
recipients list 
(4 to 6 people 
a day) 
Fengrun 
District,   
Tanghsan 
City 
5th	  ,	  6th	  ,	  8th	  	  May	  and	  8th	  ,	  9th	  ,	  10th	  	  June	  2012	  
From	  10:00	  am	  to	  4:00pm	  
Questionnaires Migrant 
workers 
Kai Fa Qu-
Longze 
Road.  
Tanghsan 
City 
13th	  to	  15th	  ,	  18th	  	  June	  2012	   10:00am	  to	  1:00pm,	  	  	  3:00pm-­‐5:00pm	  
Questionnaires Migrant 
workers 
Feng Run 
Qu-Yanshan 
Road.  
Tanghsan 
City   
10th	  to	  15th	  	  	  July	  2012	   	  1:00pm-­‐5:00pm	  
Questionnaires Migrant 
workers 
Feng Nan 
Qu-Tangxu 
Road.  
Tanghsan 
City 
7th	  ,	  9th	  ,	  20th	  	  August	  2012	   1:00pm-­‐5:00pm	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